1918 -- the anatomy of defeat.

For Germany, defeat was a bitter experience. For them, their army was not defeated, but stabbed in the back. In future years, they remembered well their own humiliation. The ending of the 1914-1918 war is rarely well explained. For Australians the usual explanation stops at the Australian victory at Amiens on 8 August, 1918, saying only that it led directly to the armistice in November. By what path, what mechanism, is rarely detailed. Some other stories I have heard include:

* In Greece, the British force on the Austrian(!) border made a breakthrough, and got into the valleys draining to the Danube. This explanation used such phrases as, `This was the beginning of the end.' and `Austria sought a separate peace.' Greece proved to be called the Salonika front, and it was on the Bulgarian, not Austrian, border. It was interesting in its own right, but only marginally relevant to our present purpose. One person I mentioned this tale to replied `Yes, that would be General McDonald. He was on the outer with the establishment at the War Office. That's why he was relegated to that front.'

* Another explanation was that `The German People had had enough -- they didn't want to fight any longer.' This came from a German who was born in 1923.

* Then there was an article by Prior and Wilson that purported to show that England's liberal government under Lloyd George restricted the flow of reinforcements to the front. This in turn forced a higher ratio of artillery fire to assault troops. This is how the liberal English government beat the autocratic German political system. That seemed sillier than most.

It turns out that all of these tales have some validity, they each played some part in the collapse. In fact, there was a sequence of small problem events somewhere in the system, occasional at first, then ever more frequently until the final crash. Because a great number of the individual failures had their roots in 1917 and earlier, it is necessary to review some of the developments during that year.

We tend to use the word `Armistice' mostly to indicate the end of the war with Germany in November 1918. In fact, it has a general meaning, and I find I have had to refer to no less than five different armistices. Context makes it clear which is which.

The Position at the end of 1916

Germany had two major allies, Austria and Turkey. She also had an interest in Bulgaria. Turkey has very little direct relevance to the present study, but there were two German divisions tied up in Turkish territory, and therefore not available to the western front. Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria were fighting on a total of six fronts. In clockwise order they were:

1. The Eastern Front, against Russia. Responsibility was shared, Germany being responsible for the northern part, Austria for the south. Romania, as mentioned below was by then included as an occupied state. Germany seems to have had 95 divisions tied up in the east.

2. The Mesopotamian front, largely Turkish responsibility, but with one German division involved. They faced Russian troops to the north and British to the south.

3. The Palestine front also tied up a German division. It seems to have been a fairly inactive front until mid 1917, when General Allenby was appointed to the command. When he advanced through Palestine and Syria, the Germans transferred the division from Mesopotamia, thus heavily involving both German divisions.

4. The Salonika front. The Bulgarian army faced British, French, and presumably Greek troops, grouped together under the grandiose title of "Army of the Orient". It was regarded as a very low priority on both sides, but the Germans had one division there, and were also subsidising the Bulgarians.

5. The Italian front. For this front, Austria was responsible for the Central Powers, Italy for the allies. However, six English divisions were transferred to that front in late 1917, and two or three German divisions were sent `to stiffen the Austrians.' Ever since the time of Bismarck, the Germans had an underlying contempt for the Austrian army.

6. The Western Front, the action at which seems so important to us. It ran from the corner of Belgium, where a Belgian army of six divisions was fighting, to the corner with Switzerland. The north western end was the British responsibility, and the south east, French, with a small space within the French front assigned to Americans, who in 1917 were just beginning to build up numbers. One oddity is that, until the end of 1917, the British and French armies were fighting independently, although with fairly good working agreement between Generals Haig and Petain, if not between governments and people generally. Haig would not accept a French Supreme Commander.

Toward the end of 1917, Petain lost his nerve and transferred troops contrary to agreement, and Haig withdrew his objection to a unified command, provided it was not under Petain. This led to the development of a Supreme Command, with General Foch as Fieldmarshal and Supreme Commander. It became effective early in March 1918.

