15-passenger vans slip through safety gap: ever since manufacturers converted them from cargo vans to people-movers, 15-passenger vans have been outside the reach of regulatory standards. But the loopholes may be closing.

Much has been written about the dangers of 15-passenger vans, (1) but these vehicles seem to have slipped through the cracks of automotive safety regulation. They are classified as neither passenger cars nor school buses, and as a result they are exempt from many federal motor-vehicle safety standards. They are also excluded from one manufacturer's own rollover-resistance testing.

One reason the vans have escaped regulation as conventional passenger vehicles is that they were originally designed to carry cargo. In the 1970s when a market for the vehicle emerged, automakers simply took the existing frame and chassis platforms and added seating, windows, and other amenities. Little testing was done to assess the handling characteristics and rollover propensity of these vehicles when they were first manufactured, and their fundamental design has changed little in the last three decades.

Following tremendous publicity surrounding several high-profile accidents involving 15-passenger vans--usually single-vehicle rollovers--the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began looking at how to correct regulatory omissions and may include the vehicle in its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), which would provide consumer-safety information related to the vans' rollover propensity.

NHTSA identified the vans' hazards in two public advisories and an accompanying research report, all of which revealed that as the vehicles were loaded with more passengers, the center of gravity changed, causing handling and stability problems. On April 9, 2001, the agency issued its first consumer advisory:

   The results of a recent analysis by NHTSA
   revealed that 15-passenger vans have it
   rollover risk that is similar to other light
   trucks and vans when carrying a few passengers.
   However, the risk of rollover
   increases dramatically as the number of
   occupants increases from fewer than 5 occupants
   to over 10 passengers.

   In fact, 15-passenger vans (with 10 or
   more passengers) had a rollover rate in single-vehicle
   crashes that is nearly three times
   the rate of those that were lightly loaded.

   NHTSA's analysis revealed that loading
   the 15-passenger van causes the center of
   gravity to shift rearward and upward,
   increasing the likelihood of rollover. This
   shift in the center of gravity will also increase
   the potential for loss of control in panic
   maneuvers. (2)

NHTSA determined that these vans respond poorly to predictable severe-steering maneuvers and account for a grossly disproportionate number of deaths in single-vehicle crashes because of their propensity to roll over. Yet, despite the 2001 advisory and another one issued a year later, NHTSA took no meaningful action. (3) The agency did nothing more than encourage operators of these vans to "understand and be familiar with [their] handling characteristics" and to make sure that occupants wear seat belts. Now, with NHTSA under political pressure, that has begun to change.

But change can't come soon enough. Despite their safety problems, the market for these large vans continues to grow. In 2001, about 500,000 registered 15-passenger vans were on the road, nearly triple the number in 1990. (4) Unfortunately, the number of deaths associated with the vans has also increased. During those years, 1,441 15-passenger vans were involved in accidents that resulted in 1,003 families. (5)

Regulatory change is urgently needed because 15-passenger vans do not fit neatly into any existing motor-vehicle category, so several important safety standards don't apply to them. The primary reason the vans are exempt from many federal standards that apply to cars, pickup trucks, and SUVs is their gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR): Most regulations apply to passenger vehicles and light trucks with a GVWR less than the vans' 9,100 pounds.

Although NHTSA has never promulgated rollover-resistance standards for any vehicle, it has issued other safety and crash standards specifically designed to protect occupants in rollovers, such as a roof-crush-resistance standard intended to "reduce deaths and injuries due to the crushing of the roof into the occupant compartment in rollover crashes." (6) This standard does not apply to 15-passenger vans, which NHTSA has determined to be among the most unstable vehicles on the road when fully loaded, and serious rollover risks.

