'The boldest outreach': the Eastern Partnership initiative of the European Union.

AS a counterbalance to the Northern Dimension and the Union for the Mediterranean, the Foreign Minister of Poland, aided and abetted by his counterpart in Sweden, suggested a Partnership with the emerging states to the east of the European Union. This has been described as the 'boldest outreach' since the accessions of 2004 and 2007.

Holding out a hand to Ukraine, to Moldova, to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbiijan received an urgent jolt when the stability of these regions was seriously undermined in 2008. Germany in particular has looked with alarm on what is happening on its eastern flank. The question arose as to whether values or geopolitics was paramount, particularly in relation to the sixth state, Belarus. The EU has long looked disapprovingly on Alexander Lukashenko, the autocratic President of Belarus, as the 'last dictator in Europe'.

However, in the present context, geopolitics, or perhaps realpolitik, has won out, and the EU Commissioner for External Affairs and Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has set the seal on it by visiting Belarus in an official capacity in June 2009. Thus the overall picture is now of the six states in an Eastern Partnership with the European Union, the specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, although Belarus will continue to have a diminished role until there is a regime change. For the present this state is counted onboard.

Importantly, the issue of NATO membership runs parallel with this initiative. Ukraine and Georgia are eager to prove themselves as members of NATO. Belarus of course remains aloof, locked in a potential political union with Russia, and participating only in co-operation with the Alliance through its 'Partnership for Peace' programme. Nevertheless, communication, though fragile, has been established.

Whether NATO membership was a concomitant backdrop to membership of the EU has long been dismissed with the accession of neutral member states, beginning with Ireland, and now including Austria, Finland and Sweden. It may be asked whether, in the present context, it would be better for the states of the Eastern Partnership to consider this option. It would be less likely to offend Russia, who long considered the Caucasus and the areas covered by these states as a 'sphere of influence', its own backyard, and the pointed translation of the Russian, 'the near abroad'. Of course this is, understandably, an area where Russia feels neuralgia. It finds the EU less threatening than what it perceives as the meddling of the United States of America, and it was not particularly helpful when Joe Biden, the American Vice-President, who on a visit to Georgia rejected the idea of 'spheres of influence', saying that these belonged to the Cold War. Jose Barroso, the EU Commission President, compounded this by saying that 'The Cold War is over, there should be no spheres of influence'. However, as all historians know, the concept of 'spheres of influence' is very much older than the present century or even the last century. Joe Biden must know all about the Monroe Doctrine which the US announced in 1823.

The attitude of Russia vascillates, but since the time of Gorbachev, it has seen the benefits of co-operating with the European Union. When Austria wished to join in the late 1980s, Gorbachev told both the Austrian President and the Austrian Chancellor to go ahead, but 'to remember us'. The six states of the Eastern Partnership are thus in an interesting position: engagement with Russia or engagement with the EU. The EU is a regional power centre, an alternative to Russia. But it becomes apparent that it may be possible, with careful handling, to have both, to the advantage of all three parties. This EU plan, could 'force' Russia to engage with the EU. 'What works with Russia is forced co-operation', says Nicu Popescu, research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 'We are now in (a time of) crisis management'.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, believes in a strong EU presence in its Eastern neighbourhood. 'For the sake of stability on our doorstep, we have decided to move beyond declarations, improve on our up-to-date performance, and offer tangible benefits to our closest neighbours'. Ultimately, do these six states look forward to being members of the European Union?

The Human Rights issue has to be addressed. Minimum standards need to be attained for those countries that want to negotiate an Association agreement, which would intensify economic ties. That would be the next step towards EU membership.

So, interestingly, there has been, in the last six or seven months, a rejigging of those countries queuing up to be candidates for membership. Surprisingly, Iceland is now at the top of the list, likely to be fast-tracked to membership because it is already a member of the European Economic Area, and because of its wish to save its dire financial situation. It is now followed by Macedonia, Croatia, and of course Turkey. In all of these states membership talks have stalled, for all kinds of reasons, some of them outside the control of the parties concerned. It is worth considering the wisdom of Otto von Habsburg the most veteran of all the members of the European Parliament, which he left finally in 1999. As well as being the eldest son of the last reigning ruler of Austria-Hungary, he is a profound student of European history, a history considerably shaped by his family.

