'The vision was there....' (Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Marrack Goulding) (interview)

Marrack Goulding has been in charge of UN peace-keeping operations since 1986, when Sir Brian Urquhart retired. After studying Greek and Latin at Oxford's Magdalen College and Arabic in Lebanon, the British diplomat served his country in Kuwait, Tripoli, Cairo, Lisbon, New York and Luanda. Before becoming Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, he had already had a taste of the United Nations from 1979 to 1983 when he represented his country in the Security Council and the General Assembly and presided over the Trusteeship Council for a year. What repercussions do you think the Nobel Prize will have for peace-keeping?

I hope it will have two political repercussions. One is that this recognition at a very high international level of the value of peacekeeping will make parties to conflicts where there are peacekeeping operations readier to cooperate with the peace-keeping operation. It will enhance the prestige of peace-keeping, which will make it more effective in that sense.

Secondly, I hope that this international recognition of peacekeeping, of the value of peacekeeping, will cause parties to conflicts, where at present there is no peace-keeping involvement, to think about using this service that the United Nations makes available to them. Peace-keeping is available

to all the Member States of the United Nations-to use the techniques that have been developed here, which we believe play a valuable role in controlling conflict. I hope this recognition will make Member States who find themselves in conflict with their neighbours readier to turn to the SecretaryGeneral, to turn to the Security Council and seek the help of the UN.

You recently said that peace-. making and peace-keeping should go hand in hand. How,v,r, that seems not to have been always the case, particularly in the Middle East. How do you explain this?

It has always been clear that peace-keeping cannot solve the problem by itself Peace-keeping can create conditions in which peace-making can take place. And peace-making, obviously, we think should be done by the United Nations, by the Secretary-General or a special representative of the Secretary-General.

Why has the UN been more successful lately in its peacekeeping/peace-making efforts?

A number of things have contributed to that. First of all, the fact that relations are better between the United States and the Soviet Union is important, UN peace-Making and peace-keeping efforts always flourish at times of detente. Detente makes it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union jointly to support the Secretary-General's efforts. That's a very important change,

Secondly, I think there has been a realization amongst the parties to many of these conflicts that they cannot be resolved by war, that there's got to be a negotiation. These two things interact. This time of detente has made it easier for the parties to see that the answer to their problems lies in negotiating a settlement rather than fighting.

There have also been conspicuous failures in recent years of bilateral or unilateral attempts to resolve international. problems. The experience of recent years has reminded the world that the multilateral approach is the approach most likely to succeed.

All of these things coming together have created a climate in which there has been greater willingness on the part of the membership to usethe peacemaking and peace-keeping functions of the United Nations.

The two new peace-keeping operations-Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq-both have very precise time-frames and come at the end of a long negotiating process, in contrast to some operations in the past. Is this the kind of operation the UN can now afford politically and financially? Is this the wave of the future?

It has always been clear that these operations are interim arrangements, that they should have a time-frame. Sometimes it has not Proved possible to negotiate the settlement as quickly as it was hoped. In 1978, for instance, Israeli troops did not withdraw from South Lebanon within three months as had been hoped. In such cases the operations do get renewed, as you just said, by the Security Council. Take UNIIMOG-it has a timeframe of six months. But let us suppose that after six months the negotiations are continuing and have not yet reached a successful conclusion, Are we going to withdraw and jeopardize the ceasefire by taking away the observers who are there every day monitoring the situation, the tension on the cease-fire line? I cannot believe the Security Council would do that. You cannot guarantee that peacemaking is going to succeed. If peace-making does not succeed or if its success is delayed, it would seem irresponsible to withdraw the peacekeeping operation, thereby running the risk of provoking a resumption of fighting,

Some critics say that the Cyprus operation has "frozen?) the possibility of a political solution there. And it seems to be true that the presence of UN troops may make some Governments less eager to solve a problem. This may in turn discourage contributing Governments. Is there anything that can be done to restore a sense of urgency?

