100% bang fuzes, or a necessary basic toll?

There are few more emotive topics in defense--and the ultimate use of defence products--than the killing of civilians by unexplored ordnance after conflicts have ended. This has taken over from the (continuing) concerns about the impact of anti-personnel landmines on populations around the World.

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The 1997 Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines has eased concerns to a degree about these weapons, and the chances that continued de-mining operations are reducing the risks. But the spotlight has been turned onto the problems with other weaponry and ordnance--notably cluster weapons, and their failure rate history. The key here is the problem posed by fuzes not detonating as expected. This issue covers geographical areas as diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan and even Kenya, where the British government has just settled a series of claims with Masai tribesmen resulting from injuries and deaths from unexploded ordnance in training areas.

Aid agencies and Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) fighting against cluster munitions have been releasing more and more data about their usage in Iraq in 2003, and the dud or failure rate. Exact figures are difficult to gauge. Some NGOs talk of around 1500 US-dropped cluster weapons, although the official US Air Force tally stands at 1208 CBUs, and 253 bomblet-armed AIM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon systems. All-in-all, the maximum number of bomblets that could be delivered by these adds up to some 280,000 bomblets. Official submunition failure rates stand at three to five per cent, equalling some 8400 to 14,000 unexploded bomblets. Some believe that because of old fuze technology, failure rates have been as high as 15 to 20 per cent, meaning that between 42,000 and 56,000 unexploded submunitions remain. On top of these weapons, the Multiple Launch Rocket System battlefield artillery weapon was also deployed by US Army units and was used frequently, also with bomblet rounds. As seen below, there are serious concerns about the reliability of the MLRS bomblet fuze system.

Although planned MLRS bomblet failure rates are meant to be on the order of five per cent, a US General Accounting Office report on Operation Desert Storm states that in the terrain conditions in 1991, a proven failure rate of over 20 per cent was reported. There is attention being paid to this issue in the United States, and the Guided MLRS rocket system under development (GMLRS) is meant to have new fusing on the bomblets to achieve a dud/failure rate of less than one per cent in all terrains.

So far, the official line from both American and British governments and defence departments is that cluster weaponry is entirely legal for use and that even with smart weapons, there is still a place for cluster weaponry against certain targets. The following is a quote from the British Ministry of Defence's 2003 publication, Operations In Iraq: Lessons For The Future: <<There was a continuing military requirement for the RAF to use a small number of cluster bombs. However they were only used against appropriate targets such as widely dispersed armoured vehicles or artillery, or mobile targets which are ill-suited for precision weapons>>.

Even though both countries, and many other Nato/European nations, generally support this stance, it tends to be the US forces that are still active in modernisation of cluster munition capabilities--witness the US Air Force's Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser programme--and does not seem to be affected by the same pressures on cluster weaponry. Having said this, both Sweden and Germany are active in the introduction of cluster weaponry--the DWS glide dispenser system for the former; and the Smart 155 artillery round for the latter. Both do include new generation fuzes to maximize detonation chances, and reduce the risks of 'blinds'.

There is what might be seen as a degree of a split between European and American views of bomblet rounds. To give one example, British Army 'lessons learned' reports from both Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, and then Iraq in 2003 have come up with one firm rule: never ask for cluster bomb air support from US air units--the dud rate on any US cluster munitions are so high that, in effect, an anti-personnel minefield gets laid. There is also some concern about use of Royal Air Force (RAF) cluster munitions, the RBL-755, which has a standard dud rate of six per cent. However, there seems to be confidence in the new 155 mm L20 shell, an Israeli Military Industries design, with some British input. This saw widespread use around Basra with some 2000 being fired. Although the weapon was being used in what is called 'complex terrain', with mixed houses, suburbs and so forth, it was deemed in many cases to be the right shell to use. The double fuze on the L20 is designed to be able to detonate at extreme angles--often a problem with older systems--and there is also a back-up to ensure round detonation 15 seconds after the first fuze ought to have fired. But no system is perfect, and there are reports--not fully substantiated at present--of some failures with L20 submunitions.

France seems to see little future for bomblet rounds at all. A document released by the Delegation Generale de l'Armement, the French defence procurement agency, in 2002 talks of the, "Very low probability of use of current MLRS with M26/M77 rockets because of duds", as well as, "Limitation of duds with possibly at medium term the end of bomblet projectiles". Medium term is seen as being somewhere early in the next decade. It ought to be noted that in both of these comments it is the unreliability of the payload that is marked out as he reason why there are problems using these weapons. Such a view might seem strange coming at a time when France was just introducing its Ogre 155 mm smart bomblet round into service, although this does have a self-destruct fuze system so as to allow for the minimum number of dud rounds. And at the same time, it has to be assumed that the view is that in the case of the MLRS, there is no cost-effective way of upgrading the rockets with new, smart fuzes.

The views on the limitations on the MLRS are echoed by British Army internal studies--the MLRS was not deployed to Iraq in 2003, as it was seen as far from precise and safe enough to be used in complex terrain. To back up general concerns about cluster weaponry, it should be mentioned that the amounts of air-dropped cluster bombs used by the RAF in the 1999 Kosovo Campaign equalled 531, but then only around 45 to 50 in Iraq in 2003.

