1-87 Infantry's split-focus fires and effects cell: urban and rural Iraq.

Reorganizing under the modular concept brought a tremendous increase in capabilities to both the brigade and battalion staffs, particularly in the new fires and effects cell (FEC) at both levels. [The Army recently renamed the FEC the fire support cell, or FSC.]

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After transforming in less than a year and deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Task Force (TF) Summit's or the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry's (1-87 IN's) FEC quickly implemented this improved version of the fire support element (FSE) to conduct effects-based operations (EBO) in Baghdad.

Test Driving the "New Car." In August 2005, 1-87 IN deployed in support of OIF under the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division (Light), as the first fully transformed infantry BCT (IBCT) to deploy to a combat zone. TF Summit spent the majority of its deployment operating on the dense urban streets of western Baghdad, predominantly the districts of Al Shula, Ghazaliya and Amariya--all widely known for their high frequency of attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces as well as for Sunni/Shia sectarian violence.

After the successful national elections on 15 December 2005, 1-87 IN conducted a transfer of authority (TOA) of its area of operations (AO) to 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division (2/1/6 Iraqi Army)--a significant milestone along the path to the complete transfer of control of Iraq to its security forces.

Simultaneously, the battalion relieved the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1-11 ACR) of the force protection mission for the Abu Ghraib Internment Facility and the area around it, better known to local Iraqi's as Khan Dari. Although less than 30 kilometers west of 1-87 IN's previous AO, this primarily rural and agrarian community presented a far different environment than the urban streets on which the battalion had been operating.

Three months later, in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence after the Samarra Mosque bombing in March, TF Summit was given the mission to surge its operations in Baghdad in conjunction with 2/1/6 Iraqi Army and the newly activated Iraqi National Police. At this point, TF 1-87 IN was back in the urban areas of western Baghdad while retaining its force protection mission at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib.

This combination of urban and rural terrain created a complex mission set for the 1-87 IN FEC. In western Baghdad, where the use of indirect fires is restricted due to the high risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties, attack aviation was the primary fire support asset, and it was integrated into every operation above the platoon level. 1-87 IN primarily used attack aviation for outer security and reconnaissance during raids and cordon and search operations and used it somewhat less often to support counter-improvised explosive device (IED) operations to supplement unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage.

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The needs of the urban population differed greatly from the needs of the rural population. The city's primary concerns were security followed closely by essential services (sewage, water, electricity and trash, called SWEAT). These urban issues focus nonlethal operations on establishing and developing civil projects and local governance.

In contrast, FOB Abu Ghraib is mostly surrounded by farmland and small pockets of villages with little or no local government representation. In Khan Dari, we concentrated on integrating our mortars, Raven UAVs and attack aviation assets in support of the countermortar and counter-IED fights while focusing nonlethal operations on agricultural development and addressing the health care needs of the rural populace.

Because the enemy, terrain and population differed significantly between the urban and rural AOs, the commander's desired effects for each area did too, resulting in a split-focus for our FEC.

Nevertheless, the FEC's traditional role in the maneuver battalion has not changed. Initially, its reorganization created some uncertainty about its increased role and capabilities leading up to deployment. But the FEC retained its fundamental function and capabilities as the primary planning and integration cell for mortars, artillery, attack aviation and fixed-wing close air support (CAS). However, the FEC's new additional positions have increased its capability to plan, coordinate and integrate nonlethal operations for the battalion, such as civil-military operations (CMO), tactical information operations (10) and psychological operations (PSYOP).

Despite the challenges of two different AOs, the 1-87 IN FEC's success during OIF can be attributed to the additional manning produced by the modular transformation, the additional staff embedded in the FEC and the systems and policies established within the FEC to create an effective and cohesive planning team. The latter included a reference document outlining expectations of the embedded staff members and the battalion's attachments, such as civil affairs (CA) and tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs), etc.

FEC Manning and Operations. Before transformation, the FSE consisted of the battalion fire support officer (FSO), a fire support NCO (FSNCO) and two enlisted Soldiers. In addition to integrating lethal fires, 10, CMO and PSYOP into battalion operations, this staff cell was responsible for training and employing a 34-Soldier fire support platoon divided into four fire support teams (FISTs) and attached to the infantry companies throughout the battalion. This was a significant task for the FSE, particularly when operating in environments such as Iraq or Afghanistan where the focus is relatively balanced on both lethal and nonlethal operations. This old battalion fire support model was lacking in its capabilities to quickly integrate joint fires (Air Force and Navy CAS), coordinate CMO and PSYOP support and conduct offensive 10.

