"Supremacy on the sea": definition and interpretation.

The three centuries old history of the Russian navy has been marked by an almost continual dispute over whether the country needs a navy in the first place. And if so, what kind of a navy should be built? Affirmative answers to these questions were given by Peter the Great, the great founder and creator of the national navy. His successors, however, not just once deviated from the general line that he had firmly mapped out. Over the past 300 years, the history of the Russian navy has been punctuated by recurring periods when the navy, due to its perceived uselessness and costliness, went into decline. One of the principal reasons for that was the fact that Russian rulers lacked continuity in the foreign policy sphere as well as a coherent state strategy capable of setting sound guidelines for the development of the country and its armed forces for decades to come. Another serious factor here was the absence of a coherent concept for the navy and its place within the structure of the national armed forces or the complex of tasks that the navy could effectively address.

The resumption, in the specialist military press, of the discussion about the purview of the naval science, (1) the return of the somewhat forgotten terms "naval warfare" and "naval (sea) supremacy," and the recognition of their objective nature are once again compelling the naval science to formulate these notions by taking into account the present level of the development of the military theory and practice. In this context, it is of critical importance not to lose continuity and not to reinvent the wheel.

In his article, K voprosu o gospodstve na more, E.V. Vassilyev, notes that "after Colomb and Maham, there were no serious studies on sea command and sea supremacy." (2) It must be said that this is not quite the case, however. Throughout the 20th century, the world's leading naval powers had been conducting research into the theory of naval warfare, while almost each major country has made its own significant achievements in the sphere of naval strategy. Suffice it to mention such prominent researchers as J. Corbett [Yu. Korbett], (3) D. Creswell [D. Kresuel], (4) W. Wegener [V. Vegener], (5) O. Groos, (6) and R Barjot [Barzho], (7) as well as a number of others who made a substantial contribution to the development of the concept of "sea (naval) supremacy." This country, which has an extensive and fruitful experience in this field, has not been an exception here either.

Until works by Mahan and Colomb were published, there were no fundamental studies on matters of naval strategy or naval warfare in Russia. Consideration of theoretical propositions concerning the employment of the navy was, rather, the domain of army officers whose focus was mainly on joint army and naval operations in defending littoral (coastal) areas. In 1874, a series of lecturers by M.N. Mazyukevich (8) were published, providing a more or less wide coverage to matters of interaction between land and naval forces. In the mid-1890s, matters of interaction of land and naval forces were included in a course of lectures on military strategy that was read by Lt. Col. N.A. Orlov at the Navy Academy and the Artillery Academy. Subsequently, his revised lecturers were published for a broad military readership. (9) Still, in spite of an insufficient theoretical basis, the concept of "sea supremacy" per se was well known to Russian seamen. It was used to describe a certain situation at sea or at a certain part of the naval theater of operations as early as in the course of the Northern War (1700-1721). It was also well known to officers who had taken part in the Archipelago Operation. Admiral G.A. Spiridov, in his report on the victory at Chesma, wrote: "On the night of the 26th, the enemy fleet was attacked, smashed, destroyed, burned, broken, sunk, turned to ashes; as a result, we achieved supremacy in the whole of the Archipelago." (10)

Nor did the content of this notion arouse any doubts with Admiral F.F. Ushakov, who, on May 11, 1791, received the following instructions from Count Potemkin: "I hereby direct you to look out for the enemy in all parts of the Black Sea and ensure our supremacy on the Black Sea so that our shores remain inviolate." (11)

In the 1870s, the concept of "naval supremacy" asserted itself, gaining such currency in the domestic navy that it began to be used in the training process at the Naval Corps. Thus, Lt. Capt. E.V. Berezin, in a textbook on naval history, wrote: "When war begins with the participation of naval forces, achieving sea supremacy is usually the first and foremost task. With a substantial disparity or imbalance of forces, this task is fulfilled by directly blocking the roadsteads and harbors where enemy squadrons are deployed, and then blocking the entire coast line; in the absence of such disparity, this supremacy has to be achieved by effectively engaging the enemy's naval forces, and then a blockade is set up with the aim of destroying the adversary's merchant trade and all of its relations conducted by sea." (12)

Following the publication of Mahan and Colomb works, the concept was closely studied by Admiral S.O. Makarov and Nikolaev Naval Academy Professor N.L. Klado. Klado was one of the first researchers to consider the concept of "naval supremacy" through the prism of military works by K. Clausewitz, H. Jomini, and G.A. Leer, analyzing the works by virtually all navy experts of the late 19th-early 20th century. (13) To understand his position better, it will be appropriate to highlight the differences in Mahan's and Colomb's approaches toward the content of this notion.

