$200 MILLION BLUNDER! METHANE WARNINGS WERE REPEATEDLY IGNORED; TOO FEW SOIL TESTS CONDUCTED AT BELMONT SITE.

Byline: Greg Gittrich Staff Writer

The lead developer for the Belmont Learning Center used incomplete environmental tests to repeatedly assure the Los Angeles Fire Department that hazardous levels of explosive methane gas did not pose a threat to school buildings, a Daily News investigation has learned.

Correspondence and technical documents obtained by the Daily News show Kajima Urban Development relied on soil and vapor samples that had been taken almost entirely from the northern portion of the 35-acre site.

Virtually no tests were conducted for the planned locations of the school buildings and retail complex on the south side of the site, documents show.

Fire Department certification of the site's safety was needed for the project to go forward and played an important role in defusing environmental criticism at the time a sharply divided Los Angeles school board was deciding whether to approve the project.

Kajima, a subsidiary of one of the world's largest construction firms, stuck with its analysis until late in the process, only to switch gears after the foundation for the retail shops it was financing had been poured, according to documents and Los Angeles Unified School District officials.

The mitigation measures that Kajima eventually supported, and school officials signed off on, were later called inadequate by district-hired environmental experts who said they would not ensure the safety of students and faculty.

A lack of oversight by LAUSD officials in the face of explicit warnings about the danger of methane gas permitted construction to move forward unabated until an environmental consultant literally stumbled upon the problem in November.

Extensive new test results released last week by the LAUSD Safety Team found methane seeping from the oil field beneath the site of the nation's most expensive school. The explosive gas has been described as pervasive throughout the site and in the buildings.

``You had a project here that was 100 percent designed and 50 percent completed before the necessary investigations were even started,'' said Angelo Bellomo, the top environmental scientist for the Safety Team. ``That's why we have all these problems now.''

Kajima referred questions to its public relations firm, Fleishmann Hilliard, which declined comment.

`Fail-safe' system needed

Belmont stands half-completed, strangled by toxic problems, mismanagement, project delays and alleged cover-up schemes that threaten to push the price tag over $200 million - or force abandonment of the school.

The new tests indicate methane gas would likely accumulate in the buildings and potentially ignite or explode unless a ``fail-safe'' system is installed and maintained without human error for the school's 30- to 50-year life span.

Hot spots of carcinogens, including benzene, and other deadly gases, like hydrogen sulfide, also need to be mitigated.

The new tests have left school board members reeling, and led to calls to abandon Belmont and launch a criminal probe.

``The dream still lives in the immigrant community who need a school,'' said state Sen. Tom Hayden, a Los Angeles Democrat and Belmont critic.

``The promoters of this and bureaucrats at the district had other agendas. They kept exploiting the dream without ever telling the community they might put their children's health at risk, that it might take years to build, and that it would be the most expensive school ever built.

``Those nightmares were hidden from the dreamers. It's arrogance and greed. You have private contractors at the public trough with no one at the district watching the money and making sure the work is done correctly.''

It was widely known that the Belmont site was an old oil field, which isn't unusual in petroleum-rich Los Angeles. But the shallow oil formation under the site, coupled with an unknown number of abandoned wells, presented challenges.

``The existence of the shallow oil field does not represent a fatal flaw,'' Bellomo said.

``It's a matter of getting the information and conducting an investigation to understand the site conditions before you do anything. Even prior to designing the building, you need the information.''

The district's strategy was to deal with unknown environmental problems as construction crews found them and reported them.

The Belmont gamble

In January 1997, shortly before the school board was set to vote on the novel and controversial project, Fire Inspector Joseph Gould was called to a meeting with honchos from Kajima, the school district and the design team.

A lot was riding on Belmont.

It was to be the Taj Mahal of schools - eight academies offering a superior education to 5,300 disadvantaged teen-agers, a gleaming academic monument to quality in the nation's second-largest school district.

The careers of an LAUSD building team led by Dom Shambra and the fortunes of Kajima had been gambled on an unprecedented public-private partnership combining resources in a revenue-generating school and commercial complex that would be a model for cash-strapped communities across the country.

Shambra and Kenneth J. Reizes, Kajima's project executive, and the rest of the team buried Gould in charts, graphs, reports and other data to show where ``potential pockets of methane'' were located.

Approval of the site as safe was an important element in a complex strategy to overcome enormous opposition to the project from well-connected contractors and labor unions trying to organize workers at the New Otani Hotel, owned by Kajima's Japanese parent company.

In a March 6, 1997, letter to the Fire Department, Reizes wrote soil testing had found ``no petroleum-saturated soil'' south of Colton Street, on the larger portion of the L-shaped property.

``As you can see, the only enclosed structure in close proximity to gas producing soils north of Colton is the field house and toilet facilities located between the grandstands and the baseball diamond,'' Reizes wrote.

Arguing the city Department of Building and Safety and the Office of the State Architect were not authorized to sign off on a methane mitigation, Reizes asked fire officials to review the findings and provide the construction permits.

