"Roaring mice against the tide": the South Pacific Islands and agenda-building on global warming.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most intriguing areas of policy analysis is agenda building, how issues are recognized (or reframed) as problems and then placed upon the agenda to be discussed. Problems need to be recognized as such before any sort of policy can (or will) be constructed to address the situation. As with any aspect of policy (or politics more widely), it is important to note that sometimes nondecisions can be as pertinent, if not more so, than actual decisions. Whether something is a "problem" that needs to be addressed or is a "natural" or perhaps "unproven" issue that requires "more study"; or whether an issue is discussed at all within the political realm are all potential outcomes in the agenda-building arena.

This paper details the efforts of the South Pacific island nations to place the issue of global climate change onto the international political agenda. An issue of great import for the South Pacific islands for nearly a decade now, the issue of global climate change reached its greatest visibility with the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio. Efforts to make the promises of Rio a reality continue today, most recently with the Berlin Summit. This paper reviews the literature on agenda building, and also details the issue of global climate change and the special interest that the small island states have had in that issue. Then, it uses the case of Vanuatu, a leading force among the South Pacific island nations, and focuses upon Vanuatu's efforts to bring the issue of global warming to the discussion table for not only the small island states, but also the advanced industrialized states as well.

In the following case, the agenda-building framework will be used to explain how the island states were able to put the issue of global warming onto the formal agenda at Rio. Kingdon's agenda-building model allows us to separate the stages of the process and to examine how the three "streams" intersected to allow the island states to advance their views. Although Kingdon's model was originally conceived with the United States in mind, there is much heuristic value in its application to a very different kind of democracy as well as to an issue of international focus. The possibility of examining and weighing the importance of each stream against each other may give us some information on how island states may best get their views heard in the international arena. The analysis of the policy stream will reveal the components of domestic politics within the island states which served as sources of strength and as limitations in the international arena. The agenda-building approach will also identify key problems faced by the island states, and recognizes the key role of policy entrepreneurs in taking advantage of the "window of opportunity." Finally, it is the pre-decision, agenda-building stage that is the key point in the policy formation process at which the island states (and indeed, most of the weaker states, micro- or otherwise) can probably best affect the international policy docket, and the agenda-building approach is a useful vehicle for examining the role of the island states towards that end.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: AGENDA SETTING

Kingdon's dynamic model of the agenda-setting process is perhaps the seminal piece in the general area of agenda-setting theory. Kingdon asks what makes people in and around a government address some subjects and not others? Further, in the consideration of these subjects, why are some alternatives considered while others are not? Kingdon notes that politicians often frame policy options, even policy matters, as an "idea whose time has come."(1) Kingdon's model seeks to understand just how an idea's time arrives.

Kingdon defines the "agenda" as "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time."(2) Kingdon further separates the factors that affect agenda setting into two categories: participants and process. Participants are obviously the players of the game, government officials and those close to them. Also, the media, interest groups and academics could also be participants. The process of setting the agenda and the discussions of alternatives is further divided into three "streams": the problem, the policy, and the political.

The problem stream is the least "systematic" of the three, although, due to its nature, is usually the most highly visible point in the agenda-building experience. An issue moves to a place on the agenda after a crisis, some critical event which captures the attention of the policy maker either directly or indirectly by capturing and bringing about public action (electoral concerns of the policy maker). The general proposition is that the more visible the policy domain, the less important crises are for putting new issues on the agenda. Kingdon cites the example of health policy, arguing that because health is of concern to all of us, it is a policy domain that is followed very closely, and is "naturally" on the agenda most of the time. On the other hand, the policy domain of transportation is usually not so visible, and requires something like a plane crash or a shutdown of a major transit system to gain the notice of the public and/or the policy maker. Also included in the problem stream, although less "drastic" than a crisis, are such things as public feedback on existing programs, to see whether the recognized problem is being adequately addressed with the program currently being implemented.