Mahan understood "supremacy on the sea" as military supremacy that can result in prolonged control over an adversary's strategic merchant marine centers. In this definition, naval supremacy is the ability to prevent an adversary from shipping and navigation. Complete supremacy can only be achieved after an adversary's navy has been destroyed or after its naval forces have been reduced to a negligible size, incapable of conducting any significant combat action in the course of a war. Mahan's definition of "supremacy on the sea" closely correlates with K. Clausewitz's description of the action to deprive an adversary of the ability to resist. This is in fact the ultimate objective of warfare per se. Both achieving supremacy on the sea and depriving an adversary of the ability to resist on land, thus forcing him to sign a peace treaty on any conditions, are means to achieving an infinite political goal. So Mahan's definition of "supremacy on the sea" is absolute and has no gradation.

Colomb believed that "supremacy on the sea" meant ensuring control over the water surface with effects analogous to those ensured by the seizure of territory and ensuring control of it on land. Tracts of territory and water area can be occupied, but until an adversary's armed forces have been routed, it is too soon to talk about depriving an adversary of the ability to resist--that is to say, until an adversary's naval capability has been eliminated, there is no cause to talk about supremacy on the sea. Colomb noted that a naval force, even one discredited by a defeat and even one that is inferior to an adversary's, nonetheless constitutes a force that can effectively paralyze the action by a victorious navy both on the sea as well as on land. So Colomb contemplated three states of the sea in the context of landing operations and hostilities on the shores as the categories of strategic conditions of the sea: indifference [indifferentnoye]; doubtful seapower [osparivaemoe]; and ensured seapower [obespechennoe obladanie], Importantly, not even "ensured seapower" covers exactly the content of "supremacy on the sea." Seapower, in Colomb's interpretation, rather corresponds to superiority in force--temporary or permanent, which gives the side that has this superiority an obvious advantage. It is only absolute control of the sea that is synonymous to Mahan's supremacy on the sea. The degrees of domination on the sea do not have hard and fast lines between them, gradually passing from one into another.

It is important to understand the essence of Mahan's definition of supremacy in the context of K. Clausewitz's war theory since it sets the right approach in developing shipbuilding programs. Here is what N.L. Klado wrote on the matter at hand: "Different wars can require different degrees of the straining of efforts and different forms of applying these efforts, but still, the requisite ability by own forces to strain efforts to the maximum degree possible cannot be gauged other than by the extreme straining of efforts on the part of the most powerful of possible adversaries. The composition of military force cannot be changed at will when war is imminent, but especially when it has already begun. This in particular applies to naval warfare in so far as it is impossible to package on short notice or improvise a credible battle force fit for an "ultimate" war. So considerations about 'limited' political objectives or their possible effects on the form of warfare must under no circumstances be factored into the shipbuilding program of states that are able to wage an 'ultimate' war and have adversaries able to wage such a war. These considerations are only suitable for the conduct of war per se, once the 'limited nature' of a political goal has been established and once we as well as our adversary have expressed an attitude to this goal." (14) Following Mahan's theory, N.L. Klado defined the principal task confronting the navy as follows: "The basic purpose of employing a naval force against an enemy target is to break the enemy's naval power, thus either protecting the state's littoral areas from attack or seizure by an adversary's naval force or to take control of the adversary's littoral areas." (15) These, in fact, were the views on naval supremacy and the required configuration of the naval force that the Russian navy had at the time that World War I broke out.

The naval war theory was further developed in the Soviet period. In the period between the wars, both representatives of the old academic school and young Red Army and Navy commanders took an active part in this process. A substantial contribution to the elaboration of the naval war theory was made by N.L. Klado, B.B. Zherve, L.G. Goncharov, N.V. Novikov, M.A. Petrov, N.A. Garsoev, V.A. Belli, and others. (16) In the 1930s, after the so called Young School gained the upper hand, the use of the term "naval supremacy" was expressly dropped from specialist use, but already in December 1940, at the Second Conference of Representatives of the Main Naval Staff, the Directorate for Naval Aviation, and the Naval Academy, chaired by Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, people's commissar for the Red Navy, the position on the theory of supremacy on the sea was reviewed. In his report, titled On the Character of Modern Warfare and Operations on the Sea, Admiral I.S. Isakov, first deputy people's commissar for the Red Navy and chief of the Main Naval Staff, noted: "This theory came under heavy attack and was finally reduced to such a state that at one time people were even afraid to talk about it, but nothing new was proposed in exchange, so as a result, there was a certain lack of coherence in thinking ... But we seamen must not go to another extreme since a number of propositions of the naval supremacy theory make good sense. This theory should not be used in all circumstances since it has become largely archaic, nor should it be rejected completely, anathemized." (17)