Manufacturers are not even required to affix a warning label to the sun visor to inform drivers that the vehicles "have a higher possibility of rollover than other vehicle types and to advise them of the steps that can be taken to reduce the possibility of rollover and/or to reduce the likelihood of injury in a rollover." (7)

Surprisingly, 15-passenger vans are not classified as school buses, either, even though they fit the definition because they carry more than 10 people. (8) Yet, because legally they cannot be used to transport primary- and secondary-school children to or from school, the vans do not have to comply with school bus safety standards. (9) Unfortunately, a growing number of media reports about accidents involving the vans have shown that they are being used to carry children to extracurricular events. (10)

Nor do the vans have to comply with the safety standards lot commercial motor vehicles because, by definition, a commercial vehicle is designed to carry more than 15 passengers. (11)

The 15-passenger van has also eluded other safety checks. Ford Motor Co., the vehicles' largest producer, has exempted its van, the Econoline E-350, from its own rollover-resistance guidelines. (12) Ford's guidelines apply only to vehicles whose GVWR is less than 8,500 pounds; (13) The E-350's GVWR is 9,100 pounds. Ford's rationale is that any vehicle over 8,500 pounds is a commercial vehicle and does not need such testing--even though its 15-passenger van is designed and marketed to carry people, and even though it can be driven without a commercial driver's license.

NHTSA takes another look

After the worst motor vehicle accident in Maine's history, when 14 forestry workers were killed in a 15-passenger van rollover in September 2002, Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Me.) introduced the Passenger Van Safety Act of 2003. (14) The pending bill requires NHTSA to develop and implement a dynamic rollover test program for the vans--one that tests real-world performance--and include the vehicles in the NCAP program. The agency would also be required to test and evaluate various technological systems that may assist drivers under conditions that cause rollovers. The bill also would prohibit the sale, lease, or rental of 15-passenger vans to preprimary, primary; or secondary schools for transporting students, and would impose a significant fine on those who violate the prohibition.

Snowe's proposal focuses on the 15-passenger van but borrows language from earlier legislation aimed at NHTSA's general testing procedures. The Transportation Recall Enhancement Accountability and Documentation Act of 2000 (TREAD Act) already required the agency to develop and implement a dynamic rollover test for sport utility vehicles and light trucks and to provide the results in the NCAP consumer information program. (15) This program has published comparative data on frontal crashworthiness of new vehicles since 1979, on side crashworthiness since 1997, and on rollover resistance since January 2001. Unfortunately, this program currently does not include the 15-passenger van.

The current NCAP rollover-resistance ratings include reliance on the static-stability factor (SSF), a mathematical ratio of a vehicle's track width divided by twice the height of the vehicle's center of gravity: After receiving many proposals and public comments about the methodology for measuring rollover resistance from auto manufacturers and interested individuals and groups, including the National Academy of Sciences, NHTSA decided in November 2003 to retain the SSF measurement and combine it with the dynamic "fishhook maneuver." The predicted rollover rate from these tests will be translated into the existing five-star rating system.

The fishhook maneuver simulates a situation in which a driver steers sharply in one direction, then performs a hard steer the other way. For predictability and repeatability reasons, the test uses an automated steering controller, and the reverse-steer is timed to coincide with the maximum roll angle to create a worst-case scenario for all vehicles. The maneuver is conducted at different speeds and with different loading in the vehicles. "Rollover" is defined as tip-up of two wheels.

The tests and ratings will not be used to draft regulations, but they will provide valuable consumer information and may motivate some manufacturers to design safer vehicles.

Although NHTSA does not include the 15-passenger van in the NCAP rollover ratings, it is testing the vans to determine whether it is "appropriate to use the rollover resistance maneuvers developed for the NCAP rollover ratings program to assess the dynamic rollover resistance of 15-passenger vans." (16) The final report on whether the vans will be included in the five-star rollover ratings was expected last month hut had not yet been released at press time.

NHTSA is also conducting tests to identify rollover causes other than steering maneuvers, including analyzing tire pressure from 15-passenger vans to determine the role tires play in these crashes. (Results are expected in July 2004.) The agency is also trying to determine how loading affects tire pressure and the vehicles' handling and stability problems, and is testing the effectiveness of electronic stability-control systems on the vans as well as SUVs and light trucks. (The final report was due in February.)

Eliminating loopholes

NHTSA has begun to address some of the regulatory loopholes associated with 15-passenger vans.

Seat belts. NHTSA has issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) that would require lap-and-shoulder--also known as three-point--belts lot all seated positions in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. Currently, only the outboard seats in 15-passenger vans have three-point belts, leaving the middle-seat occupants with only a lap belt. (17) (A final rule was scheduled to be released in December.)

