101st Div Arty: fighting with artillery fires in an urban environment.

The 101st Airborne Division's (Air Assault) experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) offer several case studies for fighting with fires in an urban environment and demonstrate that artillery remains a vital part of the maneuver commander's successful operations.

The 101st Division deployed by sealift and civilian reserve air fleet (CRAF) to Kuwait during late February and early March 2003. By 20 March, elements of the division were prepared to participate in the initial invasion of Iraq by both air assault and ground assault convoy.

While the difficult desert terrain and sheer distances involved challenged our initial advances, enemy resistance was relatively light as we followed the lead elements of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) northward. After an initial after-action review (AAR) following an armed aerial reconnaissance, the division gained a better appreciation for the size and magnitude of the major population centers in south-central Iraq. The 3d Division made spectacular advances in a relatively short period of time, but enemy forces remained behind in the large urban areas.

Najaf, Iraq. The 101st Division's first major ground combat action centered on the city of Najaf from 28 March through 5 April. The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) attacked from the south while the 2d BCT attacked from the north. (See the map on Page 3.)

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Initially, units were deliberately restricted in their use of artillery fires in urban areas because of rules of the engagement (ROE) that reflected concern for the welfare of innocent civilians and (or) damage to infrastructure. Mechanized and light infantry maneuver commanders and their fire supporters effectively used indirect fires against confirmed enemy targets and in support of attacks. High-explosive ammunition with variable-time fuzes (HE/VT) was effective against enemy snipers and observers on rooftops.

Units also learned they could fire this shell-fuze combination in close proximity to friendly forces. In at least one instance, friendly troops were clearing the lower floors of a building when HE/ VT swept the roof of enemy soldiers. (This was confirmed by the infantrymen who looked out the windows to see the dead and wounded foe fall past them).

Artillery fires with both rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) and Charge 8 proved very accurate, even without a current meteorological update (Met) or survey control beyond that provided by the gun laying and positioning system (GLPS). Additionally, traits executed an extremely effective counterfire program against enemy mortars and artillery systems.

At Najaf, the division artillery (Div Arty) weighted the fight, adjusting the artillery organization for combat by attaching C Battery, 1st Battalion, 377th Field Artillery (C/1-377 FA), an M198 155-mm towed battery, and firing batteries from 3-320 FAR (FA Regiment) to 1-320 FAR and 2-320 FAR, the latter two FA battalions in direct support (DS) of the 1st and 2d BCTs, respectively.

One major obstacle to overcome was communications throughout the depth and width of the battlefield. Each brigade had an operating area of approximately 12 by eight kilometers of city blocks. Because of the nature of urban fighting (crawling through windows, moving through holes in walls and low power lines), fire supporters were restricted to using short-whip or broken down long-whip antennas. The urban structures and interference from power lines further reduced the range of the single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) advanced system improvement program (ASIP) radios carried by fire supporters. Due to the quick movement of the infantry, fire supporters could not always make it to the upper floors in buildings in time to get better radio range.

To counter the problem of limited radio ranges, the artilleryman used combination of tactics, techniques an procedures (TTPs). Fire support elements (FSEs) often used centralized control to transmit mission requests and operational updates on the fires nets. The battalion fire support officer (FSO) moved with the dismounted tactical command post (TAC). Once the infantry gained a foothold, the battalion fire support NCO (FSNCO) moved forward with the mounted TAC, which allowed him to use an ASIP radio with a power amp for increased range. The mounted TAC filled the communications void and provided a pivotal communications node for each FSE. Additionally, the artillery battalion pushed its retransmission as close as the situation permitted to the line of departure (LD), thus, increasing the range of the brigade fire net.

Although these TTPs proved invaluable as the forward elements pressed deep into the city streets, new equipment, such as the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) antenna developed by the Marine Corps, would enhance our ability to communicate in an urban environment significantly.

Karbala. Before the fight in Najaf was finished, elements of the 2d BCT began to prepare for an attack to Karbala in the northwest. The Div Arty weighted the main effort, leaving C/1-377 FA attached to 1-320 FAR and assigning 3-320 FAR (-) a reinforcing (R) mission to 1-320 FAR. Two Q-36 radars provided counterfire coverage, and the Div Arty established a sensor-to-shooter link between a 234 FA Detachment (FAD) Q-37 radar section and a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battery from the 41st FA Brigade: C/1-27 FA.

1-320 FAR and 2d BCT incorporated fires into planning and executing the battle in Karbala very effectively from 4 through 7 April. The fire plan involved sending a clear message to the enemy in the form of three Air Force joint direct attack munition (JDAM) strikes on key Ba'ath Party headquarters, initiating an echelonment of fires.

Immediately after these precision air strikes, fire supporters used brigade and battalion targets to orient the firing batteries on possible enemy locations. As the maneuver forces closed with the enemy, they used indirect fires and close combat attacks with rotary-wing aircraft to destroy the enemy.

