1985 Conference on Disarmament concludes.

1985 Conference on Disarmament concludes Progress made on chemical weapons, outer space issues

Proposals to ban strike weapons in outer space and to launch a programme of international co-operation in peaceful space exploration were put before the Conference on Disarmament at its 1985 session. Also, for the first time, the Conference established a subsidiary body on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

During the second half of its two-part session (5 February-23 April, 11 June-30 August) in Geneva, the 40-member Conference arrived at "preliminary formulations' to be used as a basis for further elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. Stanislas Turbanski (Poland), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, said that negotiations on the text, although "slow and arduous', were progressing "systematically and distinguishably'.

Despite widespread agreement on the importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the Conference was again unable to establish an ad hoc committee on the subject. It also failed to establish subsidiary bodies on agenda items dealing with the prevention of nuclear war and with cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Conference did establish bodies to continue work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, on a draft convention against radiological weapons, and on effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (For a report on the first part of the 1985 session, see UN Chronicle, 1985, No. 5.)

The Conference also considered measures to improve its functioning and reaffirmed its decision to increase its membership by not more than four States. Two candidates were to be nominated by the Group of 21 neutral and non-aligned States, one by the socialist Group and one by the Western Group. Requests for membership have been received from Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon and Greece.

Conference membership now consists of the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States) and the following 35 countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romaina, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

Outer space: The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which began work on 20 June under the chairmanship of Saad Alfarargi (Egypt), was set up on 29 March to "examine, as a first step at this atage, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space'. This body also was to deal with existing issues and agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and with proposals and future initiatives in that regard.

The Ad Hoc Committee reported (CD/641) there was widespread concern at what was seen as the "extensive use' of outer space for military purposes. A number of delegations said the majority of space objects now in orbit, although not meant as weapons or weapons platforms, served military functions and constituted integral parts of weapons systems on earth.

Socialist States said the threat that the arms race would spread to outer space stemmed from the "Strategic Defence Initiative'--the United States' "Star Wars' programme--which in their view was not a research programme as claimed but a programme to develop and deploy a new class of armaments, attack space weapons.

The United States reiterated that its Strategic Defence Initiative was only a research programme to explore technologies that might someday be useful in providing a defence against nuclear ballistic missile attacks, and was consistent with all international obligations to which the United States adhered.

India emphasized that the nonaligned and neutral States had consistently opposed the development of space weapons systems by any Government. As its Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, had said: "When we criticize "Star Wars' and the Strategic ?? Initiative, it is equal for everyone, it is not just for the United States of America. We criticize it if the Europeans are doing it, or . . . the Soviet Union . . . or anybody else.'

"An arms race in outer space will undermine the prospects for arms limitation and reduction as a whole', said Mongolia, in introducing a proposal (CD/607) submitted by a group of socialist countries for an agreement prohibiting and eliminating strike weapons of any kind in space-- whether manned or unmanned, conventional, nuclear, laser or particle-beam, including space-based antimissile systems and anti-satellite systems. As a first step in that direction, they called on other States to join the Soviet Union in its unilateral moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

Some States felt the Committee should negotiate an international treaty banning all space weapons, including those directed against targets in space. A number of countries said, however, that its first priority should be to clarify ambiguities surrounding existing legal regimes in outer space. There was no agreement, for example, on the meaning of such basic terms as "peaceful purposes', "militarization' and "weapons of mass destruction'. Some delegations said, however, that those ambiguities could be resolved only through elaborating new agreements.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space was emphasized by some delegations, to give all States access to advanced space technology. The Soviet Union submitted a proposal (CD/639) for a programme of international co-operation in space exploration that would include the launching of interplanetary spacecraft; the application of space technology to such areas as biology, environmental studies and global satellite communications systems; and development of international orbital scientific space stations, with such long-range applications as the industrialization of space.

The Soviet proposal also called for convening not later than 1987 an international conference to review all aspects of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, including the possibility of setting up an international space organization. Instead of plans for "Star Wars', the Soviet Union proposed a "programme for "Star Peace' in which all States on our planet could take part.'

The Committee received a proposal to entrust satellite surveillance and reconnaissance activities to an international body that would set up data banks from which any country could obtain information relevant to its needs. Such a body could also be used to provide advance information on crisis situations, it was suggested, to enhance the United Nations crisis management role.

Some delegations stressed that, in general, all proposals on the prevention of the arms race in outer space must apply equally to all parties, be verifiable, and enhance stability and security. There was concern among others, however, that making verifiability a fundamental criterion would have the effect of "creating an insurmountable obstacle to all attempts at negotiating agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space'.