Romania

Up to 1916, Romania had not yet been involved in the war. It was a relatively recent nation, developed on an ethnic basis. Its oilfields had been developed with German money, and naturally supplied Germany's war effort. But in 1916, the Russians on Romania's eastern border were doing fairly well, and Romania saw its future as associated with them as fellow Slavs (and Orthodox Christians). It did have some problems with its western neighbour, and therefore declared war on Austria. The German army, on its northern border, immediately invaded Romania. It was a rather messy operation because they got into mountains where local troops had a big advantage. But they eventually broke through, and over-ran the country. While this was happening, a small British team destroyed the oilfields. Although the Germans tried to restore operations, oil production in the whole of 1917 was only 30% of a normal year's production. By the end of 1917, production was back to about 80% of the pre-war level. Nevertheless it was a serious blow to Germany. Romania remained occupied territory until 1918, when a peace treaty was negotiated.

The Russian collapse

The `official' date for the Revolution was 25 October, 1917. But it was only on 7 November that Lenin ousted Kerensky, and took direct control of the whole apparatus of government. From our point of view, his key act was to seek an armistice, to which the German General Ludendorff agreed on 27 November. But the Tsar had abdicated on 5 March, and for the intervening period -- over six months -- affairs were conducted by a provisional government, headed at first by Prince Lvov. After four months Lvov was replaced by Kerensky, who is often referred to as the last prime minister of Imperial Russia, although with the Emperor gone, one may question the word `Imperial'.

In the army, all officers were, of course, sworn to the service of the Tsar, and without the Tsar, their position was somewhat uncertain. The result was that for the period between the abdication and Lenin's coup, the army carried on by its own very considerable inertia and the imperatives of the war. Decisions that would have been the prerogative of the Tsar were made by the provisional government. They were not always made to the liking of the general staff.

When, early in November, Lenin sought armistice, he spoke of peace `without reparations, without annexations,' but things were not so easy. A number of subject peoples had already put out feelers about separating from Russia. Treaty negotiations eventually started at Brest-Litovsk on 22 December, 1917. The negotiators were German Foreign Minister von Kuhlmann and the general officer commanding on the eastern front, General Hoffmann; for Austria, Foreign Minister Czernin, and for Russia, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Joffe. There was a break for Christmas, and on resumption on 8 January, 1918, Leon Trotsky appeared in place of Joffe. During the Christmas break, Livonia (now Latvia) had declared its independence on 30 December, and on 6 January, Germany recognised the new independent Finnish government of Svinhufvud. On 27 January, Estonia also declared its independence.

1918 -- The Russian Peace Treaty and its Consequences

with the Russian armistice, things were expected to immediately become easier in the east, with transfer of lots of troops to the western front. But no! Forty two divisions of troops were transferred immediately, but until the peace treaty was signed, it was necessary to keep an effective force on the eastern front. Germany had fifty three divisions, by some estimates a million troops, still tied up on that front at this critical time.

When negotiations started at Brest-Litovsk, the Russians quibbled about many details, often referring them to Moscow, eventually, in February, Germany asked quite bluntly whether they wanted a peace treaty at all. They referred this question to Moscow, too, and Moscow replied with a comment that they could start fighting again. This proved too much for the Germans, who responded by occupying Livonia, and Estonia (Lithuania was already occupied), and also the Ukraine as far as the Dnieper and Odessa, thus shifting much of the front line a long way east.

At this stage Moscow got the message, but apparently the Russian navy at Odessa didn't, because they proceeded to scuttle many of their own ships rather than hand them over, and for good measure also scuttled their largest oil tanker. So Germany went on and occupied the Crimean peninsula, and a bit beyond, including part of the Kuban. At the time, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was regarded as extremely harsh, a `robbers treaty'. From our point of view, this unscheduled occupation of territory simply overstressed the German military system further.

All of this secured for Germany the supply of wheat from the Ukraine, the coal from the Donetz basin, and perhaps tobacco from the Kuban. Ludendorff then heard that there was a British force in the oilfield at Baku, so he then despatched part of the German army further east to secure Caucasian oil. Certainly he needed it, but again it tied up troops. In any case, he was too late. It was intended to ship Ukrainian wheat and coal and Caspian oil supplies up the Danube to Ulm. When the Bulgarian army sought armistice it opened up the right bank of the Danube to French and British troops.

All this was spread over eight months of the year 1918, and constitutes background to the main action.

