[F.sup.2][C.sup.2] Experiments for Rapid Transformation to Effects-Based Fires.

Several forces are interacting to shape the transformation of the Field Artillery to an effects-based, information-centric system-of-systems. Rapid technological advances, asymmetric or uncertain threats, complex operational environments and shifting national priorities and interests are converging on our warfighting organizations to present new leader and soldier challenges.

These geo-strategic changes are resulting in a dynamically complex environment that has fundamentally altered how artillery staffs must organize, train, equip, man, lead and fight artillery forces in the future. Throwing more technology at the problems or expecting battle staffs to accommodate change without a trade-off in performance are typical responses that have proven costly and ineffective under these new battlefield conditions.

This article reports on a series of experiments the FA School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is using to develop efficiently adaptable fires organizations, begin implementing effects-based fires and introduce information architectures for Army-wide transformation. These experiments will help the FA transform more rapidly into a force capable of meeting the fires and effects challenges of the future.

Future Fires Command and Control ([F.sup.2][C.sup.2]) Concept Evaluation Program (CEP). The [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] is an ongoing series of brigade-level, interactive, simulation-supported, command post experiments begun in 1999 that are conducted in a unique Fires Test Bed at Fort Sill and use III Corps Artillery soldiers as test battle staffs. The purpose of the experiments is to re-engineer personnel, systems and information architectures to accomplish full-spectrum effects-based fire. The effects-based fires concept is described by Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major Carl R. Trout in their article "Effects-Based Fires: The Future of Fire Support Coordination and Execution" in this edition.

The catalyst for changing the FA was the FA Vision outlined in the Chief of Field Artillery Major General Leo J. Baxter's article, "Meeting the Future: State of the Field Artillery 1998" in the 1998 November-December Red Book. The chief's vision describes a strategy for adapting to new patterns of operations with next-generation organizations, information and systems technologies. The FA Vision was also the catalyst for starting the series of future fires command and control experiments.

The Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (D&SA BL) at Fort Sill formed an advanced concepts team to conduct the experiments. The team is made up of behavioral scientists from the Human Research and Engineering Directorate of the Army Research Laboratory and software developers and information technologists from industry and the Army Materiel Command.

The primary areas of interest in the experiments are organizational transformation, such as the effects coordination center (ECC) and future Field Artillery battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs), and effects management. Organizational transformation involves separating battalion command from tactical fire control, while effects management addresses requirements for centralized planning and coordination of effects-based fires.

In brief, the concept team is using a series of focused, quick turn-around, in-house experiments to operationalize the FA Vision and help determine the FA's organizational transformation. For the FA to transform rapidly into the force needed for the future, the solutions must be timely and relevant and our fires culture must be willing to adopt new methods for improving fires and effects planning, coordination and distribution.

The Fires Test Bed. This is a research facility that can produce a realistic synthetic battlefield to evaluate operational concepts. It is made up of a system of constructive warfighting simulations; command post mock-ups linked by a digital, single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS)-compatible communications network; and re-configurable work stations that support a wide range of battlefield visualization technologies.

The test bed is instrumented to facilitate in-depth measurement of performance and unobtrusive observation of command post activities. In addition to the experimental applications, the test bed can support command post training or be linked to large-scale training or exercise events.

The experiments simulate a rapidly evolving distributed battlefield consisting of overlapping operational requirements for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and warfighting that tax the resources of the ECC and brigade. Each [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] experiment employs an expansive, nonlinear battlefield setting to allow the ECC players to conduct information-centric operations and leverage information superiority. The intent is to create an operational environment where the problems are complex, information sources overlap and converge, and collaborative problem solving is central to accomplishing mission critical tasks.