Many delegations felt there were areas of agreement on major aspects of the problem and therefore a good basis for pursuing the elaboration of an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. Others, however, said the discussion, while useful, had been "general and preliminary in nature.' All delegations welcomed the initiation of bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear arms, at the same time stressing the importance of and need for a multilateral approach.

The Committee stated it had had "a wide-ranging discussion that contributed to clarifying the complexity of a number of problems and to a better understanding of positions'. The importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space had been recognized. All efforts should be made to assure that the substantive work on the item would continue in 1986, the report concluded.

Chemical weapons: During 1985, the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons continued its priority task of elaborating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Committee forwarded preliminary formulations of various provisions to the Conference, recommending that the texts be used as a basis for further negotiations and drafting, and noting that they represented "the present stage of the process of negotiations' and were not, therefore, binding on delegations.

Reports of the Committee's three working groups and of the Chairman of the Open-Ended Consultations on prohibition of use of chemical weapons and the problem of herbicides are also to be used in the further elaboration of the convention. (Working Group A dealt with scope, definitions, nonproduction and permitted activities; Group B, with elimination of stocks and production facilities; and Group C, with questions of compliance.)

Some nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, called the chemical weapons issue the "most ripe for resolution' by the Conference. Although substantive progress in the negotiations was acknowledged, there was widespread concern that negotiations were moving too slowly. Verification remained a major sticking point, and the Committee received a number of proposals suggesting verification measures.

Another area that remained under discussion was the question of binary weapons systems--those made up of chemical compounds produced for ordinary peaceful use. The Soviet Union said the United States' decision to produce binary chemical weapons had had a negative effect on negotiations.

The United States, noting that with the Soviet Union it had agreed to ban civilian production of chemicals that could be used as supertoxic lethal chemical weapons or precursors of binary weapons, said the convention must encompass all chemical weapons, including binary weapons, and efforts should be expanded to find mutually acceptable ways to identify chemicals to be included under the convention.

Nuclear test ban: After considering the item on a nuclear test ban, the Conference was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on the subject, as no consensus could be reached on a mandate.

"Time is more than ripe for negotiations', said Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic in a paper (CD/629) proposing subjects for discussion by a subsidiary body, such as the scope of a test ban treaty, main obligations of States Parties and implementation, including means of verification.

The Group of 21 also took the view that the nuclear test ban treaty was the most urgent problem "ripe for solution' by the Conference. The continuing failure to achieve progress on the matter gave rise to serious concern, particularly in view of the vertifical and geographic proliferation of nuclear weapons, Group members indicated. There were no "insurmountable technical obstacles' to a nuclear test ban; what was needed was a political decision to relate existing knowledge to the problem.

The Group of 21 drew the Conference's attention to the Joint Declaration of the six Heads of State or Government in New Delhi on 28 January 1985, which included an appeal for an "all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban', accompanied by adequate and non-discriminatory verification measures. The socialist States shared the views expressed in the Delhi Declaration and urged a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until a comprehensive test ban treaty could be negotiated.

The Soviet Union announced its unilateral decision to stop all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 to 1 January 1986, stating that the moratorium would remain in effect as long as the United States refrained from conducting nuclear explosions. Referring to a recent invitation from the United States for Soviet experts to visit a test site in Nevada, the Soviet Union said that nuclear explosions should be stopped rather than invitations made to observe how they were conducted.

Strong support was expressed for the Soviet moratorium. Many nations stated that a similar decision by the United States would constitute an important step towards the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

The United States said a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remained its long-term objective in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent and improved verification capabilities. It doubted that moratoriums on nuclear testing were a sound basis for agreement on verifiable testing limitations, or that they would limit further growth in nuclear arsenals or contribute significantly to the confidence that sustained disarmament negotiations. It hoped the two countries could establish the basis for the verification of effective limits on underground testing.

The Group of 21 and the Group of socialist States said that existing means of verification were adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear test ban. Western delegations, however, rejected the Group of 21 view that problems or verification and compliance had been resolved.

Some Western States emphasized the importance they attached to institutional and administrative arrangements for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which met from 15 to 19 July 1985, reported (CD/616) positive preliminary results of an international experiment on the exchange of seismic date between international data centres and national facilities.

The United Kingdom said the verification problem was being made infinitely more difficult by some States' insistence on claiming exemption from the test ban for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom was ready to renounce permanently the right to conduct nuclear tests for peaceful purposes as part of a comprehensive test ban.

France said commitments on prohibiting nuclear tests should be part of the process of nuclear disarmament, and should be made first by the two countries with the biggest arsenals and which conducted the most tests. Until such conditions had been met, France would not participate in work on a nuclear test ban.

China said that once the two States with the largest arsenals had begun halting the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and substantially reduced their stocks, it would take corresponding measures.