Changes to the FSE in the new infantry (combined arms) battalion table of organization and equipment (TO & E) include the duty title of "battalion FSO" changing to "effects coordinator (ECOORD)" and the creation of the assistant ECOORD (AECOORD), a targeting NCO, and an additional FSNCO. The transformed TO & E also includes a three-man Air Force tactical air control party (TACP) falling under the FEC's supervision for the terminal control and delivery of munitions from fixed-wing aircraft--a major step forward toward joint integration of fires. These manning additions allowed 1-87 IN's FEC to remain tied into current operations and future plans simultaneously.

The counterfire cell at FOB Abu Ghraib was comprised of the targeting NCO, advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) operator and Air Force TACP and was augmented by the company FSO and FSNCO executing the FOB's force protection mission. Operating 24/7, this cell was fully committed to managing counterfires and area denial fires and had the ability to employ joint fires, CAS, Army attack aviation, 105-mm artillery from 3-6 FA--our BCT's fires battalion--and 1-87's organic 120-mm and 81-mm mortars located on the FOB. FOB Abu Ghraib received frequent mortar and rocket attacks, and the counterfire fight was very complex due to Abu Ghraib's proximity to the Baghdad International Airport and the frequently urgent need to clear airspace.

To make the counterfire drill more responsive, the FEC's intelligence section conducted pattern analysis to determine most likely points of origin (POOs) and time windows for insurgent mortar and rocket attacks. Using this analysis, the FEC established pre-cleared, three-dimensional restrictive operating zones (ROZ) over the gun target lines (GTLs) for both the mortars on the FOB and the 105-mm "Hot" gun located close to Baghdad International Airport supporting the greater divisional AO. This caused some initial difficulty in gaining approval for the artillery ROZ, as the area around FOB Abu Ghraib was barely within the maximum conventional range of the supporting howitzers and required shutting down a significant portion of the airspace between the firing point at the airport and the target area during these windows.

The FEC also used this pattern analysis to establish radar acquisition call-for-fire zones (CFFZs) over these historical enemy mortar/rocket POOs, allowing the AFATDS computer to receive fire missions directly from the acquiring radar system. By pre-clearing airspace, establishing radar CFFZs and maintaining a Hot tube during these windows, the FEC reduced the average counterfire response time by half to the doctrinal standard for effective counterfires.

Effects Integration. With part of the fires cell fighting the enemy indirect fire threat at FOB Abu Ghraib, the remaining members of the FEC had the flexibility to supervise the fires cell and still remain focused on the effects-based targeting process and coordination of lethal and nonlethal assets for operations within western Baghdad. While this relatively small manning increase has improved the FEC's overall capabilities significantly, it takes far more than simply adding Soldiers to achieve effects integration at the battalion level; effects integration also requires minor realignments in staff relationships and systems and a change in the organizational culture within the unit.

Staff Reorganization and Cultural Change. Within the first month of our deployment, the FEC evolved and grew into the central planning and targeting hub for all the battalion's operations. During the course of our tour, the nature of how our FEC operated can be best described as a scaled-down hybrid of an operational planning group and an intelligence fusion cell (staff sections found only at the brigade level and above).

We accomplished this by embedding our tactical intelligence officer and scout/sniper platoon leader into the FEC. Their traditional administrative and rating responsibilities remained unchanged, although they physically worked within the FEC alongside the AECOORD (who assumed the duties of the S5 civil affairs and S7 information operations planner) and the attached CA and PSYOP team leaders.

These five FEC members along with the counterfire cell carried out their duties under the ECOORD's guidance who, in turn, received direct operational guidance from the battalion commander via the battalion S3 and executive officer (XO). Each member also had one or more staff counterparts within the brigade FEC who they "plugged" into the BCT's targeting process and provided bottom-up feedback to.

While this concept is slightly non-traditional, it helped integrate and synchronize every available asset for planning future operations and targeting. The FEC had the ability to integrate and apply any mix of assets to an operation quickly, whether it be leveraging UAV coverage and tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams to develop and action a time-sensitive target (TST) or using a CA or PSYOP team for consequence management and mitigation after a civil disturbance. This concept significantly increased our ability to shift back and forth from kinetic (lethal) to non-kinetic (nonlethal) operations or apply a mix of the two, depending on the commander's desired effects.

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While the framework for operations in Baghdad and Iraq was established two and three levels above the maneuver battalion, instilling a clear understanding within the FEC of how the division's BCTs' and battalions' operations are nested with the overall campaign plan was essential for success.

Compared to the high-intensity combat operations in March of 2003 when our ground forces had to achieve clearly defined objectives by lethal force, conducting full-spectrum combat operations in a maturing theater today presents more obscure objectives. These objectives include influencing the local population to support its newly elected and seated government, which is often difficult to measure to determine mission success. The operational framework provided a "way ahead" for combined efforts through clearly defined lines of operation (LOOs), each with a corresponding effects objective and supporting measures of performance.