This position to a very large degree predetermined the direction of the evolution of the naval theory in the post-war period when the problem of supremacy of the sea was a subject of two discussions (in 1946-1947 and in 1955), held in the pages of the journals Morskoy sbornik and Voennaia mysl'. In the course of discussion, several different definitions of the concept of "supremacy on the sea" were proposed.

Thus, V.A. Alafuzov opined that "the zone of supremacy by our forces should be understood as an area where our forces will be able to fulfill all tasks, while the enemy will not be in a position to thwart the fulfillment of our tasks, only giving pinpricks but not causing real problems." (18) At the same time, supremacy was understood not only as supremacy on the sea but also in the air. Supremacy can be either temporary or permanent. "Supremacy is created by a certain correlation (balance) of forces, the disposition of bases, and geographic conditions," V.A. Alafuzov pointed out. Meanwhile, the "essence of naval warfare, in the final analysis, consisted in the struggle for expanding the zone of permanent supremacy across the entire theater of operations."

These theses were subsequently expanded and used as a basis for a course of lectures on strategy and operational art by Rear Admiral V.A. Belli. (19)

The principal opponent of this view was Vice Admiral I.D. Eliseev. In a number of articles, (20) he criticized the position of V.A. Alafuzov and V.A. Belli, presenting his own definition of the essence of naval warfare as "fulfillment of tasks arising from a single strategy in a maritime sector which necessitate the achievement of a particular type of permanent or temporary supremacy." Types referred to strategic, operational, and tactical supremacy.

I.D. Eliseev's position to a very large extent echoed the views of representatives of the interwar school and played into the hands of those opposed to a strengthening of the navy's positions and its independence since it denied the "decisive role of sea power in modern warfare and the treatment of 'supremacy on the sea' as the essential core of naval warfare." These articles had a broad response with officers upholding the views of the academic school. The 1948 discussion, however, was short-lived. In April 1949, Morskoy sbornik published an editorial titled "Against the Reactionary Ideology of Cosmopolitism," marking a crackdown on the naval science. In one article, Maj. Gen. S.F. Nayda, the editor in chief of Morskoy sbornik, attacked the Naval Academy whose faculty members, according to Nayda, were using "vicious" textbooks--Istoriya voyny na more [A History of War at Sea] by A.N. Shcheglov and Istoriya voyny na more by A. Shtentzel. (21) These works were declared "harmful." Subsequently, a whole concept evolved for fighting "servility and obsequiousness before Western culture and science" and "rootless cosmopolitanism" in the Navy since "it is impossible to learn anything new from the degenerate bourgeoisie and its modern military theoreticians." (22) The works by Russian "bourgeois historians" A.V. Viskovatyy, F.F. Veselago, P.I. Belavents, A.N. Shcheglov, and others were rejected completely, while "bourgeois followers" such as N.L. Klado, M.A. Petrov, and B.B. Zherve were accused of "engaging in counterrevolutionary activities under the guise of scientific and research work." (23) The works by all those who had laid the foundations of the Soviet naval theory--V.A. Alafuzov, G.A. Stepanov, A.V. Shtal, and others--were declared the "most harmful manifestations of bourgeois influence." Similar charges were leveled against the naval historians S.P. Moiseev and N.V. Novikov.

During this period, the Navy's scientific and research cadres were seriously weakened. All of that dangerously impeded analysis and generalization of the naval experience in World War II, which also affected the status of both naval theory and the Navy as a whole.

Even so, the creative work by naval scientists and researchers was not terminated completely. Thus, Prof V.A. Belli, at the Naval Academy, headed up a program to develop strategic interaction between naval and land forces, laying the groundwork for a naval strategy that evolved in the early 1950s. Its definition first appeared in the draft Regulations on the Conduct of Naval Operations (NMO-51), noting in particular that "naval warfare, being an essential component of general warfare, is based on naval strategy, arising directly from the state's unified military strategy." (24) The Regulations defined the area of application of this new essential component of the naval art: "methods of the best possible employment of naval forces for achieving victory over the enemy. Based on the propositions of the state's unified military strategy, naval strategy encompasses matters pertaining to the conduct of war at sea and determines the direction of the main attack on maritime theaters of operations in the interest of attaining the objectives arising from the state's military strategy, which is predetermined by politics."

