101st FIST platoon in SOSO: lessons learned from CMO.

The usefulness of a fire support team (FIST) platoon does not disappear at the conclusion of high-intensity conflict. While the forward observers (FOs) no longer routinely are placing timely, accurate fires on the battlefield, the FIST has several attractive attributes for the maneuver commander in stability and support operations (SOSO). It has a high concentration of officers and NCOs, familiarity with tactics and communications, a fire support chain that extends to the highest levels of the organization, a habitual relationship with the maneuver element and the intelligence and flexibility that typifies Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F Fire Support Specialists.

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In 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry (3-327 IN), Battle Force, of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the FISTers were dedicated to the battalion's civil-military operations (CMO) at the end of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The FISTers of the 5th Platoon, Headquarters and Service Battery, 2-320 FA undertook CMO in Mosul from May 2003 to February 2004.

CMO is likely to be a common mission for FISTers in SOSO; thus, the phases of developing CMO and the lessons learned in this article are important information for FISTers deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan or other areas of the world.

CMO presents several challenges for a FIST platoon. Untrained personnel must learn critical tasks rapidly. The platoon must develop staff procedures to integrate a variety of new mission types. FISTers must balance on-going combat operations with community-building missions. CMO must include an active security plan to address residual enemy forces while keeping the organization's aggressive posture from undermining relations with the local community. In short, CMO is hard work.

CMO occurred in essentially four phases: area assessment, key leader recruitment, project creation and project integration. Each phase set the conditions for the next, and each provided unique challenges in command, staffing, planning and implementation.

Phase I: Area Assessment. As our battalion entered Mosul, it rapidly transitioned to SOSO, which includes CMO. To "get our bearings," we began assessing local institutions that could become focal points for US aid and policy directives. Initially, we focused on schools, hospitals and mosques. Due to severe fuel shortages, US forces also assumed responsibility for the distribution of propane and kerosene.

We undertook several initiatives to assess the area.

* We established a standing operating procedure (SOP) that outlined the various organizations' anticipated information requirements and the resources that will be dedicated to each. For example, will the infantry companies check religious institutions in their area of operations (AOs) or will the chaplain check all of them? This is not only more efficient, but also eliminates repeated visits to the same institution to ask the same questions, making US forces seem disorganized and ineffectual in the eyes of the local population.

Additionally, the assessment process can become a never-ending process of reassessment for more and more detail. If the command knows what information is necessary for effective decision-making in subsequent phases, as outlined in an SOP, it can avoid this trap and shift its main CMO effort at an appropriate time.

* We interacted with the local population but did not revisit institutions unless we had news the institutions needed. Once again, if one week a school asks for pens and paper and a unit drops by the next week without any supplies, the school will not appreciate the neighborliness; it will be irritated the unit came empty-handed.

* We integrated information operations (IO) into the Assessment Phase in the form of "talking points" disseminated to all leaders who have formal interactions with local institutions. Initially, these talking points addressed US efforts in areas likely to be of great concern to the Iraqis (food, water, electricity and fuels) and increased local perception that the unit is addressing community problems in a decisive and coherent manner.

Phase II: Key Leader Recruitment. As is generally the case in CMO, there was significant overlap between Phases I and II. Phase II began in late May and continued through July. Having done our initial assessments of community institutions, we began meeting with local leaders to gain their support of the US effort. In Iraq, we met with secular community leaders (called Muktars), local religious leaders, academic leaders from the university and city leaders from the newly selected Mosul City Council.

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We invited these leaders to a series of forums known internally as Operation Soul Train. Additionally, company FISTs made a concerted effort to recruit Muktars in their AORs.

* We took into account the local culture. In Iraq, the Muktars are a combination of public services hotline, notary public, phone book, postmaster and gossip columnist. However, they were not included in the battalion's initial assessments.

Once we "discovered" Muktars, we had an additional intelligence source that had broad knowledge of the community, a source of local legitimacy for searches of suspects' houses and a convenient neighborhood liaison. At the same time, we also learned that community leaders may have links to the old regime and, therefore, should be approached with caution.

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It is likely that every society will have an idiosyncratic institution that may be of some value to occupying forces. It is up to battalion and company-level leaders to make contact with these individuals and use them to achieve their CMO mission.

* We recruited key leaders on a one-on-one basis. While some local leaders are suspect, others can be extremely valuable allies. A relationship built over time can be translated into concrete intelligence benefits.

For example, in one instance a Muktar, yielded the name and location of a former regime loyalist plotting sniper attacks on Coalition Forces. In another, a Muktar went with US forces to confirm the location of the home of a former regime loyalist. In both cases, a previously established working relationship made these actions possible. Thus, recruiting assets in targeted areas can yield significant results.

* We avoided repeated mass meetings if initial results are unpromising. There is a distinct possibility that these meetings will become forums for airing grievances that yield neither goodwill nor progress. Even acknowledged enemies of the US will show up for a good meal and a chance to try make the US leadership look bad.

Additionally, preparing facilities for a mass meeting, distributing invitations and tasking battalion leaders for the evening are resource-intensive activities. Attempt a mass meeting, but unless some identifiable benefit is apparent early on, beware of being trapped into a recurring high-effort, low-yield activity.