The policy stream is the stream dealing primarily with the determination of alternatives to address the problem. The selection criteria for options include things such as technical feasibility, acceptability to the public, and budget constraints.(3) Because agenda building is a highly subjective area of the policy cycle, the issue of how the problem is defined (or framed) is most important. The "public" is willing to accept more drastic policy alternatives if they perceive that some kind of radical change in current behavior is necessary. This point of issue framing will be addressed in regards to global climate change later in this paper.

The political stream consists of those events which lead to a political atmosphere that is conducive to the addressing of the problem, such as the mood of the national populace.(4) Also, electoral outcomes which lead to new participants and priorities are placed under the political stream. Different actors have different worldviews; different ideas about what issues need to be addressed. (This last point should not be overblown, however. For the most part, policy changes and alternatives focus more often on incremental changes than drastic ones.)

Kingdon argues that issues have the greatest chance when all three streams converge at the same time, creating a "window" of opportunity that someone (a "policy entrepreneur") can take advantage of. The "policy entrepreneur" is one who is willing to invest time and energy in order to place the issue onto the agenda. An important note should be made here that getting the issue onto the agenda does not in any way guarantee (or even indicate) that the issue will be addressed and policies will be developed that will satisfy the policy entrepreneur. The policy entrepreneur of course has some opinion of how he or she would like to see the issue addressed, but getting the issue on the agenda does not mean that the proposed solutions of the policy entrepreneur will be heeded.

More in complement to Kingdon rather than exclusive of his work, Cobb and Elder argue that there are actually two "agendas" that must be studied. There is the systemic agenda, when an issue is recognized as a problem, and there is the institutional agenda, when institutional actors recognize and discuss an issue and its policy implications. Cobb and Elder note four observations about modern democratic theory that have a larger applicability than simply domestic politics. Most particularly, they note that in every system there exists inherent biases, and that it is the pre-decisional realm that is often the most crucial in determining which issues and alternatives will be considered.(5)

Because any system, any organization, holds an inherent bias for those who benefit most from the system, Cobb and Elder argue that the masses can have their greatest impact at the pre-decision, or agenda setting stage, since "by its very nature, participation in the agenda-building process is open and widespread."(6)

While both Kingdon and Cobb and Elder focus upon agenda building within a single country, there are benefits to bringing their work into the international realm. Cobb, Ross, and Ross also analyze agenda building, but do so as a comparative process. Distinguishing between a "public" (systemic) and "formal" (institutional) agenda, they develop three different models of agenda building. There is the Outside Initiative model to be considered, a model wherein issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are expanded first to the public and then the formal agenda. The Mobilization model is one in which issues are initiated inside government and therefore end up on the formal agenda almost automatically. In this case, though, it is often required that the issue be placed on the public agenda as well (the public must be mobilized). And finally the Inside Initiative model is one where issues appear within the governmental sphere and whose supporters do not try to expand them to the mass public. The initiating groups in this case do not want the issue on the public agenda.(7)

While Cobb, Ross, and Ross's analysis gives us the most specific categorizations of the type of agenda building process that one can see, Kingdon's work offers us a model with which one can more closely examine the internal dynamics of placing an issue upon the agenda and the evaluation of policy alternatives. In other words, Kingdon's problem, policy and political stream appear in any one of the three models identified by Cobb, Ross, and Ross.

It is therefore primarily Kingdon's approach that is applied in the examination of Vanuatu's efforts to bring global warming to the international agenda. Vanuatu has been a past leader in South Pacific politics, and its history has been a more crisis-filled one than its neighbors. As such, Vanuatu has taken on a role as a leader among the island nations, and their actions are worth examination here.