Achievement of strategic supremacy on the sea was deemed as the best possible prerequisite to the conduct of successful naval operations. Supremacy on the sea was understood as "a favorable situation (the correlation of forces, their basing, organization of the theater of operations, etc.) wherein an adversary is not able to prevent us from achieving our objectives in the course of an operation." (25) Achievement of supremacy on the sea was accompanied by the attainment of superiority in the air. This definition of "supremacy on the sea" was very much in conformity with G. Douhet's [Due's] definition of "supremacy in the air." "Having supremacy in the air means being under such conditions that make it possible to conduct air combat operations against an adversary who is incapable of any significant analogous action," G. Douhet wrote. He goes on to say: "Having air supremacy does not at all mean that an adversary will have absolutely no flying capability. There is nothing absolute for everything is only relative--even air superiority. Yet it is relative in the sense that an adversary over whom we have air superiority, although it has not lost absolutely all flying capability, will be unable to conduct any combat action that could in any way tip the scale of victory in its favor." (26) This concept was predicated completely on Mahan and Colomb's classic theory.

Naval strategy evolved under extremely difficult conditions. In 1953, a military scientific conference held at the Military Academy of the General Staff, rejected the sheer existence of the category of "naval strategy" per se since its recognition was purportedly in conflict with the principle of the state's unified naval strategy. That triggered the resumption of two discussions in the naval press whose subjects were closely linked with each other. The first discussion was concerned with clarifying the term "supremacy on the sea" in modern conditions, while the second was connected with the subject matter of the naval science as a whole.

The 1955 discussion opened with a publication by Captains 1st Rank D.A. Vershinin and L.M. Eremeev, offering a new definition of the term under review. These authors posited that "supremacy on the sea is a constantly changing aggregate of interrelated conditions evolving as a result of planned, continuous and active operations against an adversary at sea, in the air, and on the coast adjacent to this part of the sea (or theater of naval operations) wherein the naval forces of a given side (which has superiority over the other side) are able to conduct successful combat operations aimed to fulfill their tasks, while the adversary can only create minor difficulties for the dominant side." (27) Deeming this definition too lengthy and unwieldy, Capt. 1st Rank N.M. Sobolev, proposed his own definition: "Supremacy on the sea is a sum total of favorable conditions wherein naval forces can successfully fulfill operational or strategic tasks that are set to them, while the adversary, being unable to fulfill its own tasks, can only create inconsequential problems for the dominant side." (28) Admiral V.I. Platonov offered his own interpretation of the term: "Strategic (operational) supremacy should be defined as a favorable operational situation on the whole of the maritime theater of operations, achieved over a certain period in the interest of ensuring the success of all operations and thwarting all of the adversary's attempts to disrupt their preparation or conduct." (29)

Adm. V.A. Alafuzov also took part in the debate, publishing an article titled Zavoevanie gospodstva na more v usloviyakh sovremennoy voyny (Achieving Supremacy on the Sea in Modern Warfare) (30) which, based on the aforementioned definition, offered an in-depth analysis of the issue at hand. He distinguished between general and local supremacy, temporary and permanent supremacy, and partial and complete supremacy, classifying it by space, time, and degree. Just like a number of other experts, Adm. V.A. Alafuzov did not share the view on the division of naval supremacy into strategic, operational, and tactical.

It is worth mentioning that this discussion did not have a logical conclusion. In February 1956, Fleet Adm. of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov, commander in chief of the Navy and first deputy defense minister of the USSR, was dismissed from all of his official positions. Large surface warships began to be decommissioned and scrapped for metal. In the new political environment that had evolved, the work to advance the naval theory once again began to acquire a politically motivated nature. It became unsafe to express one's point of view, even in the course of a scientific discussion. As a result, the viewpoint amenable to the country's political leadership prevailed.

In 1957, the Naval Academy prepared draft Regulations on the Conduct of Naval Operations (NMO-57) wherein the term and the concept of "naval strategy" per se were replaced with "strategic employment of the Navy." The draft retained such a category of the naval art as "strategic supremacy on the sea," while such concepts as "naval warfare" and "war at sea" were expunged from the text.

Regulations on the Conduct of Naval Operations (NMO-63), which were drafted under the aegis of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (prior to that, all regulations had been prepared by the naval department), made no reference to naval strategy at all. Nor did they set the task of achieving supremacy on the sea although the task of routing an adversary's naval forces was considered to be one of the principal ones.