Phase III: Project Creation. In June, the 101st Division made funds available at the brigade level for projects designed to improve the quality of life in the local communities. The 502d Infantry Brigade, to which 3-327 IN was attached, then allowed the battalions to submit projects to the brigade for funding. The battalion created some projects of its own, but it also tasked its companies to produce projects for their sectors.

We considered several things when initiating a project.

* We focused on high-payoff projects, regardless of cost. The ideal project for local communities would make their lives significantly better and cost next to nothing (e.g., digging a culvert that drains a local swamp). However, these projects are few and far between.

Thus, the battalion was pulled in two directions; a low-cost "quick fix" that treats the "symptoms" but not the "disease" (e.g., sending trucks to eliminate a local cesspool) or high-cost systemic fixes (e.g., rebuilding the neighbor-hood sewage network). In our experience, a two-pronged approach is best. Initially, we used the quick fix to alleviate some of the worst problems that had built up over months. Next, rather than continue the quick fixes indefinitely, we followed up with a systemic fix that prevented the problem from reoccurring. This alleviated both current suffering and avoided future problems.

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* We established an asset under battalion control to create and monitor projects. Company commanders inevitably sought to distinguish themselves from their peers, and the easiest measure to compete in CMO is the number and cost of projects. Unfortunately, this may result in the proliferation of easy to manage quick fixes at the expense of the development of the more time-consuming systemic fixes.

A battalion asset that did the actual contracting avoided this issue and encouraged company commanders to focus on the security and well being of their sectors, regardless of the projects that resulted from their assessments.

* When possible, we allowed the local government to award and administer contracts. This was an excellent way to build institutions, reduce the battalion's work load and find contractors to do the work. We found the best way was to establish a contract for a project with the relevant government agency and allow the agency to take care of the project's implementation.

The implied tasks are that either the battalion or some higher headquarters checks the accounting of the funds and spot-checks the work being done.

Phase IV: Project Integration. In September, the brigade began transitioning away from the use of US-controlled funds to let contracts. The brigade began receiving smaller payouts to distribute to the battalions.

At the same time, the Mosul government agencies received their operating and capital budgets from the central Iraqi agencies. Thus, it became imperative that the battalion develop a way to ensure that local communities received the services they needed from their government. This necessitated the creation of Task Force 95 (TF 95).

In TF 95, the battalion's FISTers reconsolidated into a single FIST platoon of subject matter experts (SMEs) who became proficient in working with the broad range of agencies that dealt in providing public services. Instead of helping formulate and supervise projects at the company level, the companies submitted their needs to the battalion staff, which then prioritized the requirements for the FISTers to work with the agencies to implement them.

To facilitate this process, we undertook several initiatives.

* We developed an IO plan that enabled untrained Soldiers to understand how to build a network with external agencies. The Soldiers and NCOs of the US Army are without parallel. However, it's foolish for leaders to assume they naturally will understand the tasks inherent in becoming CMO SMEs.

SMEs need an easy format to fill in the points of contact (POCs) for all the agencies they discover, so the POCs can link up with the known agencies early on and monitor their progress with a tracker they can update daily. This enables Soldiers to achieve success.

* We used liaison meetings as an opportunity to ensure the community development vision was embedded in each agency's capital budget. If unit funds are limited, creative leaders must go elsewhere in search of funds. One way is to be an advocate on behalf of local residents in meetings with their government agencies.

These meetings also may yield some unpleasant truths about where the AO stands in the priority for funding and repairs. However, being able to explain to local residents that there is a plan and that they will get services eventually will go a long way toward winning their trust.

* We disseminated contact information to local citizens to facilitate the eventual transition of US forces out of the AO. Nobody wanted us to be an occupying force in perpetuity, but before the US can leave, it must ensure the local community can succeed on its own.

To create a sense of self-sufficiency, Soldiers began referring residents who cited problems directly to the relevant government agencies and the city council members. This acquainted them with democracy and forced the officials to "own the problem," rather than push it onto the US Soldiers. The intended result was for the Coalition to leave behind a community that registered its own complaints, allocated its own resources and solved it own problems.

CMO is an inherently difficult task as it requires Soldiers to operate beyond the scope of their training and experience. The difficulty is compounded if the Soldiers are forced to learn their jobs "on the fly."

However, with an effective SOP in place and a well-articulated long-term CMO vision, the initiative and intelligence of the American Soldier can overcome these difficulties and he will accomplish his CMO mission.

While it is difficult to train for CMO, it is not difficult for leaders at all levels to build a plan in anticipation of CMO. The lessons learned by our FISTers should help leaders across the Army with "boots on the ground" to transition smoothly from high-intensity conflict to SOSO.

By First Lieutenant Robert M. Chamberlain

First Lieutenant Robert M. Chamberlain was a Company Fire Support Officer in 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery (2-320 FA), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom from May 2003 until February 2004. During that time, his Fire Support Team (FIST) undertook civil military operations for its supported battalion, 3-327 IN. Returning stateside, he became the Assistant S4 for 2-320 FA before attending Oxford University in Oxford, England, starting in October, as a Rhodes Scholar. He received his commission from the University of Kansas ROTC in 2002.