VANUATU: A RADICALLY DIFFERENT HISTORY

The island nation of Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, had a colonial experience, and a subsequent decolonization experience that was quite different from those of its neighbors in the South Pacific. The New Hebrides were colonized by both Great Britain and France because neither country was willing to annex the New Hebrides outright, but did not want the other country to gain an advantage in the region. To deal with this situation, a "condominium" form of administration was developed between Britain and France. This pact was consolidated formally in 1906, and would eventually be called the "pandemonium" by those who had to live under its arrangements. Dual institutions were established, most notably police forces and education systems. Also, with the condominium arrangement there were actually three sets of official laws in New Hebrides - the British, French, and the Joint Administration.(8)

This redundant arrangement would bring about much confusion and difficulty after World War II, and waves of independence and decolonization movements arose. While Britain sought to release itself from any ties in the Pacific, France had other ideas. Independence for the New Hebrides could trigger the dreaded "domino" effect, leading to independence for New Caledonia and eventually French Polynesia, where it could threaten France's nuclear testing program. Hence, France initiated efforts to hang on to the New Hebrides by any means necessary. Some of their tactics did not appear as destructive on the surface. For example, in an effort to encourage more Francophone education, discrimination against "ni-Vanuatu" (native Vanuatuans) was ended in the early 1970s.(9) The French idea was to establish a Francophone majority on Vanuatu that they could manipulate. The French helped in the development of a coalition of French-speaking parties (eventually to coalesce as the Union of Moderate Parties [UMP]) opposed to independence to stand against the Anglophone New Hebrides National Party, which would become the Vanua'aku Pati (Our Land Party) (VP), led by the Anglican priest, Father Walter Lini. Lini was the driving force behind the movement towards Vanuatu's independence, and was a fireless speaker against colonialism and neocolonialism.

The labor pains of independence would be greater for Vanuatu than for any other Pacific nation. On the islands of Santo and Tanna, there were strong feelings of secessionism in the air, and there was doubt as to whether Vanuatu would remain together before it had even become independent. Despite that, the VP, led by Lini and running on a platform of immediate independence, took 62 percent of the vote and two-thirds of the National Assembly (with a 90 percent voter turnout). More significantly, the VP won majorities on every island, including Santo and Tanna.(10) The secessionist movements continued, however, with two outside sources of support (financially and morally). The two sources were the right-wing American organization, the Phoenix Foundation, which sought to create a free market haven, untainted by "socialist" ideas (of which the VP was guilty, espousing a version of "Melanesian Socialism"(11)), and the French government, who hoped that a secessionist movement would destabilize the independence movement. Lini argues, though, that the differing ends of the French government and the Phoenix Foundation brought them to a crossroads in regards to the timing of it all. The secessionist movement forced the breakaway before independence, which was inconvenient for the French who had hoped that the break would occur after independence (thereby proving that the New Hebrideans were not ready for independence).(12)

Under the growing spotlight of the international media (which fell upon the cliched but effective "Trouble in Paradise" motif), Lini, now deputy-minister-elect, pressured the British and French governments to squelch the rebellion before they left. Failing to get support from the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force, they considered bringing troops in from another Pacific nation, perhaps Papua New Guinea. In the meantime, the public in Vanuatu were becoming increasingly convinced that France was only interested in maintaining its influence in the new nation, while Britain sought to exit the scene with as little fuss as possible.(13) Troops from both Britain and France were sent in, under the direction of a French colonel, and did nothing to end the rebellion, and on the day before they were scheduled to leave, several soldiers (subsequently court-martialed) took part in looting and random destruction.(14) In contrast, the small contingent from Papua New Guinea acted quickly and efficiently, putting down the rebellion within thirty-six hours, something that the British and French had failed to do in over a month.

Vanuatu thus achieved its independence, becoming the only South Pacific island nation so far to have to survive a violent conflict on its path of decolonization. Such an experience has made Vanuatu one of the most outspoken critics of colonialism and neocolonialism in the world. Vanuatu continues to advocate the independence of New Caledonia from French rule. Vanuatu is the first Pacific nation to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, Vanuatu has become one of the leading lights in the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific, Father Walter Lini (by this point prime minister of Vanuatu) himself coining the term "nuclearism" to refer to a new type of colonial power. Vanuatu's antinuclear policy is the most stringent in the Pacific, and its refusal to admit two United States' warships into its waters due to the U.S.'s continuing "neither confirm nor deny" policy over the presence of nuclear weapons onboard the U.S. ships occurred in 1982, becoming the law of the land in 1983. This was a year before the Labour party with its much-publicized antinuclear policy was brought to power in New Zealand.(15) Indeed, Lini's subsequent refusal to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was founded on the argument that the treaty did not go far enough, and had been watered down by the United States through the efforts of the Australian contingent.