Roof crush. NHTSA is also planning to upgrade the roof-crush requirement of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216 and will expand it to cover 15-passenger vans. The agency's testing has shown that these vehicles would barely meet the current standard and would need stronger roofs to comply with an upgraded one.

NHTSA plans to test roof crush only for the front-seated occupants because the agency believes that it is not a significant threat to rear-seated passengers. Although NHTSA plans to examine whether roof-crush testing for occupants in the rear of the van is necessary, the agency has stated that the primary danger to back-seat passengers in a rollover crones from ejection and lack of seat-belt use. (The study was to have been completed in February, and an NPRM should be issued soon.) (18)

Warnings and education. In what is nothing more than a Band-Aid approach, NHTSA is beefing up warnings regarding the handling and stability characteristics of 15-passenger vans. When it issued its second consumer advisory about the vans in April 2002, NHTSA created a hang tag--to be distributed at Championship Auto Racing Teams (CART) races and through the agency's Web site--that provides information on the rollover risk. The tag also gives drivers tips for preventing rollover, and recommends seat-belt use for all passengers.

The agency, in cooperation with Indiana University of Pennsylvania, is also creating an educational curriculum and a driver-training program for novice teenage drivers, after it identified why the typical driver is not prepared to handle the vans:

   A majority of highly publicized crashes
   involving 15-passenger vans have involved
   inexperienced drivers for private organizations
   such as churches and YMCAs. Because
   of the infrequent use of these vehicles for
   these purposes, drivers are less likely to h ave
   taken formal training. In addition, many of
   these organizations operated programs
   with volunteers with limited budgets. (19)

Established engineering principles state that manufacturers and regulators should rely on warnings only if a defect cannot be eliminated from a product's design. Rather than focus on hang tags and videos, NHTSA should require that 15-passenger vans be made safer.

Fortunately, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, of which Snowe is a member, is considering the safety improvements outlined in the senator's proposal, including subjecting 15-passenger vans to the dynamic rollover testing mandated by the TREAD Act; requiring that all such vans with a GVWR up to 10,000 pounds meet all federal safety standards for occupant protection and cash avoidance; and requiring that they be subject to the NCAP rollover-resistance test program at various load levels.

If these proposals gain the three of law, our nation's church groups, school children, and others will travel more safely--without fear that hazards have been ignored by manufacturers and the government agency responsible for automotive safety.

Notes

(1.) See, e.g., Robert E. Ammons & Brian Augustus Beckcom, The Risky Ride of the 15-Passenger Van, TRIAL, Feb. 2003, at 18.

(2.) NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Consumer Advisory (Apr. 9, 2001), available at www.nhtsa.dot.gov (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).

(3.) NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Consumer Advisory (Apr. 15, 2002), available at www.nhtsa.dot.gov (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).

(4.) NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA Action Plan for 15-Passenger Van Safety (Sept. 2003), available at www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/15PassVans/15passvan.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).

(5.) Id. at 1.

(6.) 49 C.F.R. [section] 571.216 (S2) (2002).

(7.) Id. [section] 575.105 (a).

(8.) 49 U.S.C. [section] 30125(a) (1) (2002).

(9.) Id. [section] 30125(a) (1). For school bus safety stan

(10.) Tom McGinty & Pat Burson, Student Hurt in N.C. Van Crash Sues Church, NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 2004, available at www.newsday.com (search for "van crash") (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).

(11.) 49 U.S.C. [section] 31136(e) (2) (K) (2002). For a discussion of safety regulations that exempt 15-passenger vans, see C. TAB TURNER, PUBLIC CITIZEN, STOPPING ROLLOVERS: THE DUAL-WHEEL SOLUTION FOR 15-PASSENGER VANS (2002), available at www.citizen.org/documents/PC15PassVanReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).

(12.) Deposition testimony of Al Darold at 58-(60.) Johnson v. Ford, No. 99 C0509 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2001).

(13.) Id.

(14.) S.717, 108th Cong. (2003).

(15.) TREAD Act 49 U.S.C. [section] 30101 (2000).

(16.) NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 4, at 7.

(17.) Id. at 8.

(18.) Id. at 9.

(19.) Id. at 6.

JAMES LOWE and DENNIS MULVIHILL are partners with Lowe, Eklund, Wakefield & Multivihill in Cleveland.