1918 -- The Main Event

Against this background, the German Supreme Command (OHL = Oberste Heeresleitung) clearly had its hands full. There had, in 1917, been some thoughts of a peace treaty, a `peace of understanding,' which would allow Germany some honour, and perhaps give Germany access to Belgian ports, which had always been part of the Grand Design. This peace concept was not very popular, but the Foreign Minister had kept some lines of communication open through embassies in neutral countries. The alternative was to end the war with a major offensive while they still had some superiority of troops (192 divisions, including those transferred from the eastern front, against 176 Allied), and while they still had enough oil.

The key actor was General Erich von Ludendorff. He was noted as a very thorough strategist. Although he was junior to Hindenburg, who had been made Chief of General Staff, it was he who was to decide how best to attack the allies. His official title was `First Quartermaster General'. Ludendorff occupied the winter of 1917-18 by having some 12 different possible plans of attack studied in depth. He came to the conclusion that his best option, codenamed St Michael, was to attack the British at the end of their line nearest the French. There are several suggestions as to what was in Ludendorff's mind. One was that it would drive a wedge between the British and French and perhaps reach the sea. Their assessment was that, if they defeated the British, the French would collapse, but if they attacked and defeated the French, the British would still fight on.

This was to be Ludendorff's `king hit', and he named it Kaiserschlacht, the Emperor's Battle. He divided his troops into three groups. The first he called storm troops. They were fairly lightly armed, and were to advance rapidly, by-passing any resistance points, gaining territory as quickly as possible. The second group, who had heavier arms including artillery, were called assault troops. Their role was to attack these resistance points and if possible occupy them. The third group was to clean up, secure the new fronts thus created and dig in. The attack started on 21 March, 1918, and the storm troops advanced fairly steadily until the 29th, then a bit more on 5 April. In all, they gained about 40 miles (65 km), before they ran out of steam. It was significant, but they had another 100 miles or so before they reached the sea.

Then, on 9 April they attacked the British near the Belgian border, the Battle of the Lys. Again on 27 May, this time against the French (Chemin des Dames) and later again against the French, at Montdidier on 9 June. Each was one of the winter studies, and each gained ground, but none was comparable with Operation Michael.

In June there were two other events to mention. In the first, the Kaiser held a small party on 14 June to celebrate completion of the 30th year of his reign. In it he responded to a toast by pointing out that they were involved in a war between two world systems. He described his own as a `Prusso-German-Teutonic system of justice, freedom, honour, and morality,' as against that of the enemy as `in the end, little more than worshipping the golden calf.' I mention this because in it we are seeing things through German eyes, a rare experience.

The next day, the 15th, the Germans attacked at Rheims on the French front, commencing at 4.30 am. The Kaiser was taken straight from the party to a suitable bunker to watch the opening barrage. But the attack was not a success. It gained very little ground that day. But worse befell three days later. A mixed force of French and Americans burst out of a nearby forest (Cotterets), in a flank attack, and the net result of this major German offensive was a three mile retreat to the River Vesle.

The next significant action in France was the British counter-attack at Amiens on 8 August, so well known in Australian legend. From the German point of view, of course, it was a fiasco. As soon as the Kaiser heard about it he suggested that the war should be brought to an end as soon as may be. That was on 10 August. But perhaps even more seriously, the German Army knew it was losing. From then on, both French and British made advances fairly regularly, each time gaining a few miles and pausing to regroup, resupply, and go on again.

The most serious obstacle to the British advance was called the Hindenburg Line. It was well planned, based on a canal, and it gave our troops pause, but they soon found a weakness, attacked, and broke through. This was on 29 September. After that the Kaiser said, `Well, the war is over, and not in the way we foresaw.' He added a remark that the politicians had not been very helpful. This may have been triggered by the resignation of the Chancellor, von Hertling, the day before.

German Civil Government

This brings us to a consideration of the German civil government. The Reichstag was an elected house, where the political parties were all small, usually based in part on the local interests of the former principalities that amalgamated to constitute Germany. Loyalties were fairly constant, but not quite certain. Within this there was one coterie, perhaps from several parties, called the War Aims Group, whose common purpose was victory at any price. The house also included representatives of at least five, perhaps seven, different Socialist parties in two groups, the Majority Socialists (also referred to as the Majority Bloc) who were involved in government, and the Independent Socialists, who, although in parliament, did not take part in government. They did not want to be involved because they felt that it would be to some extent bolstering up a system whose collapse they expected and very much desired. (A further group, the Spartacists, were not represented in parliament. They were entirely devoted to revolution Russian style, and their leaders, Kurt Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, were in gaol for sedition.)