Several simulations make up the distributed, interactive environment. Fire support systems operated in FireSim XXI, a Battle Lab-managed simulation that processes tactical information to the decision support system. High-resolution maneuver operations are simulated in the joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS). JCATS represents complex and urban terrain features that are especially important in small-scale contingency operations. The in-flight, three-dimensional terrain model for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is simulated in the multiple unified simulation environment (MUSE) model. The extended air defense simulation (EADSIM) provides intelligence feeds from national assets to spot reports from individual soldiers.

This type of environment demands adaptive thinking and team collaboration, as the information about the situation is unclear, extensive and often conflicting. Several operational issues have been identified for further exploration. What is the arrangement of personnel and systems necessary to leverage information dominance? What interfaces and information linkages define pro-posed operational architectures? What information technologies are most suitable to gather, organize and display information for effects processing?

The results of these experiments point the way toward defining the information needs of fires organizations and highlight functional requirements for a future effects control system (ECS) that will replace the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS). The experiments also are offering insights for performance on distributed battlefields.

Issues, Insights and Implications. [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] experiments require the player-participants to operate "outside of the box" to examine the key tenets of the FA Vision: manage effects-based fires, transform the force organizationally, tailor the force dynamically and move to munitions centrality. Emerging [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] results illustrate the complex nature of on-going transformation processes and provide insights for information management, training, organizing, equipping and fighting forces for future operations.

Overcoming Information Barriers. Information technology is a key enabler for successfully transforming to future organizations. The development, maintenance and sharing of situational awareness within and between command posts are necessary, but not sufficient for ensuring an efficiently adaptable battle staff.

The [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] experiments introduced prototype information systems to test theories about knowledge engineering and team collaboration. Two barriers had to be overcome: the notion that information in itself is power and the lack of collaborative tools to support military decision-making processes.

Information filters and intelligent agents were introduced to reduce the impact of information overload on performance. This was accomplished by introducing the battlefield visualization tool called the future fires decision support system ([F.sup.2]DSS), which is prototype software that displays the common operating picture of friendly and enemy situations. [F.sup.2]DSS can be configured at the different work stations to provide timely information relevant to the operator, including the status of all acquisition, lethal and non-lethal attack assets available to the brigade. It also provides ECC operators total asset visibility, including army force (ARFOR) collection platforms and joint systems.

The [F.sup.2]DSS computer displays do not replace the need for voice communications between commanders and for unit cross-talk and situation reports when these information exchanges are critical to battle outcomes.

The [F.sup.2]DSS that improves battlefield visualization and information sharing is facilitating the transformation to the ECC. With [F.sup.2]DSS, the battle staff can shift its focus from individual information maintenance and gathering to team problem solving. Even though [F.sup.2]DSS is a prototype, it enables the smaller ECC to function.

ECC Organization and Operations. The ECC experiment consisted of intelligence, targeting and effects staff elements that planned coordinated and provided full-spectrum effects through the [F.sup.2]DSS. The ECC is a multifunctional team where targeting, lethal and nonlethal effects processing, battle management and planning are interdependent tasks.

The coordination of effects to support the scheme of maneuver was complicated by the responsibility to reconcile every action with the rules of engagement (ROEs)--especially when the ROEs were ambiguous, unclear and conflicting.

Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) proved a versatile tool important for intelligence gathering and targeting. The UAV was employed in several roles. One role was as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) asset to provide over-the-hill intelligence.

Because ISR operations were widely dispersed, the maneuver elements of the brigade lacked the "eyes" to look deep or ensure intelligence collection in-depth. Once gaps in the intelligence picture arose, the UAV served as a collection tool that was focused on the brigade's critical area.

Subsequently, the UAV was re-tasked to perform targeting for shaping or counterfire operations. The UAV was most effective for targeting when the UAV controller and targeting officer were collocated so both saw the image and had constant communications. UAV operations were somewhat less effective when only the targeting officer was able to see the images.

UAV employment will be critical in developing the enemy situation. The operational control of the UAV as well as the positioning of the controller and downlink for imagery must be evaluated as part of future experimentation.