``I accepted their plans based upon the best information available: the tests they provided to me,'' Gould said last week. ``The stuff they gave me didn't give me any indications there would be problems.''

Reizes failed to note that nearly all the soil and vapor tests he cited had been taken from the northern end of the property.

In fact, almost none of the soil samples came from the southern portion of the property, where the buildings would be, according to a mapping grid prepared by Environmental Strategies Corp., which oversaw the latest round of tests.

Reflecting on the presentation and follow-up meetings with fire officials, Gould remarked: ``They came back a few times and seemed nervous about it. . . . I was wondering when someone would call me about this.''

Exhaustive sampling - 900 soil, vapor and groundwater tests - completed recently by Environmental Strategies at the request of the district found ``methane everywhere.''

``Methane is pervasive on the site, low concentrations but pervasive,'' said Tom Watson, Environmental Strategies vice president. ``It is everywhere.''

`Don't build over oil wells'

School officials had been been cautioned repeatedly about potential methane problems as early as 1993. At that time, the LAUSD owned 11 acres and was about to buy the adjacent 24 acres for Belmont.

In August 1993, Richard Baker, a deputy for the state Division of Oil and Gas, recommended installing a methane barrier and venting system under any buildings to harmlessly release the gas into the air.

Three months later, the state Department of Education advised the district to conduct geotechnical and environmental studies on ``potential risks of oil fields.'' Those tests were never fully completed, records show.

The most straightforward warning was delivered - this time in person by Baker - on Nov. 18, 1996, during the school board's review of the final environmental impact report.

``(The) Division of Oil and Gas' policy regarding any building project - whether it's your project or anybody else's - is don't build over oil wells. That's our policy. But we don't regulate land use,'' Baker said.

``We can't say one way or the other whether the project is safe or not.

``We'll tell you that if you do it the way that we have prescribed over the years . . . that it's as safe as you can get developing in an oil field. And that's as far as we'll warranty it. We make no warranties.''

Unusual decision

Despite Baker's comments and the incomplete status of the environmental report, David W. Cartwright, the district's outside legal counsel for Belmont, assured the board it was safe to go forward.

``I cut my teeth as an oil and gas lawyer. So I'm not exactly unfamiliar with this topic,'' said Cartwright, who worked for the same law firm, O'Melveny & Myers, that represented Kajima.

Three years earlier, Cartwright had negotiated a deal with Shimizu Corp. of Japan for the 24-acre parcel.

Cartwright asked Shimizu to assess environmental issues on the property. The firm's soil samples were part of the data given to the Fire Department.

Kajima used the test results despite a warning from LAUSD officials during the final developer selection phase in 1994. The request for proposals stated: ``The district makes no warranty on the environmental conditions of the site. . . . (The) district makes no representation as to the accuracy of (environmental studies performed).''

When the board finally voted on Belmont in April 1997, only Julie Korenstein and David Tokofsky voted against it.

In February, LAUSD officials removed Cartwright amid growing concerns about methane and toxic contamination at Belmont, but he continues as outside counsel on other issues.

`Welcome aboard'

Days after the district approved Kajima's contract, Sepich Associates, a methane specialist and engineering firm, submitted a proposal to Kajima to mitigate the explosive gas at Belmont.

Referring to previous meetings between Kajima, the LAUSD and the Fire Department, the proposal concluded the ``methane hazard area'' was located ``north of Colton Street. . . . Areas south of Colton are not to be considered to have methane hazard.''

Shambra, LAUSD director of planning and development, signed off on the $27,000 design and management plan.

In a May 2, 1997, letter to Sepich, Kajima's Reizes wrote: ``Welcome aboard, and we look forward to a successful project.''

From that point on, dozens of documents reveal Reizes dealt directly with the methane specialists. Most correspondence was copied to LAUSD construction and management officials, most notably Ray Rodriguez.

``I really don't recall that in detail,'' Rodriguez said last week. ``It was not my job. My job was to make sure those guys did their work and were proceeding. It appeared (Kajima) and Sepich were working together to create a design to fix the methane problems.

``The project managers from Kajima were very concerned about the methane. . . . We relied heavily on the expertise of Sepich. They were the experts in this field. We looked to the professionals.''

Reports by others

As Sepich designed a technical fix for the northern portion of the site, Kajima continued to send documents to fire officials supporting its claim that methane was not a problem on the property's south side.

On June 11, 1997, Reizes sent forward a site report by Law/Crandall, an environmental consultant hired by the district through Kajima.

Law/Crandall took six borings, but its study relied heavily on the previous samples, including the Shimizu tests.

``These report copies were incomplete. . . . It appears the reports were purged to present pertinent material concisely,'' Law/Crandall wrote.

Law/Crandall did not back away from drawing conclusions but carefully specified many of its findings came from work completed ``by others.''

``Based upon previous methane studies by others and LAW's observation and analytical testing . . . it appears that methane gas does not pose a significant environmental concern in the areas of the proposed enclosed structures south of Colton Street.''