In July 1918, the Foreign Minister, Baron von Kuhlmann, making a speech in the Reichstag, suggested that peace might not depend entirely on military decisions. This was enough for the War Aims people, who howled for his blood. In this they were abetted by the Socialists, all of whom thought that he should have heeded Lenin's `no reparations, no annexations' in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The two groups together were enough to bring von Kuhlman down, and he was forced to resign. His replacement was von Hinze. Then, at the end of September, the Chancellor resigned. There was a problem in nominating a successor. Eventually the choice fell on a Bavarian royal prince distantly related to the Kaiser -- Max, Prince of Baden. (He is usually referred to as either Max or Prince Max. Where von Baden is used, it is a description, not a surname, and translated as `of Baden'.)

Meanwhile, the allies kept advancing. The last battle I have noted was Le Cateau on 4 November, but by then the real action lay elsewhere. It had been left to the civilian authorities to arrange for an armistice. It was feared that, if the army sought peace, the enemy might realise how weak the army was, and demand an ignominious surrender. They thought the armistice would save face.

Negotiations

Let us go back to the Amiens debacle, on 8 August. It was followed on the German side by a military conference on 10 August at Spa, the German Supreme Headquarters. At it, a report from the Military Attache in Vienna, General Cramon, was read, to the effect that the Austrian Emperor Karl had said that they should make peace in 1918, and if they did not, he would make a separate peace. Then there was a political conference at Spa on 14th, at which the position was summarised as: We are unable from a military standpoint to break the fighting spirit of our opponents, and are forced to consider the military situation in the further conduct of our policies; diplomatic feelers with reference to an understanding with the enemy must be thrown out at the appropriate moment. Such a moment would present itself after the next success in the west; the Supreme Army Command asserts that it will be possible to maintain a footing on French territory and thereby eventually force our will upon our enemy.

This may seem to be having it both ways. It seems they expected a negotiated peace treaty on fairly favourable terms.

This conference was followed, both that day and the next, (14 and 15 August) by a conference at which the Austrian Emperor Karl and his minister Count Burian were present. The Austrians proposed to start negotiations immediately by a direct approach to the enemy. While the Germans agreed to negotiations in principle, they wanted to wait for a favourable moment, that is to say, when the German army had had a military success. They also would prefer to act through a neutral intermediary. The German Kaiser favoured negotiating through the King of Spain or the Queen of Holland. They sought an armistice, which would let them retreat to a shorter defence line, as against abject surrender. Also, they believed that they were entitled to keep Belgium, that no country would refuse them that!

That was the start of another fiasco. Each side then acted as though its views had been accepted by the other. Austria went ahead and approached Turkey and Bulgaria on the 19th, and on 21 August presented Germany with the text of a note it intended to send out, suggesting peace negotiations. The Germans were horrified, and after appeal, the Austrians agreed to hold fire for a few days. They were, of course, waiting for the German army to win another battle. It never did. This row continued for a month, each side restating its case and not listening to the other, or rather, not giving an inch. Eventually, on 14 September, Austria announced to the press that she had opened peace negotiations. It later appeared that Austria had sought to find a suitable neutral intermediary, as Germany had suggested, and failed. This episode took till the end of September.

In the mean time, on 15 September, on the Salonika front, the allied `Army of the Orient' began an offensive. German headquarters had previously directed that a further six divisions be released from the Ukraine, and sent to the west. The natural route included train travel through Bulgaria up the valley of the Danube. On 19 September they were ordered to detrain near Sophia. They were too late. The Bulgarian army was clearly overwhelmed, and on the 19th it sought an armistice. On 30 September, the Bulgarian Government signed a peace treaty. (One document from German archives suggests that the Germans were there, not so much to save a Bulgarian collapse, but to rescue the Bulgarian King Ferdinand from his own Government.)

We now go back to the story of the German armistice. On 3 October Germany, in the person of Foreign Minister von Hinze, cabled US President Woodrow Wilson, seeking conditions for peace, and suggesting the `fourteen points' of his State of the Nation address to Congress in January, 1918. These fourteen points were very idealistic, and in any case were more suitable as a basis for permanent peace rather than a basis for armistice. Wilson, perhaps flattered, took some time to reply, and his reply, received on 8 October, was rather vague and idealistic. The Germans, however, saw it as an opportunity to disengage their army and regroup and re-equip. They therefore cabled back on 12 October accepting them.