Clearly established as the most "radical" of the South Pacific island nations, Vanuatu was poised to lead in the international arena on the matter of global warming. Its nonalignment allowed it greater flexibility in its international dealings, and from its diplomatic corps would arise the policy entrepreneur that would take advantage of the window of opportunity that was opened when the three streams intersected. We will now analyze the three streams in regards to Vanuatu's efforts to get the issue of global warming onto the international agenda.

AGENDA-BUILDING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE PROBLEM STREAM

Small islands and the developing nations are not the only ones for whom a crisis can trigger the agenda-setting process. All countries face moments of crucial decision at one point or another. Indeed, as noted earlier, Kingdon's analysis was originally developed in a study of the United States.

In the matter of global warming, the problem stream was a different one for the island nations than it was for most of the developed world. If global warming was a problem that had implications only for the island nations, then it is highly doubtful that there would ever have been an international summit on the matter. However, the issue of the environment has had some resonance for the developed world, at the very least since 1972, with the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. The issue of the atmospheric environment in particular became a major issue in 1986, with the discovery of the thinning of the ozone layer.(16) In 1988, the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) and the U.N. World Meteorological Organization established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC's first report, published in 1990, argued that there was building evidence that the earth was growing warmer due to the actions of humans, particularly due to the large-scale burning of fossil fuels and the clearing of forests which absorb much of the carbon dioxide, the major "greenhouse gas." The prospective consequences of the continued warming of the earth included rising sea levels and the possibility of flooding low lying islands in the next forty years.(17)

This prediction of a catastrophic rise in sea level placed the problem of global warming at a crisis point for those low-lying islands. This was not the case for most of the developed world, however, despite the fact that most of them do indeed have some vulnerable regions. Hence, the problem of the "problem stream" arises - how is one to identify and define what is at issue? Because global warming had not reached a crisis point for the developed world, the problem was defined as one of economics versus the environment. Indeed, President Bush's (ultimately successful) efforts at the Rio Summit to dilute the Convention on Climate Change were based on two arguments: that there was not enough scientific evidence to warrant such drastic legislation, and that such legislation would put an undue strain on the U.S. economy.(18) It is recognized that the debate of "economics vs. the environment" cuts deeply in the issue of global climate change because unlike other pollutants, carbon dioxide is an unavoidable byproduct of the consumption of fossil fuels, and therefore "better technology" cannot fix this problem. The sense of almost apocalyptic urgency on the part of the small islands was a powerful motivating force for action, as well as a source of political discourse against the economic and scientific issues. As was stated at a 1989 conference in the Marshall Islands, "We don't have time to wait for conclusive proof. The proof, we fear, may kill us."(19) Such imagery was hard to dismiss.(20)

Even now, with the issue of global warming and climate change on the formal agenda for nearly every country in the world, the problem stream and the debate on how one is to frame the issue remains, although now it is a question of how one identifies and deals with policy alternatives rather than a question of how one deals with a "nondecision." Apocalyptic visions and warnings may be effective tools to get an issue onto the public and formal agenda, but such cries do not make for a basis of discussion on the formation of policy. In fact, when addressing the consequences of global warming today, the issue of rising sea levels tends to be seen as a problem belonging to "the longer-term future well into the twenty-first century, rather than to the immediate future of the coming fifty years."(21) Sharma summarizes a report, saying "average temperatures will rise by only 1.5 degrees centigrade during the next 70 years, a fraction of the increase feared by early scientists and experiments."(22) Although still recognized as a threat, there has been a shift in focus somewhat from the consequences of a rise in sea level to the effects of increased storm activity (increasing in both intensity and frequency). Much of the scientific debate today also recognizes that much of the influx of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is produced naturally. The human contribution still may be significant, the potential straw which could break the camel's back.(28) Scientific debate and analysis are only part of the story, however; the implications of scientific analysis for policy and what one is to base policy upon are as much political as scientific. Scientists have a role (and perhaps, obligation) beyond just that of the "objective" researcher. As Penehuro Lefale, atmosphere/energy campaigner in the Pacific for Greenpeace New Zealand says, "We failed to heed the warning of ozone depletion in time and our children and our grandchildren will have to live with the consequences. The impacts of global warming pose even greater threats."(24)