Those ``enclosed structures'' include nearly the entire complex, where methane has subsequently been found.

Law/Crandall would not comment, directing inquiries to the district.

Barry Groveman, the lead attorney for the district's Safety Team, described the Law/Crandall report as ``obviously inaccurate.''

``These documents evidence the lack of a thorough environmental review and oversight. We have found methane in those buildings, so that shows this isn't accurate.''

Groveman said the Safety Team had never seen the documents.

The Daily News' findings ``show the clear need for the thorough investigation'' being carried out by Don Mullinax, the LAUSD director of internal audits and special investigations, he said.

Big changes

The first challenge after groundbreaking in mid-1997 was excavating the site.

The Belmont complex sits partially atop a concrete podium, erected to level a severely sloping hill. Parts of the sloping site had to be cut and terraced to make way for the academy houses, athletic facilities, retail stores and parking lots.

Kajima had agreed to pay for the shopping mall and recoup its expenses by leasing out the property, officials said. With the mitigation system planned for only the southern side of the site, Sepich decided to run its proposed technical fix past the city Department of Building Safety.

The firm's president, John Sepich, noted in a Jan. 6, 1998, letter to the city that the system only dealt with the site's north side and that the ``data was developed and provided . . . by the owners' representatives (Kajima).''

In an interview last week, Sepich said: ``We were hired by Kajima specifically to design a methane system for north of Colton. Then, it's my understanding, that during the grading operations, Law/Crandall was monitoring the earth moving and detected combustible vapors. At that point Kajima asked us to do some reports south of Colton.''

Sepich took 12 additional samples - all in the supposedly clean southern portion of the site, according to a memorandum he sent to Reizes.

After months of insisting that hazardous levels of methane were not a problem near school buildings, Reizes sent a letter on Feb. 25, 1998, to the district supporting new tests.

Samples were to be taken from the proposed sites for the academies, gyms, administration building, multipurpose building, community center and aquatic center, the letter states.

The tests found methane and hydrogen sulfide in nearly all of the locations, prompting Sepich to suggest placing a membrane under the buildings, letters and financial documents said.

There were no plans for a methane barrier at the retail portion.

``We could not test there because there was an existing building there,'' Sepich said last week.

After months of wrangling, a methane barrier system - one now deemed inadequate - had been designed.

A Thanksgiving visit

With construction in full swing, the Safety Team's Bellomo visited Belmont just before Thanksgiving 1998 to evaluate construction and remediation efforts.

Bellomo said he refused to approve Kajima's plan to pour concrete for a classroom building because the state Department of Toxic Substance Control had raised methane concerns.

After a preliminary review in November 1998, the DTSC concluded the site was never sufficiently assessed and noted LAUSD failed to comply with a state law requiring its approval.

In February, the district mounted a $1.4 million effort to fully define toxic conditions, assess health and safety risks, and prepare an adequate mitigation plan to obtain state certification for site occupancy.

Nearly half of the complex had been completed before the Safety Team and DTSC stepped in. Under a partial construction ban imposed in February, work has continued on buildings with previously poured foundations.

Kajima has filed notice that it may charge the district $3.4 million for environmental delays under terms of its contract, sources said.

`Never be cleaned up'

On June 15, John P. Black, vice president of engineering for Environmental Strategies, told the school board methane and toxics create a permanent health risk at Belmont.

``You cannot remediate the Belmont site. You cannot clean it up,'' Black said. ``What you can do is mitigate it, reduce the risk.''

Black said the planned methane barrier system met minimum legal requirements but allowed methane and other toxics to accumulate beneath the buildings and had no emergency venting system. The retail structure also needed mitigation.

A week later, Bellomo told the board the entire first floor of the complex should be off-limits unless it can be retrofitted with an adequate venting system. He said the Sepich-designed methane control system needed to be vastly improved.

``I don't agree,'' Sepich responded Friday. ``Our firm has designed most of the methane control systems in Los Angeles in the last 10 years, including the Los Angeles Central Library a few blocks away.''

``We've protected thousands of structures from very similar situations. We have never had methane inside the building after we are done. I would question how many designs has that crew previously has done. To my knowledge it's either none or not that many. I don't believe they have expertise in this field.''

Beyond the methane issue, Groveman warned costs, liability and uncertainties about the health risks must be considered.

``If the school district cannot guarantee the mitigation system we approve will be fail-safe for the entire life of the school,'' Groveman said, ``they should not go forward and attempt to open it.''

CAPTION(S):

2 maps, photo

Map: (1 -- 2) Belmont Toxic Testing: Then and Now

The 35-acre site of the Belmont Learning Center had undergone a barrage of tests prior to construction. Unfortunately, these tests largely excluded the land directly beneath the school buildings, land which later tests have shown to have methane contamination.

SOURCE: Environmental Strategies Corporation

Bradford Mar/Daily News

Photo: ``Potential methane is located . . . away from all planned school buildings.''

- Kenneth J. Reizes

Kajima project executive for Belmont in June 11, 1997 letter to Los Angeles City Fire Department.