The trouble was that Wilson, in formulating his reply, had neglected to consult his allies, and when they heard about it, both the French Premier, Clemenceau, and the English Prime Minister, Lloyd George, separately advised Wilson that their countries could not conclude peace on those terms. There were other problems, too. Many German units, withdrawing through the French countryside, had inflicted wanton damage on the villages they passed through. Furthermore, on 10 October, two passenger ships had been torpedoed off the Irish coast, with the loss of over 800 civilian lives, mostly women and children. France and Britain saw these actions as barbaric, and said they refused to deal with a polity that permits such acts. They demanded a complete change of government in Germany. This, of course, played into the hands of the Socialist parties, especially the revolutionaries.

So on 14 October, Wilson passed a second note to Germany that made two points. First, Germany would deal with military authorities for details of a cease-fire, and secondly, the Allies would not deal with a government whose armed forces committed such atrocities. On this last point, however, the Germans were able to show that they had a new Chancellor, Prince Max, as well as a new Foreign Minister, von Hinze. The Navy now sent a signal to all U-boats, recalling them and forbidding further mercantile warfare. So, on the 20th, Germany sent Wilson a second reply.

Wilson's third note, received in Germany on 23 October, was brief and to the point. The terms of the armistice would not be negotiable, and Germany would be left defenceless. But there were other matters relevant to the issue. Ludendorff had attempted to dictate to Max the terms of his reply to the second note. As a result of this, and perhaps other incidents, Max told the Kaiser that there was not enough room at the helm for both Max and Ludendorff. As a result, on 26 October, the Kaiser asked Ludendorff for his resignation.

Matters now went from bad to worse. Prince Max contracted Spanish Flu, and was out of action until 3 November. During this time both Turkey and Austria signed separate armistice agreements. Bulgaria had already signed a peace treaty on 30 September, so Germany was on its own. Also, on 29 October, Admiral yon Speer ordered elements of the fleet to sea, but as soon as they sailed, the crews mutinied, and sailed back into port, some ships displaying a Communist red flag. Rebellious crews were ordered to Kiel to isolate them, but there the rebellion took further hold. By 6 November, mutiny had spread to Hamburg and Hanover.

Also, about this time the leader of the Spartacist movement, Kurt Liebknecht, who had been jailed for sedition, was released, and the Spartacists judged that it was now a good time for a full scale revolution. They first chose Monday, 4 November, and set about getting the other socialists to agree. They mounted strikes and demonstrations, and generally disrupted civil life. But they found that the 4th was too soon, and they deferred it by a week, to the 11th.

On 5 November, Wilson sent a message that the Allies had agreed to peace on the general basis of the fourteen points, and that the Allied Supreme Commander, Marshal Foch was authorised to arrange an armistice. The German government, with a revolution developing, wasted no time. On the 6th, a small group of officials travelled to German Supreme Command Headquarters at Spa, and through them arranged an immediate meeting with Foch. This was done and, at 12 noon on Thursday, 7 November, four delegates left Spa for France by car. They were Secretary of State Erzberger, (chairman and representing Prince Max), Minister Count Oberndorff, Major General von Winterfeld, and Naval Captain Vanselow. They also took Army Captain von Helldorf, an interpreter, and two secretaries.

They passed through the lines, changed to French cars, and later to a railway train, went to a small siding in the forest of Compiegne, behind the French lines towards Paris, and arrived early on Friday 8 November. They faced Marshal Foch, his deputy, General Weygand, and the British Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Sea Lord, and another admiral, George Hope. Foch left the Germans in no doubt that the terms offered were not negotiable. They included surrender of 5,000 guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 motor lorries, and also 6 battlecruisers, 10 battleships, 6 light cruisers, and 50 modern destroyers, the ships to be taken to a British port and left there with only "care and maintenance" crews on board. The armistice conditions also included a clause mentioning that reparations may be required. Provided that they signed before the deadline -- which was noon local time on Monday the 11th -- hostilities would end at that time.