Whether as merely another issue in the "economics versus environment" debate or a genuine threat to the very physical existence of one's country, the issue of global warming did develop a problem stream. The ominous indication of a warming earth, while not a crisis in and of itself, implied to the island nations possibly disastrous consequences; consequences which the islands could not survive. Recognition of the problem in this fashion stirred the policy community of the small islands to action, and was one of the more effective initial tools to combat those who would frame the problem as simply an economic one.

With debate over the problem continuing, it was up to the island states to take advantage of this debate, and to focus their resources towards the further discussion of the issue and possible policies to address it.

AGENDA-BUILDING: THE POLICY STREAM

Due to their small size and lack of resources, the South Pacific island nations have found it very difficult to make much of an impact in the international arena as single units. Therefore, much of the work by the island states has been in the form of collaborative efforts. The similar recognition of the problem of global warming by the various island states led to a desire to collectively address this problem. It was quite clear to the island nations that while they were among the least industrialized nations in the world, they were going to be among the first affected by the consequences of global warming, whether by the possibility of rising sea levels, or the more probable and more impending issue of storm activity. While high islands such as Vanuatu might have been able to put off concern for the former to the "back burner" to some extent, the latter issue most definitely gained the attention of Vanuatu. The islands were not going to be able to solve the problem of global warming by themselves; this necessarily had to become an international issue. And among the island nations attempting to bring global warming to the international formal agenda, the island nation of Vanuatu was a key player and leader.

AGENDA-BUILDING: THE POLITICAL STREAM

Within the political stream, the growing international mood had begun to swing in the direction of viewing issues such as climate change and biodiversity as issues that need to be addressed and not solely within one's territorial borders. With this in mind, the Rio Summit was scheduled for June 1992, holding out the promise that there would be more than just talk. The end of the cold war had brought about a new and rising optimism, that with the East-West conflict gone, the North-South divisions could now be examined without the boogeyman of "National Security" around to cloud the issue. Such optimism, while still present through much of the summit, was lessened even before the summit began.

Foremost among the obstacles was the fact that President Bush hesitated as to whether or not he would even go to Rio, sparking much protest and criticism both domestically and internationally for Bush and the United Sates. It was recognized, especially in the matter of climate change, that any agreement that did not have the United States onboard would be next to meaningless - as the U.S. is the single largest producer of greenhouse gases.(25) Bush's hesitance to attend the summit, as well as his reservations on both the biodiversity and climate change agreements, undermined his claim to be "the environmental President" and severely hurt his reelection hopes. Still attempting to ride high on his military accomplishment in the Gulf, President Bush received a rude awakening in Rio. U.S. representative George Miller stated that he and the rest of the congressional delegation to the summit were particularly struck by the palpable resentment towards the United States from both the developing and developed world at the summit.(26) In such an atmosphere, with President Bush playing catch-up rather than leading the way, the vanguard role in the American contingent was taken up by then Senator (and soon to be Vice-President) Al Gore.

With international opinion swinging toward a "greener" stance, the setting was right for the small islands to attempt to assert their voice. All that was required now was the creation of a forum (beyond that of the South Pacific itself), and a "policy entrepreneur" to take advantage of the open "window of opportunity."