For all fire missions, fire supporters adjusted each mission with at least one round before entering the fire-for-effect (FFE) phase. Executing adjust fire missions actually minimized collateral damage. This prevented forward observers (FOs) from having to adjust fire with multiple volleys for effects on targets. HE/VT remained the munition of choice and, once again, proved very effective at inflicting enemy casualties while minimizing harm to civilians or structures.

The fight in Karbala presented a different set of obstacles, requiring the artilleryman on the ground to adjust his operating procedures. To best observe the target and ensure civilian or friendly personnel were not in close proximity, we used multiple observers on fire missions. This allowed us to clearly observe the target via multiple site lanes created by alleys and streets.

However, under heavy fire, the observers could not always gain the vantage point with a clear line-of-site to the target and also observe adjusting rounds. In these situations, we integrated 2-17 Cav's OH-58 Kiowa Warriors as aerial observers that were particularly effective in positively identifying targets and controlling artillery fires. The aviators monitored the brigade's FM fires net, cleared fires directly with the various task force commanders and FSOs, and then sent their calls-for-fire through the FSE to the DS artillery battalion tactical operations center (TOC).

The brigade's plan involved four maneuver battalions attacking simultaneously from different directions. Each element was supported by 2-17 Cav aircraft for close combat attacks and aerial observation.

Clearing fires and deconflicting airspace proved challenging with artillery firing across the width of the battlefield. See the figure for TTP to conduct missions using aerial observers.

This TTP allowed us to cover each ground maneuver battalion with attack aviation continuously and ensured the safety of the pilots and aircraft. With the OH-58s monitoring the fires net and all involved elements understanding the TTP, artilleryman repeatedly massed two or more batteries against high-payoff targets (HPTs) and inflicted many enemy casualties--particularly against dismounted forces. In Karbala, FA fires controlled by FOs and attack aviation provided devastating effects on enemy forces.

Hillah. Immediately on the heels of the battle in Karbala, the 3d BCT launched an attack on the historic city of Hillah (ancient Babylon). Partially because Hillah was mid-way between Najaf and Karbala, the Div Arty provided nine artillery batteries in support of the 3d BCT. In addition to its normal DS battalion, 3-320 FAR, the 3d BCT received supporting fires from 1-320 FAR in a reinforcing mission to 3-320 FAR, a battery from 2-320 FAR (105-mm, towed) attached to 3-320 FAR, and C/1-377 FAR (155-mm, towed) also attached to 3 -320 FAR. Once again, two Q-36 radars supported the battle, and the Div Arty established a sensor-to-shooter link between a 234 FAD Q-37 radar section and C/1-27 FA (MLRS).

3d BCT initiated the battle with reconnaissance-in-force on 8 April with a heavy force advancing from the west and a light force approaching from the south, both supported by close and accurate fires. 3-320 FAR "tucked" five firing batteries behind the armor column of 14 tanks. Meanwhile, two batteries supported the light force and one battery continued a long move into position.

The artillery targeted enemy troop locations along the roads, sniper/machine gun positions in buildings and known air defense artillery (ADA) sites. Artillery fired throughout the night, using illumination for harassing fires and HE/ VT for known enemy positions within the city.

Ninety minutes before initiating the main attack on 9 April, 3-320 FAR executed an aggressive schedule of fires: massing multiple batteries on single targets and firing as many as eight batteries simultaneously. These preparatory fires focused on ADA sites, troop barracks and military facilities. The brigade FSO also incorporated Army aviation assets and close air support (CAS) into the attack.

The artillery fires were extremely accurate, and the massed fires proved effective at destroying point targets. As the maneuver forces continued their advance, FSOs and FOs cancelled some of the planned targets because earlier fires had already destroyed them.

The initial onslaught of accurate and massed fires was largely credited with destroying the enemy's will to resist and contributing to a general collapse of enemy defenses. After the initial volleys, maneuver forces advanced rapidly; by mid-morning, the 3d BCT had secured the city.

Throughout urban operations south of Baghdad, fire supporters struggled with employing battalion and company mortars in the fight. Due to the depth of the battalion area of operations and the need to maximize range, 81-mm mortar platoons occupied close to city edges. Company 60-mm mortars moved forward with their lead elements into the city.

As the maneuver forces progressed deeper into the city, the mortars often occupied complexes with exterior walls. The exterior walls provided protection from direct fire, and security forces, to include snipers, occupied the upper levels of buildings within the walls to provide force protection for the mortars. Due to concerns for civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, fire supporters found it challenging to register the mortars. Within the cities, 60-mm mortars proved to be a valuable asset in direct lay mode against an identified enemy.

Given the circumstances, fire supporters and their maneuver counterparts often opted to use artillery fires instead of mortar fires.