The Germans had von Helldorf carry the text of these conditions back to Spa (and then send it to Berlin). There followed a wait -- anxious, not because they feared rejection, but because of the time limit set. It caused problems in Spa, where it was perceived as unrealistic. It demanded, for instance, 2,000 aeroplanes. There were only 1,700 in existence. More of a problem, if they delivered up the railway rolling stock required, food distribution within Germany would be impossible, and famine would follow.

But more was happening in Berlin. During the week, 4 to 8 November, several efforts were made to get the Kaiser to abdicate, and Prince Max announced from Spa that he had decided to do so, but in fact he did not. Eventually, on Saturday the 9th, Prince Max sought to pass the Chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the Majority Socialists. It had no legal standing, but it allowed Ebert to wear the hat when useful. As part of the Revolution, Ebert was also Chairman of the Council of Six established to co-ordinate administration. In the event, the Revolution occurred over the weekend, with Sunday the 10th, the day that the Council of Six actually took control, as the nominal date of the Revolution. But when asked to approve the terms of the Armistice that day, Ebert signed as Chancellor.

The answer was received at Compiegne at 8 pm on Sunday the 10th, accepting these conditions, but adding a rider as to the practicability of some of the demands. After conveying the comments as to practicality to the Allied team, all four Germans signed the armistice instrument, and next day, at noon local time, hostilities ended. One German record says 11.55 am. It was, of course, 11 am in London, the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, and that is the detail we were all taught. It was 9 pm in Canberra.

Epilogue 

Late on Saturday, 9 November, the Kaiser left Spa by car with a small retinue of perhaps half a dozen personal staff. The cars arrived at Eyschen, or Eijschen, on the Dutch border in the early hours of Sunday the 10th. They had some difficulty waking the Dutch border guards, but after some delay were allowed to cross the border. They then dismissed the cars, and took the next train to the railway village of Maarn, where the Kaiser phoned and sought hospitality of Count Bentinck, who lived at Amerongen, a more rural village a few miles away. Bentinck, it is said, asked, `For how many.?' `About thirty.' `Not possible," said Bentinck, and put the receiver down.

The Kaiser then re-thought the matter, and after a while rang again and sought Bentinck's help as a fellow Knight of the Order of St John. Bentinck agreed to accept him personally, and in due course his wife, who had a heart problem. Bentinck offered him a suite of four rooms in his home, Amerongen House. His staff were to find their own accommodation at the village.

On 28 November, a delegation arrived at Amerongen House from Berlin. They asked the Kaiser to sign a formal abdication, which had been prepared for him. He read it, agreed, and signed. He had little choice.

In the mean time, Ludendorff had got away from Germany by wearing a false beard and dark glasses. He went through Denmark to Sweden. He returned to Germany in 1920.

Erzberger, the man who signed the armistice document, was not so lucky. For a few months his star rose spectacularly. He became Finance Minister and Vice-Chancellor. But there was a strong swell of resentment, especially by a group called `The Disinherited of 1918.' Eventually, on 26 August 1919, in a second attempt while he was recuperating from the first, he was assassinated.

And while all this was happening in the north, in southern Bavaria at the pleasant little town of Traunstein, there was a prisoner of war camp holding Russian prisoners that the Communists were slow to repatriate. One member of the army unit guarding them was Obergefreiter Adolf Hitler.

Bibliography

Bean, C E W, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1919. Vol V. Sydney: 1938.

Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War. London: Chatto & Windus, 1977, esp pp 475 & 561. On Germany's aims in the East. Originally published in German.

Middlebrook, Martin, The Kaiser's Battle. London: Allen, Lane, 1974. On the German offensive of 21st March. Contains a great deal of background material, eg, peace feelers in 1917.

Mishark, John William, The Road to Revolution.' German Marxism and the World War, 1914-1919. Detroit, Michigan: Moira Books, 1967. This is narrative, rather than analysis, of the socialist parties from an inside point of view. Describes many socialists, including perhaps about half a dozen splinter groups unable to trust each other.

Pitt, Barrie, 1918 -- The Last Act. 1962.

Preliminary History of the Armistice. New York, 1924. In English, text of 110 official (German) documents.

Prior and Wilson, "What Manner of Victory? Reflections on the Termination of the First World War", in Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire, Vol 72 (1990) pp 70-96.

Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: 1991.

Ian D Main, ASTC, MSc, BEc is a member of the Canberra Branch of the Military Historical Society of Australia.