THE POLICY ENTREPRENEUR

Robert Van Lierop, a lawyer of African-American descent, was recruited by Prime Minister Lini to serve as Vanuatu's U.N. ambassador. Van Lierop's efforts in pushing global warming on the formal agenda in the international realm placed him in the spotlight, and he made the most of the exposure. While all the island nations are concerned with global warming, the islands of Vanuatu are considered "high" islands, and the threat of rising sea levels was not one that would confront Vanuatu in the next century even in the gloomiest of forecasts, although Vanuatu was certainly not without some concern over global warming and its effects on storm activity in the area. Van Lierop, however, proved an effective leader in articulating the interests and concerns of all the island states.

Van Lierop's efforts began in 1990, at the Second World Climate Conference and the formation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which he chaired. The AOSIS, under Van Lierop's leadership, was able to play an active role in the meetings leading to the Rio Summit, and was one of the few groups of developing nations that did play an active role in the negotiations for the climate change convention.(27) When the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) met in Geneva in 1991, Van Lierop was named co-chair to the Working Group II (WG II) which was to articulate the climate change convention's institutional framework, such as reporting requirements and legal provisions including dispute resolution. It was the first time that an island nation had received a leadership position within a U.No forum.(28) Indeed, the appointment of Van Lierop to the position of co-chair was to reflect his position as chair of AOSIS and to recognize the increasingly prominent role of the island nations in the climate change negotiations.(29)

Van Lierop's position as co-chair of WG II increased his visibility and aided his efforts and his advocacy of a precautionary principle to global warming. Benefits were also gained by the island states, who now had one of their own in a position of international leadership. Beyond their accrual of bureaucratic power, there was increasing recognition that the island nations had gained a greater voice at Rio. The Maldives and Vanuatu representatives were elected vice-presidents to the conference, and Japan and India stood down in their favor. Tuvalu and Nauru were invited to be the first to sign the Climate Change Convention as well as the Biodiversity Conventions.(30)

AOSIS has continued to grow from its initial twenty-four members, increasing to thirty-five at the Rio Summit, and to more than forty members as of 1994. Their greatest influence, however, may have now passed, as the discussion moves from the agenda-building phase towards the policy formation and implementation steps.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA AND THE ISLANDS AFTER RIO

Van Lierop and the AOSIS took a pragmatic view of the results of the Rio Summit, issuing a declaration which stated the "willingness of their governments to accept [the climate change convention as] what was achievable at this particular stage [rather than] what was desirable from the perspective of AOSIS."(31) Article 4(8) in the climate change convention specifically articulates that full consideration be given to those parties who are particularly adversely affected by global warming, particularly small island nations.(32) That, however, was all that was accomplished. A proposal submitted by Van Lierop on behalf of AOSIS that would establish an international "insurance fund" that would compensate the small island nations for loss/damage due to climate change was turned down. The basis for the proposal was that the contributions for the fund would come from the industrialized countries according to their carbon dioxide emissions and their ability to pay. Not surprisingly, the developed nations were not as amenable to this proposed arrangement.

Despite this setback, many Pacific delegations to the Rio Summit noted that at least the Climate Change Convention provided a platform, a base from which regional organizations such as the South Pacific Forum, or the AOSIS, could ask for more.(33) Indeed, the greatest blow suffered by the AOSIS and the Pacific voice in the international environmental arena may be something that was not the result of international forces at all. More precisely, the dismissal of Van Lierop as Vanuatu's U.N. ambassador (with the subsequent loss of ambassadorial credentials) may be the most destabilizing obstacle that the Pacific islands have to face as they try to exert some voice in climate change policy.

January 1992 saw the election of Francophile Maxime Carlot Korman to the position of prime minister of Vanuatu. Despite the feeling that Vanuatu had made a commitment not to change ambassadors until after the U.N. Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island States in Barbados (the first major followup to Rio), Van Lierop was dismissed in early 1994. Although the election was mostly centered on domestic issues and factional politics (Lini broke away from the VP and formed a coalition with the UMP), the timing could not have been worse for the AOSIS. The AOSIS had secured the conference in Barbados, and this followup conference was considered by many a real test of the commitments made at Rio.