After Coalition Forces advanced to Baghdad and the regime collapsed, the bulk of the division helped secure and clear the southern portion of the Iraqi capital while 1st BCT remained in the south attached to the 82d Airborne Division.

Mosul. The division then advanced to the north to defeat non-compliant forces and establish a safe and secure environment in the ethnically diverse region. The division's efforts focused on the population center of Mosul.

Initially hovering in the gray area between combat operations and stability and support operations (SASO), the 2d BCT advanced on the city with 1-320 FAR DS and the recently arrived 1-377 FA (-) reinforcing 1-320 FAR. Although the initial situation in the city had been tense, the 2d BCT entered under semi-permissive conditions and rapidly established a military presence and instilled order. 1-320 FAR and 1-377 FA (-) used illumination effectively to discourage looters, supporting infantrymen with nonlethal fires.

Urban Fires Lessons: Maps and Low-Angle Fire. Due to the scope of operations in Iraq, units were issued 1:100-kilometer scale maps for the majority of the country. Although these maps provided a large-scale picture o operations spanning hundreds of kilometers, they did not provide fire sup porters the detail needed to accurately call-for-fires. 1:12.5-kilometer maps of the cities were available in limited quantities.

To provide every FO a map with de tailed imagery down to five-meter resolution, battalion FSEs printed satellite imagery available on Falcon View. This satellite imagery provided FOs the resolution required to identify particular buildings and navigate through the city streets. They used these printouts to obtain accurate target grids in conjunction with the Viper laser range finders or mini eye-safe laser infrared observation sets (MELIOS).

At a minimum, observers were required to call in eight-digit grids and elevations for targets in urban areas Six-digit grids allowed too much room for error in the urban environment. A difference of 100 meters easily could result in civilian and (or) friendly casualties and unwanted infrastructure damage.

Although doctrine calls for high angle fires in urban environments, low-angle fires proved the firing method of choice for fire supporters in close proximity to the enemy. Except for Baghdad, most of the buildings in the Iraqi cities did not exceed three stories in height. The use of eight-digit grids with elevations reduced the challenge of clearing intervening crests. Therefore, units were no forced to use high-angle fires.

The longer range of low-angle fires decreased the number of moves artillery units had to make to provide indirect fire coverage of the entire operating area. The combination of greater range and accuracy afforded by low angle fires proved effective in most urban areas.

Although the urban environment presented unique challenges, artillery continues as a relevant, critical element of combat power across the spectrum of urban operations. Fire supporters and artilleryman complied with all the tenets of the Laws of Land Warfare and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) ROE while delivering close and accurate fires in support of maneuver forces. Artilleryman must continue to be proactive and ensure the maneuver commander incorporates FA fires into his operations.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) experiences during OIF are ample testimony to the effectiveness of fires in the urban environment; the battles should be reviewed as case studies for fighting with fires in an urban environment.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Artillery Fires in Urban Operations Using Aerial Observers

1. The fire support element (FSE) designates a one-kilometer box around the artillery units as a no-fly area when missions are being processed.

2. The aircraft are restricted to a 500-foot ceiling.

3. The aircraft call the battalion or company FSE with the mission.

4. Company commanders clear the fires.

5. Missions then are sent to the battalion FSE and FA battalion.

6. Missions are sent as "At My Command" missions. This allows the aerial observer to get into position to observe before the initial round is fired.

7. In deconflicting airspace, the gun target line (GTL) is sent in the message to the observer. The ultimate responsibility for clearing airspace falls on the battalion fire support officer (FSO).

8. Once the initial round is fired, the observer lases the burst and sends the burst grid.

Colonel William L. Greer, until recently, commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Artillery and deployed the Div Arty to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Currently, he is the Deputy for Plans and Policy, J5, of the US Forces in Korea. Prior to 101st Div Arty command, he was the Senior Fire Support Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, where he had served as a Brigade Fire Support O/C. In other assignments, he was the Div Arty Executive Officer and commanded the 3d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery (3-320 FA) both in the t 01st Division at Fort Campbell Kentucky.

Major Martin J. Holland is the S3 of the 101st Division Artillery and deployed with the division to Iraq for OIF. He also served as the Div Arty Assistant S3 and S3 of 1-320 FA, both in the 101st Division. He taught Military History at the USMA at West Point after being awarded an MA in History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Major Holland was the Executive Officer for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery in the 101st Div Arty during Operations Desert Shield and Storm in the Gulf in 1991.

Captain Charles W. Kean, until recently, was the Battalion Fire Support Officer for 1-502d Infantry Battalion, 2d Brigade Combat Team, as part of the 1-320 FA, 101st Airborne Division; he deployed with the division to Iraq for OIF. Currently, he is the Fire Control Officer of the 101st Div Arty. He also served as a Platoon Leader, Battery Executive Officer and Battalion Maintenance Officer in 4-27 FA, 1st Armored Division in Baumholder, Germany. He is a graduate of the FA Captain's Career Course, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.