'I will tell you', he wrote in 2005, 'that I am absolutely a friend of the entry of Ukraine into the European Union because the Ukrainians have had an old European history, are good Christians and have generally behaved well. ... a part of Ukraine was part of Austria-Hungary and was one of the most constructive and best parts of the country. I also admired very much the freedom fight of the Ukrainians and especially of the Uniate church, which is today the dominant church of at least Southern and Western Ukraine. My son Charles is in touch with the Ukrainians and is, as I write you, again en route to Ukraine for talking with Mr. Yushchenko.

'Something else is for Turkey. I am a friend of the Turks, I like Turkey, but it is certainly not destined to be a part of the European Union. It has an entirely different task in international relations, [...] Turkey has a tremendous task in being a federating force in the Mashrek, where it has enormous prestige, as I know from my visits in that area, and also Turkey is responsible for the Caucasian nations of Islamic religion. If the Turks act like a federating force on these areas, they can contribute much to the international peace.

'In this connection I want to draw your attention on one fact, which shows, what Turkey could do: when the Westerners took over Afghanistan, it was decided that amongst the Western forces there the high command would change each six months. As a consequence the result was that at practically each one of the commands the disorder continued. The one exception was the six months of the Turks, when there was absolute peace in Afghanistan. This shows that Turkey can fulfil the task, which I think is the duty of the country.'

Thus the wisdom and observance from one who was not only a member of the European Parliament for twenty years, but speaks from the position of the legacy and provenance of a family unique in its experience of a volatile but immensely creative region.

So what has been the progress so far in this initiative? As it was partly the Swedes who were responsible for the original plan, it is appropriate that the current Swedish Presidency of the European Union should advance it. Under the terms of the Troika policy, where foreign policy is in the hands of the present, previous and future presidencies, Sweden has been involved since July 1, 2008. In taking over the presidency, it now states that: 'as regards the EU's Eastern Partnership, launched on May 7, in Prague, Stockholm is preparing its "implementation phase", which will establish the various structures envisaged by the plans'. The vagueness of official communiques needs to be made particular.

The Eastern Partnership plan was presented by the foreign minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. It was inaugurated in Prague on May 7, 2009.

The largely symbolic Association agreements come first, with their hopes for eventual membership, possibly in 2020 or later. More practical is the 'legal approximation' and joint 'institution-building' which will affect 76 million people, 46 million of them in Ukraine. The plans are to model the concept on the Stabilisation and Association process used by the EU in the Balkans, including a possible free-trade area encompassing the countries in the region, similar to BAFTA and CEFTA. It is interesting to note that the EU has been used as a template for, among other economic partnerships, the Black Sea Economic Union.

Proceeding cautiously, the Eastern Partnership documents (European Council Declaration of March 2009) do not confirm such priorities as political and economic integration or lifting visas, but it is significant now that progress has been made in similar areas.

The Swedish Presidency hopes that the EU will decide in the autumn to lift the visas requirements for countries that have met the conditions. (Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are specifically mentioned, according to reports) and, as an olive branch to Belarus, in October 2008 the EU suspended a ban against certain Belarussian people for a six-month period, and in March renewed this suspension until the end of 2009.

Ukraine is enthusiastic. Deputy premier Hryhoriy Nemyria said that the project is the way to modernize the country and that the European Partnership policy is welcomed because it uses 'de facto' the same instruments as for EU candidates. Under the European Partnership, Poland and Ukraine have reached a new border agreement replacing visas with simplified permits for Ukrainians, residing within 30 km of the border. Up to 1.5 million people may benefit from this agreement, which came into force on July 1, 2009.

The Eastern Partnership has led to the creation of four multilateral policy platforms, which are: Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; Energy security; and Contacts between people to further and support partners' individual reform efforts. (These include contact with the European Parliament and other stakeholders.)