Despite being part of a coalition with Lini, his erstwhile rival, it did not take long for the new prime minister to move into action. Besides the dismissal of Van Lierop, Korman made a strong statement on behalf of the small islands. Responding to statements as to how Van Lierop was missed, Korman claimed credit for Vanuatu and for Van Lierop being the first chair of AOSIS, and stated that although "internally we made a change ... we feel AOSIS must continue."(34) Korman is an unabashed Francophile, and complained that the AOSIS press conference was to be held in English. Van Lierop's replacement as U.N. ambassador, incidentally, is a Francophone. Such rumblings of alleged French ties, and possibly influence, in the past elections can be seen as a continuing problem of nationhood. There is still some sense among the Anglophones that the Francophones are not "real" Vanuatuans.(35) Such polarization, when connected to the clientelistic relationships and dependence on single individuals has larger implications than simply the domestic.

Without Van Lierop as its chair, the AOSIS nevertheless continues to act. Now under the direction of Annette des Isles, ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago to the U.N., the AOSIS continues to work in getting the voices and concerns of the small island states out into the international arena. The AOSIS played a prominent role at the Barbados conference, and the AOSIS itself was strengthened with its second summit meeting, held in concurrence with the Barbados conference. At the Berlin Summit, the AOSIS has exerted the strongest voice for timetables and target measures for climate change, and has even gained the support of developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil. Much to its discredit, the United States has sided with the oil-producing nations against such strong measures. The AOSIS has developed a voice of no small import, and their efforts in the international sphere as a leader in agenda building, and possibly in policy formation, will be worth our taking notice.

CONCLUSIONS

Kingdon's model of the agenda-setting process has had some application here in a case quite different from that originally described by Kingdon. This examination of Vanuatu's actions in placing the issue of global warming on the international agenda suggests that the problem stream was most critical for mobilizing the islands towards gaining collective action on global warming. Because the issue of global warming was not a highly visible one for the developed nations, a crisis element was needed to increase the visibility of the issue. The disappearance of the low-lying islands was a powerful motivating factor for organization as well as an effective image to use in the debate over the problem. However, while the problem stream may be the factor with the greatest weight for mobilizing the islands, it may be the political stream that is most crucial for the issue to reach and be discussed at the international level, especially when one takes note of the self-evident power differential between the small island states and the advanced industrial states. Indeed, it may be the use of the problem stream and the sense of crisis that stir international opinion and affect the political stream. Domestic factors in the small island states must be taken into account to see if they can take advantage of the situation (the international mood), but without a favorable political stream, the policy community can do very little to affect discussion.

The dependence upon policy entrepreneurs is perhaps felt most strongly by the island states. As such, the island states are significantly vulnerable to changes in administrations. This overdependence on key individuals is a problem chronic to a large portion of the developing world. The strong sense of clientelism, the reliance upon single individuals, is problematic in any society. Inside a highly polarized polity (and the French/Anglo division in Vanuatu remains a significant one), such clientelism can have consequences beyond the domestic realm. Vanuatu, then, suffers particularly in this regard, as changes of administration most likely lead to clear changes in personnel and policy. The experience of Rio has also shown the crucial importance of formal organizations such as AOSIS in maximizing the island states' potential influence. The power of the many to speak with one voice has a multiplying effect. Even in a system that values power over all else, the smallest members of such a system can still achieve notice, given the right circumstances. Even mice can roar, and sometimes they can be heard, even by the lions.

The problem of the island states in getting their voices heard in the international arena is a difficult one. It is not, however, impossible. Formal organizations such as AOSIS have been very important for the island states in having their case heard. However, if it is the problem stream - the perception of crisis - that carries most weight in getting the island states heard, then the impact of the island states on global warming legislation may be the best that the islands can do. Not every problem faced by the islands has available such imagery as islands disappearing off the planet, and to attempt to make any international issue that concerns the island states a crisis for them could lead to a perception of the islands merely "crying wolf" yet again.

Colorado State University, August 1996

1 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1984), p. 1.