Based on the LOOs in the operational framework, the battalion was tasked with six effects objectives as outlined in the figure. Considering that four of the six LOOs are nonlethal emphasizes the strategic importance of isolating the Iraqi population from the insurgency and influencing its support of its elected government through nonlethal means vice the tactical importance of disrupting the insurgency through kinetic operations.

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The key ingredient to assessing progress along these effects objectives is regular, bottom-up input of the measures of performance (MOPs) and effectiveness (MOEs) for each objective from the company level. The contributions of our company FSOs--charged with the responsibility of collecting MOPs within their company areas of responsibility (AORs)--proved critical to driving the battalion's weekly targeting process.

During the first month or so, most of the lethal targeting of insurgent groups and nonlethal targeting of government officials and civil-military projects were directed from higher. However, as the battalion began to familiarize itself with the environment and establish relationships on the ground, our Soldiers and leaders were able to develop actionable intelligence and get feedback relating to local Iraqi leaders, essential service issues and general attitudes of the local population. Within 30 to 45 days of assuming control of the AO, 1-87 IN's targeting process had evolved from a top-down, directive system relying on intelligence and nonlethal guidance from higher to a collaborative planning system that integrated bottom-up, company-level effects assessments. These assessments were provided by the company FSOs with intelligence gathered by patrol leaders and top-down intelligence collected by assets outside of the battalion.

The biggest lesson learned about effects-based targeting along multiple LOOs is that units--particularly maneuver units whose core competencies center on kinetic, high-intensity combat operations--must eliminate the mental distinction between a lethal operation (raid, air assault, cordon and search, etc.) and a nonlethal operation (PSYOP product distribution, 10, CMO projects, humanitarian assistance, etc.). All are means to achieve effects and should be applied together, in a combined and synchronized manner. This change in organizational culture contributed to our overall success in a very complex AO.

It is a huge combat multiplier to have platoon and squad leaders who have a solid understanding of how important 10 is, how the media is tied into every mission conducted and how the leaders can leverage nonlethal assets through the company FSOs to develop intelligence and (or) influence popular support. Effective counterinsurgencies are fought at the company level and below, and every operation must be approached with the mindset of leveraging a combination of lethal and nonlethal assets to achieve its desired effects.

In March, Iraq experienced an upsurge in sectarian violence as the elected prime minister and representative parties of Iraq struggled to seat its government. Bombing of a major Shi'ite mosque in Samarra and an upsurge in murders, kidnappings and intimidation in Sunni/Shia-mixed and predominantly Sunni neighborhoods created unease and fear within the population. Intense media coverage created an international misperception that Iraq was on the verge of civil war.

TF Summit's AO experienced this initial wave of violence that gradually subsided as combined operations with 2/1/6 Iraqi Army increased and the Iraqi National Police came into the sector. Despite the increase in violence, the Iraqi perception of a lack of security and the possibility of civil war was not reality on the ground.

This was tactical 10 at its core--a battle for information superiority and understanding of reality--to influence the local populace and bridge the gap between reality and their perception of reality. While TF Summit continued to actively target the cells responsible for the violence, the battalion's number one high payoff target (HPT) was "local perception of security," an intangible target as opposed to a definitive target, such as taking down an insurgent safe house or securing a weapons cache.

Influencing local perception is no easy task, and achieving this goal requires a combination of both lethal and nonlethal operations. This is where effects coordination becomes critical. An excellent example of this was Operation Unified Front, an operation inside of the Sunni neighborhood of Amariya, widely known at the time as a major source of sectarian violence.

This brigade-level operation included TF Summit operating in conjunction with 2/1/6 Iraqi Army and the 5th Brigade, 2nd National Police Division. It commenced with a massive cordon and search for multiple targeted individuals and weapons caches within the district. Iraqi Soldiers conducted the majority of the house-to-house searches alongside elements of TF Summit, and the Iraqi police provided outer cordon security.

In addition to the kinetic portion of the operation, the Iraqi Soldiers distributed pro-Iraqi leaflets and newspapers that helped inform the population of the recent successes of the new Iraqi government and its security forces. As the Iraqi army and National Police conducted the bulk of the operation, 1-87 IN used this as an opportunity to speak with the public, address their concerns and use CA and PSYOP teams to identify possible areas within Amariya in which commander's emergency response program (CERP) projects could be leveraged toward improving local infrastructure and essential services.

By applying a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic actions with Iraqi security forces in the lead, the people of Amariya were shown visible proof that their indigenous forces are concerned with their safety and committed to ridding their neighborhoods of terrorists.

Iraqi and Coalition troops conducted security surveys during the operation and afterward, both of which revealed a drastic increase in the Iraqi's perception of security within Amariya as compared to previous weeks. Also as a result of speaking with the locals, the companies nominated many CERP projects, to include a trash clean up employing local workers and refurbishment projects in local elementary schools and on soccer fields.