You are absolutely right. The parties to the conflict may take comfort from the knowledge, or the assumption, that the force will have its mandate renewed. You are also absolutely right that there is disquiet within the Security Council about the tendencies of these operations to become self-perpetuating. Various ideas have been put forward about how yOu could work against that. One idea which has been put forward is that the Security Council should decide that the parties to the conflict would bear a rising share of the cost of the operation-5 per cent in year one, 10 per cent in year two, 15 per cent in years three and four and so on. Again the problem you face is what do you do if they refuse to pay? Do you withdraw the force or the observer group in the knowledge that the very fact of withdrawing it could raise tension to a point that fighting breaks out again?

Yes, I know it is unsatisfactory that the forces seem to be stuck there now. But maybe it is a better deal for the international community to have, let us say, UNDOF on the Golan Heightswhich, heaven knows, is a sensitive area-costing the international community about $35 million a year, than to run the risk of an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria. Maybe this is the best we can do at the moment: to have a peace-keeping force or a group of observers keeping the situation under control, waiting for the political environment to evolve in a way that makes negotiations and a settlement possible.

The UN is now spending around $230 million a year in peacekeeping operations. The Namibia operation will carry a $600 million price-tag. A number of countries owe money. Who is going to pay for all of this?

As far as arrears are concerned, things look brighter. The Soviet Union, which owes a lot of money, announced last year-and repeated recently-that it was ready to pay off its arrears. And it has begun to pay off its arrears on the peacekeeping accounts. That is a very positive development.

The United States now also owes money to these peace-keeping accounts and we hope that the United States will decide to pay off its arrears.

As far as new operations are concerned, the Secretary-General is quite clear that they have to be financed by assessed contributions. If you go for voluntary contributions you will not get the money Therefore either the operation will not take place, or will take place at the cost of those Member countries who contribute troops. This is what happened in Cyprus-it's not fair, it's not right, it's not a stable financial basis. If these new operations are going to take place they will have to be paid for by the Member States, by the international community which sets them up.

My own view is that although $600 million sounds a terribly large sum of money, it is not a very large price to pay for bringing to independence a country that has been ravaged by 22 years of wan When you compare $600 million dollars to the sums of money that are spent on armaments, on fighting wars, it is not a lot of money. And it's not $600 million a year The Namibia operation is a one-time event.

I very much hope that the Member States will see their way to paying their share of the cost of that operation. If they are not prepared to do that then the operation cannot take place. The Security Council obviously cannot set up an operation of that magnitude unless the money is made available to pay for it.

You are now doing the job that Ralph Bunche and Sir Brian Urquhart did before you. What particular vision are you bringing to it?

I do not think I have a particular vision. The vision that I have I inherited from Brian Urquhart. I regard my part as being very much to keep going what he and, before him, Ralph Bunche started, I believe as they did that peace-keeping is something which has evolved, which has tremendous potential and must evolve all the time. We must refine the technique, develop the technique of peace-keeping.

So I see my task as being to carry on and develop this peace-keeping which was so inventively developed by Ralph Bunche and then Brian Urquhart. I don't claim to bring any particular new vision to it. The vision was there. I inherited the vision from my predecessors.

Your presence here coincides with an improvement in the international climate. . .

That's right. It's not the first time when there has been a sudden improvement in the political climate for peace-keeping. Peace-keeping went through a gray period between 1967, when UNEF was withdrawn, and 1973, when suddenly there was a great resurgence of interest in peace-keeping and UNEF 11 was established, Then in 1974 you had UNDOF the force on the Golan Heights. That was another exciting period. Then things went rather quiet again and now after 10 years-because the last peace-keeping operation was set up in 1978-we have two new operations already this year and two others are being actively discussed. It is a very exciting time. What next, after Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Western Sahara. . . ?

It is not for us to decide . . . It's up to the international community, and above all the parties in conflict, to decide whether they want to avail themselves of this service of the United Nations. There is not a conflict in the world today which would not benefit from the peacekeeping treatment. But you have first to have thc political will of the parties to that conflict to accept the peace-keeping treatment. If all the conflicts you have mentioned are resolved there would still be plenty of scope for peace-keeping.