2 Ibid., p. 3.

3 Ibid., p. 138.

4 Ibid., p. 153.

5 Roger Cobb and Charles D. Elder, "The Politics of Agenda-Building: An Alternative Perspective for Modern Political Theory," Journal of Politics, vol. 33 (1971), pp. 901-03.

6 Ibid., p. 912.

7 Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process," American Political Science Review (March 1976), pp. 127-28.

8 Barak Sope, "The Colonial History of the New Hebrides," in Father Walter Lini, Beyond Pandemonium: From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu (Wellington: Asia Pacific Books, 1980), p. 17.

9 David Robie, Blood On Their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific (London: Zed Books, 1989), p. 71.

10 Ibid., p. 76.

11 Ralph R. Premdas and Jeffrey S. Steeves, Politics and Government in Vanuatu: From Colonial Unity to Post-Colonial Disunity (North Queensland: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,James Cook University of North Queensland, 1989), p. 1.

12 Robie, Blood On Their Banner, p. 77.

13 Angus Smalles, "Nationhood comes to troubled Vanuatu," Pacific Islands Monthly (September 1980), p. 14.

14 Robie, Blood On Their Banner, p. 79.

15 Ibid., p. 80.

16 Harold Brookfield, "Global Change and the Pacific: Problems for the Coming Half-Century," Contemporary Pacific, vol. 1, nos. 1-2 (Spring and Fall 1989), p. 1.

17 Adam Rogers, The Earth Summit: A Planetary Reckoning (Los Angeles: Global View Press, 1993), p. 187.

18 Ibid., p. 188.

19 Anna Buckley, "The Proof We Fear Could Kill Us," Pacific Islands Monthly (June 1992), p. 35.

20 Indeed, "imagery" might be one of the "advantages," cliched as it may be, that the islands have over other lesser-developed countries, from the "tropical paradise" image of the musical "South Pacific," to the paintings of Gaugin. The conceptualization of such "paradises" vanishing from the face of the earth may be a tool that can, at the very least, get the attention of the developed nations, or at least make eye-catching headlines. For examples of such headlines, see Anna Buckley, "The Proof We Fear Could Kill Us," p. 32; John Connell and John Lea, "My Country Will Not Be There," Cities, vol. 9, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 295-309; and more generally on this theme see Teresia K. Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other S/Pacific N/Oceans," The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 87-109.

21 Brookfield, "Global Change," p. 4.

22 Davendra Sharma, "Doomsday Delayed?" Pacific Islands Monthly (July 1992), p. 26.

23 Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard, "Visions of a Changing World," in Mintzer and Leonard, eds., Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 9.

24 Penehuro Lefale, "Accurate Reporting on Pacific Global Warming Needed," letter to Pacific Islands Monthly (September 1992), p. 8.

25 Margot O'Neill, "Off to Rio, George?" Pacific Islands Monthly (May 1992), p. 17.

26 Rogers, Earth Summit, p. 77.

27 Ahmed Djoghlaf, "The Beginnings of an International Climate Law," in Mintzer and Leonard, eds., Negotiating Climate Change, p. 105.

28 Daniel Bodansky, "Prologue to the Climate Change Convention," in Mintzer and Leonard, eds., Negotiating Climate Change, p. 65.

29 Djoghlaf, "International Climate Law," p. 106.

30 Roslyn E. Taplin, "International Policy on the Greenhouse Effect and the Island South Pacific," Pacific Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (1994), p. 277.

31 Ian Williams, "Low Priority for AOSIS," Pacific Islands Monthly (August 1992), p. 32.

32 Taplin, "International Policy on the Greenhouse Effect," p. 277.

33 Ian Williams, "Success for Pacific Nations at Rio," Pacific Islands Monthly (July 1992), p. 25.

34 Anonymous author, "Korman Defends Small Islands," Pacific Islands Monthly (June 1994), p. 9.

35 William F. S. Miles, "Francophonie in Post-Colonial Vanuatu,"Journal of Pacific History, vol. 29, no. 1 (1994), p. 65.