In the late 1970s, the term "naval science" was withdrawn from use, but not even that could stop the development of the naval theory. In 1976, S.G. Gorshkov published a book titled Morskaya moshch gosugarstva (The State's Sea Power) with some leading naval experts and scientists contributing to it. It offered the following definition of the term "supremacy on the sea": "Creation, in a certain part of the theater of operations and for a certain period, of favorable conditions for the successful fulfillment of basic tasks by a large grouping of naval forces and at the same time of conditions preventing an adversary from accomplishing its own tasks or thwarting the operations by the opposing side." (31) This is in fact the definition of supremacy on the sea that our navy had been with at its finest period.

Today, the generally accepted definition of the concept at hand is contained in the Voenno Morskoy Slovar (A Dictionary of Naval Terminology) and other official sources: "Supremacy on the sea is a decisive superiority by one of the warring sides over another on a sea (oceanic) theater of operations or in a certain part (area) thereof which ensures it favorable conditions for the successful fulfillment of combat tasks without any substantial opposition on the part of an adversary." Supremacy on the sea presupposes simultaneous supremacy in the air. It is achieved mainly by routing the main groupings of the enemy's naval forces. By scale, it can be "strategic, operational, or tactical." (32)

Capt. 1st Rank E.V. Vassilyev proposes the following definition: "Supremacy on the sea is such a state in the course of combat action whereby the military groupings of one of the opposing sides in a certain (designated) area of sea or ocean are absent or unable to conduct military action, while the forces of the opposing side reliably ensure the combat stability of its troops and forces, command and control, basing, logistic, and all support systems as well as protection against all types of enemy impacts on industrial installations and facilities in the non-military sector. It can be permanent or temporary. The zone of supremacy should be located within the areas of air supremacy, the declared areas of combat action at sea, and complete control over the operational situation on the ground. To achieve and maintain supremacy, offensive and defensive mixed arms groupings of forces and troops, respectively, are created." (33) Let us explore this definition.

We will exclude from this definition "protection against all types of enemy impacts on industrial installations and facilities in the non-military sector" since in the present conditions, the use of precision guided weapon systems and missiles makes it possible to hit targets on enemy territory not only from adjacent maritime areas but also from outside these areas. Furthermore, historical experience shows that supremacy on the sea cannot protect against combat impacts by the enemy's special devices and assets not civilian installations but even the naval forces themselves.

Before we analyze the first part of the definition, let us look at the aforementioned interpretation of the concept of "supremacy on the sea"--that is to say, the century old experience in domestic naval thought. Virtually all of the definitions contain a phrase that reflects the core essence of supremacy on the sea--i.e., favorable conditions (a favorable situation), wherein an adversary is unable to thwart the objectives of our operations (or "can only give pinpricks without causing real problems"). If we compare these definitions with G. Douhet's definition of "supremacy in the air" we will see that they are almost identical.

Now let us rephrase them with regard to the navy: "supremacy on the sea, in my understanding, does not at all mean that an adversary will be absolutely unable to sail. There is nothing absolute; everything is relative, even supremacy on the sea. But it is relative in the sense that although the adversary is not absolutely denied any opportunity to sail, it will be unable, while sailing, to carry out combat operations that could in any way tip the scale in its favor."

Now let us address the weak points of the definition given by Capt. 1st Rank E.V. Vassilyev. He suggests that in the absence, in a certain (designated) part of the sea or ocean, of military forces on one side or in the event that they are unable to conduct military action, the other side has supremacy, provided that it can reliably (with 100 percent guarantee) ensure the ability of all of its groupings of forces and troops to stand up in combat and ensure the operational stability of command and control, basing, logistic and all types of support systems. Is this really so?

* Example 1. In conducting an operation in Norway, the Nazi navy was acting in an area where the British navy did not have a presence, while the second condition was also met at the initial stage of the operation. Does this mean that the Nazis had supremacy in that area? It is the view of the present author that they did not. Furthermore, in planning the operation, the Nazi command took into account the fact that they would have to act in the face of British supremacy on the sea. Would it be right to say that the Nazi navy had established temporary supremacy? Again, this is not the view of the present author.

* Example 2. Throughout World War I, the German blue water force, when deployed at base, ensured a favorable operational regime in the area of the Helhland bay, in full compliance with the proposed definition. The British Grand Fleet often stayed at base. Does this mean that the Germans had supremacy in the North Sea, even on the high seas? This does not seem to be the case.