Although the British Ministry of Defence has been firm in justifying the use of these weapons as seen above, it is evident that there has been a major desire to be seen to be using as few as possible because of the fears of adverse public reaction to any submunition failure rate. There is no talk of an upgrade of the RBL-755 with smarter fuze technology as the weapon is due to be replaced by several missile types: the IR/TV Maverick and the millimetric Brimstone.

Although the emphasis to date has been on both air-launched and ground-fired bomblet rounds, the debate is moving onto unitary rounds. Although there are some areas where there is less risk with unitary munitions--it is unlikely that children will mistake the average 454 kg bomb for a toy--subsequent post-mission detonation would lead to far greater damage and a wider lethal radius than a submunition with grams, not kilos, of explosive. Post-conflict civilian casualties have been reported in both Iraq and Afghanistan from unitary munitions--some from buried ordnance, but some from people trying to steam explosive out of shells or bombs for use in other systems.

The United Kingdom is trying to get higher and higher munition reliability, and the recent award of the Precision Guided Bomb contract was one example of this. The Raytheon Enhanced Paveway bomb system is teamed with the new Multi-Event Hard Target Fuze from Thales Missile Electronics. This fuze is programmable, but also has a feature that prevents a weapon from arming if it is deemed to have either lost laser lock or to have lost satellite navigation inputs during its drop trajectory. Thus it is hoped that should the worst conditions come to pass, the bomb will fall as a 'safe' chunk of iron and will not be a risk as unexploded ordnance. Work is also underway in France to produce smarter bomb fuzes allowing weapons to 'fail-safe' if the correct trajectory is not met, or if the target terrain is not conducive to the best attacks. Naturally, with a firm market in Britain for smart fuzes, Thales looks as if it will be able to sell such technology back into France.

Israel Military Industries, for its part has developed a family of self-destruct fuzes which, when fitted to the Atap anti-tank and anti personnel cluster bomb for example, is expected to be activated just seconds after a submunition hits the ground and remains a dud.

Spain, through Instalaza, also appears to have taken the problem very seriously but with a difference as it could well be one of the only--if not the only--manufacturer able to supply fully tested fuzes before their introduction into a weapon. Indeed the Zaragoza-based company has developed a fail-safe fuze for its MAT 120 120 mm mortar bomb submunition. Like many submunitions of this type, it deploys a "tail" strap the main function of which is to ensure that the weapon descends vertically through the sheer action of drag, but this also activates the timing fuze which will trigger the warhead whether impact has occurred or not--basically after 20 seconds. However, should this fail to operate, the power source is bled to death after a few minutes, making the munition as lethal as a piece of wood. Instalaza uses a similar safety feature in its Alhambra hand grenade. Something that really talks in favour of this fuze is that the very same unit is used in the training Alhambra grenade (which in this case pops a cracker) and that it can he used and reused up to one hundred times. Not only is this remarkable in itself, but with time, it can also help the user to establish some pretty realistic and reliable statistics.

Junghans, which used to be a world renown manufacturer of clocks, has for some time now been producing a fully mechanical point-detonating fuze equipped with a self-destruct device. Designated AZ-Z DM411A1, it is used on the 40 x 46 HE-PFF grenade. This nose fuze also features a device that will ensure that detonation will occur even if it has hit a target before the 8 to 13-second self-destruct delay has run out.

Finally, Zaugg in Switzerland also has developed a self-disabling device for its piezo-electrical fuse. Designed more particularly for bunker crushing shaped-charged munitions, these are designed to withstand 100,000 g launch or impact accelerations. It will neutralise firing in case of a target miss.

Public demands for safer munitions might yet see greater and greater requirements being made on other ammunition types. Work has been underway to improve the fuze reliability of artillery shells in the 155 mm range, although some of the more expensive versions are yet to be fielded. But the principle is that as the use of massed field artillery is phased out, and as tube artillery becomes more precise and exact, the cost equation will allow for smart fusing for 155 mm shells at the very least. And several companies are also working on smarter generations of fuzes for both 105 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars, both calibres with widespread use throughout the world.

There has to be a question as to how much longer will cluster weapons be deployed--simply on the basis of the bad press that fuze failure rates can generate. The problem is that trying to add intelligent, fail safe fuzes to a cluster bomb that contains over 200 sub-munitions, or an artillery round that contains 30 to 50, has significant cost implications. A normal fuze might cost several dollars--say 10 to 20--but a smarter one could cost double or even treble that. On this basis it can prove to be uneconomic to try to upgrade standard cluster munitions, be they air-dropped or ground-fired, with smart/fail safe fuzes. Many states are either retiring standard cluster weaponry, or are deciding not to upgrade them, and not to use them in the meantime. The systems that seem to still have a service life are those designed to attack higher-value targets such as tanks and armoured vehicles. Here, the overall cost of the system is high enough to be able to absorb the extra costs of higher technology fuzes.

And as more and higher demands are made on cluster weapons, so will exacting demands be made on unitary warhead weapons. Although ministries of defence can make robust arguments of the uses of various weapons, choices will become simpler: either investment must be made to guarantee fail-safe operations of munitions, or they must stop being used. At times of budget austerity in many countries, this is not an easy message to handle. The concern for many defence planners is how to handle public expectations and demands that are becoming greater and greater--as well as in some respects more and more unreasonable.