Exploitation of Intelligence Assets. Links and feeds from joint and ARFOR intelligence, targeting and attack assets were important to the success of the brigade's operations. The lighter, more mobile brigade does not have many organic intelligence or targeting assets.

Timely and direct access to joint and ARFOR intelligence information and the ability to influence the employment of assets were important components of the shaping and counterfire fights. In one engagement when joint and ARFOR intelligence assets were denied, the brigade was unable to conduct the counterfire fight effectively.

Preemptive Counterfire. The ECC's ability to target and attack indirect fire systems at depth was a major force multiplier in the brigade fight. The infantry-based brigade force was very vulnerable to indirect fire. Enemy artillery forces used during major theater of war (MTW) offensive and defensive simulated scenarios employed more artillery systems with greater range capabilities. The enemy employed small concentrations of artillery that operated from dispersed firing positions as an effective tactic to neutralized the friendly force's ability to attack his assets via the air or mass fires.

Fighting a primarily reactive counterfire fight allowed the enemy to inflict casualties and suppress direct fire weapons as he closed on friendly battle positions. During a reactive counterfire fight, the brigade had insufficient counterfire radar systems to cover its entire area of operations and its attack assets had limited effect.

Shaping the Fight with Fires and Effects. During the MTW engagements, the synchronization of fires and effects with maneuver was key to shaping the fight and creating the time and distance needed to defeat enemy forces. Attack assets, such as electronic warfare (EW), attack helicopters and close air support (CAS), were an important part of the shaping fight. High-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) fires had little effect against moving or armored targets. Long-range artillery and CAS were the principal killing effects employed for the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.

As enemy formations synchronized their main and supporting attacks, large numbers of massed, close fires were required simultaneously at multiple locations throughout the MTW operations. These fires were critical to slow and attrit the enemy so maneuver forces had favorable conditions for the close fight. When the enemy mechanized and motorized units were able to close with the friendly motorized battalions using the terrain, urban areas or mass, they inflicted extremely heavy casualties.

Future Challenges. The [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] experiments need to continue to explore future fires for urban warfare; tools for assessing nonlethal effects; improved means for measuring the situational awareness process and team work performance; and collaborative tools for planning, mission rehearsals and decision-making that are embedded in data processors.

The experiment process merely scratched the surface of urban fire support requirements. The traditional fire support tasks of isolating the objective, attacking the reserve and conducting counterfire were insufficient because maneuver battalions still had to clear each building and city block to meet their mission requirements. Rocket and mortar fires were ineffective in supporting fighting in buildings. Future experiments must evaluate tactics and techniques for destroying buildings and assess the effects of rubble on the fight.

No tools or simulations for processing or assessing nonlethal effects are available (information operations, psychological operations and civil affairs). The ECC needs the means to plan, execute and assess the effectiveness of nonlethal effects to perform its mission critical tasks.

The Army is committed to a process of systematically revolutionizing how the FA will operate on future battlefields where our roles and missions will require command posts that are agile, versatile and multifunctional. The approach implemented during the [F.sup.2][C.sup.2] CEP provides a research environment where emerging concepts can be put to the test-can be taken from concepts to a living laboratory. This approach also gives combat and materiel developers the performance data they need to formulate requirements and tactics, techniques and procedures for future effects-based organizations.

F2C2 experimentation facilitates the rapid transition of fires and effects doctrine, training, organizations, and materiel systems to the force.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) William A. Ross, until recently was a Senior Research Scientist with L-3 Communications, Inc., conducting applied and field research for the Army Research Laboratory in the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served as the Operational Manager for a series of Future Fires Command and Control (F2C2) Concept Evaluation Program (CEP) experiments. He is now a Senior Project Engineer for the Operational Testing of Crusader, working for United Defense Limited Partnership in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Lieutenant Colonel Ross, Field Artillery, retired from the Army in 1988. His last assignment was as Chief of Mobile Training Team B, part of the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.