* Example 3. In the course of the British-Argentine conflict, the British navy established its supremacy in the conflict zone. At the same time, the Argentine Navy and Air Force conducted military operations in that zone that actually had a substantial impact on the outcome of the British operation.

Thus, there seems to be little cause to abandon the earlier definition: Supremacy on the sea--favorable conditions on a sea (oceanic) theater of operations in a particular area (zone) thereof for the successful accomplishment of combat tasks on the sea without serious opposition from an adversary. There is no doubt, however, that further elaboration of the theory of supremacy on the sea is a highly topical and important task.

NOTES:

1. I.M. Kapitanets, "Voenno-morskaya nauka--osnova vozrozhdeniya i stroitelstva sbalan-sirovannogo voennogo flota Rossii," Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, 2003, pp. 18-26; M. Gareev, "Rol i mesto voenno-morskoy nauki v obshchey sisteme voennykh nauk," Morskoy sbornik, No. 8, 2003, pp 39-46 ff.

2. Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 2003, pp. 43-52.

3. Yu. Korbett, Nekotorye printsipy morskoy strategii, Moscow, 1932.

4. D. Kresuel, Voyna na more, Gosvoenmorizdat NKVMF Soyuza SSR, Moscow, Leningrad, 1941.

5. V. Vegener, "Morskaya strategiya mirovoy voyny," in: Operativno-takticheskie vzglyady germanskogo flota: Sb. statey iz germanskoy voenno-morskoy literatury, Gosvoenmorizdat NKVMF Soyuza SSR, Moscow, Leningrad, 1941.

6. O. Groos, Uchenie o morskoy voyne v svete opyta mirovoy voyny, Gosizdat, Moscow, Leningrad, 1930.

7. P. Barzho, Flot v atomnyy vek, Foreign Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1959.

8. M.N. Mazyukevich, Pribrezhnaya voyna. Desantnye ekspeditsii i ataka primorskikh ukrepleniy. Voenno-istoricheskiy ocherk, St. Petersburg, 1847.

9. N.A. Orlov, Sovmestnye deystviya sukhoputnoy armii i flota, St. Petersburg, 1894.

10. Boevaya letopis russkogo flota, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1948, p. 97.

11. Admiral Ushakov: Dokumenty, Vol. 1, Voenmorizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1951, p. 482.

12. Quoted from: S.G. Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch gosudarstva, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 374.

13. N.L. Klado, Etyudypo strategii, Petrograd, 1914; Realisty Club Publishers, Moscow, 1997.

14. Ibid., p. 286.

15. Quoted from: V.D. Dotsenko, Istoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva, Vol. 1, Sudostroeniye Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 338.

16. For more detail, see: Razvitie teorii voyny na more i eye vliyanie na razvitie voenno-morskogo iskusstva 1890-1914, VMUPPP, St. Petersburg, 1998; Razvitie teorii voyny na more i eye vliyanie na razvitie voenno-morskogo iskusstva 1918-1945, VMI, St. Petersburg, 2000.

17. Russkiy arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya, Vol. 12 (1-2), pp. 256-257.

18. V.A. Alafuzov, "O sushchnosti morskikh operatsiy," Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, 1946, p. 14.

19. V.A. Belli, Teoreticheskie osnovy vedeniya voyny i operatsiy na more, Tip. VMA, Leningrad, 1947.

20. I.D. Eliseev, "K voprosu o gospodstve na more," Voennaia mysl', No. 6, 1947, pp. 36-46; "K voprosu ob osnovakh vedeniya voyny na more," Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, 1948, pp. 3-20; "K voprosu o vedenii voennykh deystviy na more," Morskoy sbornik, No. 1, 1949, pp. 51-72.

21. Morskoy sbornik, No. 5, 1948, p. 14.

22. Morskoy sbornik, No. 1, 1949, p. 10.

23. Ibidem.

24. V.D. Dotsenko, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 371.

25. Ibid., p. 372.

26. Quoted from: P. Votye, Voennaia doktrina generala Due, Moscow, 1937, p. 69.

27. Morskoy sbornik, No. 3, 1955, p. 7.

28. Ibid., No. 6, pp. 23-24.

29. Ibid., No. 9, p. 16.

30. V.D. Dotsenko, op. cit., p. 305.

31. S.G. Gorshkov, op. cit., p. 378.

32. Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 2003, p. 45.

33. Ibidem.

Capt. 1st Rank E.F. PODSOBLYAEV

Candidate of Historical Sciences