This broad brush becomes more detailed in the Flagship initiatives, which are:

1. Integrated Border Management Programme

2. Small and Medium enterprises facility

3. Promotion of regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources

4. Development of the Southern energy corridor

5. Co-operation on Prevention, preparedness for and response to natural and man-made disasters

On June 29, 2009, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum was proposed. The Commission of the EU invited all interested parties ... to submit their expressions of interest to participate in the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, with a deadline of August 31, 2009. The European Commission, together with the EU Presidency and the European Economic and Social Committee, will organize the launch of this Forum in Mid-November 2009 in Brussels.

When the European Partnership was launched in Prague in May 2009, Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who is an Austrian, said that while the Sarkozy Plan for the Union for the Mediterranean focused on joint infrastructure projects, this plan would bring eastern nations closer to the EU by aligning them with the bloc's commercial standards. This of course means basically the Acquis Communitaire, which is the basis for the Single Market. All these many regulations need to be legally approximated, and come up to the EU standard. This was done in the past by Austria before accession, and has been largely achieved by Switzerland, making commercial transactions very much easier.

This brings one round to the question of the framework of stability, in which it is hoped all this will be achieved, but what will bring stability? What form of government should be encouraged? What can these states hope for from this Partnership?

Belarus is the least encouraging at the outset. It will only participate at a technical level, due to the EU's opposition to Alexander Luschenko while Russia will be invited to participate in some local initiatives. One of these concerns the Russian enclave Kaliningrad Oblast. The British Ambassador to Belarus said at a farewell news conference in Minsk on 1 September: 'the European Union has certain concerns that recently we have not seen the progress that there was previously [...] If Belarus hopes for a favourable decision, it would be useful for it to do what it needs to.' Yet he pointed to the Eastern Partnership as an indication of the EU's hopes for Belarus. 'One should understand the importance of the Eastern Partnership in a broader sense. It not only allows Belarus to receive some material benefits but also has a symbolic importance. Belarus has been included in one of Europe's main projects for the first time ever, which opens up new doors and opportunities for the country.'

Unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, the Partnership will not have its own secretariat, but would be controlled directly by the European Commission. Germany, France and others are not quite happy with the possibility that the Eastern Partnership will be seen as a stepping stone to membership (especially for Ukraine), while Poland and the other Eastern states have explicitly welcomed this effect. 'We're responding to the demands of these countries', said one EU official, 'and the economic reality is that most of their trade is done with the EU'.

So Belarus can hope for technical dialogues on energy, environment, agriculture, customs, transport and norms and standards. Exploratory talks are ongoing on establishing an economic dialogue, and this year's Annual Action Programme concentrates on the improvement of Belarussian food safety and quality. An Assistance package of 10 million euros has been announced.

Moldova currently aspires to join the European Union, like its neighbour Romania. It has implemented the first three-year Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Its history is convoluted, and it is by no means certain what its eventual government will be. The situation is exascerbated by the breakaway state of Transistria. a strip of land between Moldova and Russia. Its declaration of sovereignty only dates from June 23, 1990, but its history would indicate some kind of separate, autonomous identity.

Georgia and Armenia are ancient states, with histories pre-dating many European states. Georgia was one of the first states to adopt Christianity as an official religion, early in the fourth century. It developed into a famous monarchy in the early Christian centuries, which tied it to the Byzantine empire. Reaching its zenith in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the monarchy, mainly of the famous Bagrationi family, declined, and in 1800 Tsar Paul signed the proclamation of the incorporation of Georgia within the Russian empire, although this was almost certainly not the wish of most Georgians.

It is for this reason that a return to monarchy, specifically a constitutional monarchy, has been strongly proposed in the last two years. It is popular particularly within the Georgian Orthodox Church, and has been strengthened by the marriage of the two branches in February this year. This perhaps would give the required stability, as it has such a long history.

Armenia, similarly, having survived many vicissitudes, had been the first state to adopt Christianity as its religion. The modern republic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Church as a national church; while Azerbaijan claims that it was the first successful attempt to establish a democratic and secular republic in the Moslem world. That title should belong to Turkey, but indeed Azerbaijan can make this claim among the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union.

Without a stable constitutional framework in the countries concerned, this bold EU initiative will make some heavy going, but their own economic interest may be the factor which will provide the impetus for change.

Michael L Nash teaches at Les Roche Gruyeres University of Applied Sciences, Bulle, Switzerland.