Prevention of nuclear war: "The prevention of nuclear war is not an issue among many; it is the conditio sine qua non of all our endeavours', states the Secretary-General in his report on suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war (CD/603). The report, prepared for the Conference at the General Assembly's request (resolution 39/148P), summarizes the full range of views and proposals on the issue, and outlines bilateral and multilateral efforts in recent years to avert nuclear war.

In his conclusions, the Secretary-General affirms that the most effective guarantee against nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons under an effective system of international control. "In this context, bilateral, regional, multilateral and other approaches are all complementary and serve to reinforce each other in the final achievement of that goal', he states.

"Various measures leading towards general and complete disarmament, particularly those that would halt and reverse the arms race as a whole, should be negotiated and agreed upon at an early date', urges the Secretary-General. Among his recommendations are cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States; full implementation of existing non-proliferation instruments; strengthening of the security system provided by the United Nations Charter; establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; regional and international confidence-building measures; and intensification of multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations.

On 30 July, the Group of 21, supported by China and the group of socialist States, proposed a mendate for an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war which would have had that committee as a first step consider all proposals relevant to the subject, "including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war'. As the group of Western countries did not join in a consensus on that proposal, the Conference did not establish the subsidiary body.

Cessation of nuclear arms race: No agreement was reached on establishing a subsidiary body to deal with the item on "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'. A group of socialist countries and the Group of 21 had submitted proposals, but a group of Western countries said it was not convinced a subsidiary body would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament.

The socialist proposal (CD/523) called for a body to begin negotiations on practical measures for cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Group of 21 proposal (CD/526) called for a committee to elaborate on paragraph 50.

(Paragraph 50 calls for initiation, as a matter of high priority, of multilateral negotiations on agreements, with adequate measures of verification, on: cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems; cessation of production of all types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, and of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.)

Western countries, including the United States, United Kingdom and France, said they did not share the view that every item on the agenda was ripe for immediate negotiation. For negotiations to stand a chance, they said, the subject of the talks must be carefully defined and a precise objective agreed on. They felt that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union offered the best means for achieving progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Radiological weapons: The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was re-established on 14 March, "with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons'.

The Committee decided to take a "unitary' approach to the two major questions before it--the prohibition of rediological weapons in the "traditional' sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities--allocating equal time for the consideration of both without dividing the work of the Committee into two separate "tracks' or giving priority to either issue. It further agreed that this decision was without prejudice to the final positions of delegations on any "link' between the two questions, the appropriate manner of dealing with them, or any treaty or treaties.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the Ad Hoc Committee stated it had made a further contribution to solution of the issues entrusted to it and recommended that the Committee be re-established in 1986.

New types: The Conference also continued consideration of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The Soviet Union proposed that all Conference members pledge, in either joint or unilateral declarations, to immediately start negotiations on the prohibition of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, once it had been identified. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union said, there should be a moratorium on the practical development of any such weapon.

Western delegations said they, too, wished to prevent the emergence of any new type of weapon of destruction, but added that as far as they knew, no new weapon types had been identified since 1948, when existing weapons were classified as nuclear, lethal chemical, biological and radiological. Nor did they think the existence of any new types was imminent. The Conference's practice of holding informal meetings from time to time, with expert participation, was adequate to monitor the situation.

Security assurances: On 1 August, the Conference again established an ad hoc body to continue negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Because of time constraints, the Committee worked through informal consultations.

It reported (CD/640) to the Conference that while positions espoused by the nuclear-weapon States during previous years had not changed, an "overwhelming number' of countries, including nuclear-weapon States, stressed their "readiness to engage in a substantive dialogue on the issue'.

The Committee recommended that the Conference continue to explore ways to overcome the difficulties in negotiations on the matter and to keep the item under active consideration in 1986.

Comprehensive programme: The General Assembly has requested the Conference to submit a comprehensive programme of disarmament no later than the 1986 Assembly session. The Conference's ad hoc subsidiary body entrusted with preparing the text resumed its work on 7 March.

The Ad Hoc Committee reported (CD/634) that despite intensive efforts, only modest progress had been achieved and prospects of submitting a programme in 1985 seemed unlikely. The Committee must resume work on the programme early in 1986, in order to submit a complete draft to the Assembly later that year.

Photo: Every year the Conference on Disarmament meets in a two-part session, each part lasting about 12 weeks. The presidency of the Conference rotates monthly among each of its 40 members. Shown here at the opening session in February (from left) is: Lan T. Cromartie of the United Kingdom, outgoing President; Erik Suy, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Thomas Barthelemy, Deputy Representative of the United States; Donald Lowitz of the United States, Conference President; and Miljan Komatina, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.