This operation achieved multiple effects in that it disrupted terrorist cells in Amariya through the detention of several insurgents and the capture of IED-making materials. It also provided an opportunity for the Iraqi army and police to display their growing competence to the locals. The CERP project nominations helped to promote economic pluralism and improve local infrastructure within the community.

Operation Unified Front targeted five of our six LOOs simultaneously--a textbook example of how to execute EBO and how our battalion and BCT has embraced this methodology to achieve lasting effects over the course of our deployment.

Clear Expectations. The most helpful means for our FEC to integrate efforts during OIF was to establish clear expectations for enablers and the supporting staff throughout the battalion. This was done by creating a terms of reference document establishing standard policies and practices for those working within the FEC, such as direct support attachments, supporting staff sections and company-level representatives. Intended as an enduring document to encourage a collaborative and "non-stovepiped" mindset, it specifically outlines the expectations, duties and responsibilities of each position and those supporting staff members who provide essential input to the effects-based targeting process. It also served as an effective performance counseling tool.

The document provides manning recommendations within the FEC for circumstances preventing certain positions from being filled. In TF Summit's case, the AECOORD assumed the duties of the S5 CA planner and S7 10 officer. While the S5's duties focused more on local Iraqi governance support, the CA team leader focused on essential service and infrastructure project assessments and management. However, the duties of these two positions often overlapped by operational necessity.

Another highlight mentioned earlier is that the tactical intelligence officer and the scout/sniper platoon leader were aligned together under the FEC to increase the integration of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) for lethal targeting.

Naturally, this document helped integrate and transition enabler support as TF Summit experienced a great deal of attachment turnover (CA and PSYOP teams) throughout the deployment with little disruption in the battalion's operations. Often, these attachments do not train regularly with units at their home station. In addition, they rarely are attached to the unit they will support during a combat deployment in the unit's mission readiness exercise (MRE) at either the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, or the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.

The result is that these combat enablers don't meet up with the unit they will support until they arrive in theater. This creates a period in which the unit and the attached team must establish a working relationship with each other quickly--all while conducting combat operations.

The supporting attachments also often fall on a different deployment schedule than the unit they support, creating multiple periods of "attachment turnover" throughout the deployment. This initially creates potential risks for a unit and its new attachments during the integration period and hand-over from an outgoing attachment to an incoming attachment.

Throughout the deployment, TF Summit experienced three transitions of both the CA and PSYOP teams. While this issue is managed at echelons above the battalion, the FEC still must establish procedures to minimize tactical risk for its battalion and ensure a quick and efficient integration of their supporting assets. The terms of reference document helped to serve this purpose.

The Big Picture. Because the US is in a long war with threats to national security transcending well beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan, there always will be a need for lethal fires during the course of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Furthermore, today's increasing demand for balanced lethal and nonlethal effects integration is not changing the role of the Artillery; rather it is expanding the Artillery's role.

The US armed forces, government agencies and allies continue to work toward an increasingly joint and unified effort in GWOT. The need for effects integration and synchronization of activities is critical from the tactical to the strategic levels for the foreseeable future.

Tremendous efforts during recent years have gone into bridging the gaps between our armed services. The Army's transformation is providing a greater capacity for our BCT and battalion commanders to quickly and effectively leverage joint and interagency assets, in addition to their own, to shape the tactical fight. This requirement to leverage diverse assets coupled with the increasing demands for information superiority falls on the staff section that integrates and synchronizes these efforts in tactical maneuver operations--the FEC.

The battalion FEC must be a staff cell full of Pentathletes--a section that communicates and functions well from within, has a strong understanding of "two-levels up" and appropriately integrates every asset it can bring to the fight in a manner to best support its commander's intent. Today, these traits are critical as the operating environments in both Iraq and Afghanistan steadily improve where "working ourselves out of a job" becomes the true benchmark for mission success.

Captain Nicholas J. Armstrong is the Effects Coordinator (ECOORD) for 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (1-87 IN), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. Prior assignments include Speechwriter to the Commanding General and Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, Aide de Camp to Deputy Commanding General--Support, Battalion Fire Direction Officer (FDO), Battery Executive Officer (XO) and Platoon Leader, in 3-6 Field Artillery and the Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 2-22 IN, 1st BCT, all in the 10th Mountain Division. He is a graduate of Airborne and Ranger Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Air Assault School at Fort Drum, New York.

By Captain Nicholas J. Armstrong

RELATED ARTICLE

* Disrupt anti-Iraqi forces (AIF).

* Improve the capability of Iraqi security forces.

* Improve local governance.

* Improve essential services.

* Improve the local economy.

* Improve Iraqi support of their government.

Six Effects Objectives to Focus Operations and Assess Mission Accomplishment