"Peace without conquest": Lyndon Johnson's speech of April 7, 1965.

On April 7, 1965, Lyndon Johnson delivered a televised address from Johns Hopkins University, reaching an estimated sixty million viewers across the United States and many tuning in from around the world. (1) His administration billed the speech, "Peace without Conquest," as a major address on the Vietnam crisis, possibly its most important foreign-policy speech. (2) The speech responded to months of criticism regarding American military escalation in Vietnam. During the speech, Johnson spoke at length of America's commitment to the Vietnamese: "We have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.... We are also there to strengthen world order.... We are also there because great stakes are in the balance.... We will not withdraw." At the same time, however, he declared his willingness for "unconditional discussions" in pursuit of peace and announced an offer of $1 billion in aid for a development project along the Mekong River. The speech presented the North Vietnamese with a choice, as one periodical put it: "Destroy or build." (3)

Public pressure for a "peace offensive" had mounted in the months leading up to the speech. Though Johnson had won the 1964 presidential election as the peace candidate, he subsequently ordered the bombing of North Vietnam and dispatched American ground troops to the area. Domestically, a small but voluble minority, including Walter Lippmann and the New York Times editorial board, became increasingly alarmed at American escalation and critical of Johnson's handling of the situation. Internationally, it was hard to ignore complaints and public "advice" from NATO allies and the United Nations. Thus, the April 7 speech addressed not only the North Vietnamese and their Chinese and Soviet backers, but also domestic and allied public opinion. It marked the first major attempt to win the "other war" over Vietnam, that is, the one for public support.

In the short term, the speech was a spectacular success. Leaders and newspapers of NATO allies hailed the speech. At home, editors and columnists fell over themselves praising Johnson's perceived new course, while mail to the White House swung from criticism to support. Those advocating a more militant line found Johnson's promise to defend South Vietnamese independence reassuring, while those clamoring for nonmilitary solutions found their satisfaction in Johnson's willingness to negotiate and offer of development aid. Indeed, the speech is noteworthy for allowing Johnson to apply his domestic antipoverty outlook to foreign policy. Most Americans and Western allies alike expressed new optimism about peace prospects in Vietnam.

Less than four months later, at a July 28, 1965 press conference, President Johnson publicly committed the United States to a long-term, full-scale war in Vietnam. Gone were the optimism, the willingness to negotiate, and the promise of development aid in the Johns Hopkins speech. Johnson and his advisors truly believed their rhetoric about peace, with the qualification that they wanted a free and independent South Vietnam and believed that firmness was the best way to achieve it. As Senator Eugene McCarthy said, "Watching presidents, I find that at certain points their own rhetoric begins to feed back on them." (4) But they knew such oratory was unlikely to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. In this sense, the April 7 speech marked a rhetorical turning point: from that point forth, Johnson followed a course that led to war and downplayed further references to postwar development in Vietnam. (5) In effect, this speech marked the doves' last major policy initiative.

This article looks at rhetoric before delving into the speech itself, demonstrating the speech's importance not through a microanalysis but through a careful examination of its crafting and its consequences. The first part deals with the broad study of rhetoric, as well as Johnson's use of rhetoric in particular. The second part examines the situation leading to the speech: domestic pressure, both public (newspapers and speeches) and private (mail and meetings); foreign pressure; debate within the Johnson administration--and within Lyndon Johnson himself. The third part analyzes the speech itself: the different emphases and the different, seemingly contradictory, promises. The fourth part explores reactions to the speech: renewed public support which, combined with Communist rejection of Johnson's proposed negotiations and development plans, gave the administration increased flexibility and autonomy in planning Vietnam policy. The fifth part concludes that the Johns Hopkins address served to alleviate private doubts, answer public critics, and improve America's prestige. Above all, the Peace without Conquest speech allowed the administration to pursue its preferred domestic and foreign policies--rather than offer a serious basis for negotiations to develop Southeast Asia and prevent a major war. Therefore, while some observers concluded that Johnson failed with this speech, for it did not bring peace, he actually succeeded in his main objective: securing enough popular support to pursue a war he did not want but could not see how to avoid.

Rhetoric, the Presidency, and LBJ

Rhetoric Defined

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, rhetoric is "the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing." The Greek root, rhetorike, literally means "art of oratory." Aristotle says that rhetoric is partly a method (without its own subject) yet also "a practical art derived from ethics and politics on the basic of its conventional uses" concerned with "means of persuasion." (6) In Cicero's words, rhetoric is "the art of effective persuasion." (7) Broadly speaking, rhetoric is the tool by which a speaker tries to convince his or her audience to follow a particular course of action. "Rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion," writes Moya Ann Ball. (8) "Communication that persuades, informs, or celebrates, but flails to attain certainty ... has been traditionally designated as rhetoric," state Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins. It is, they continue, a "description of reality through language." (9)

From this description one can easily see the need for politicians to become effective rhetoricians. "Rhetoric is method, not subject," suggest Richard E. Denton, Jr. and Dan F. Hahn. "It does rather than is." (10) Taking this argument further, rhetoric is not merely the use of language to convey factual information or suggest a course of action; rather, rhetoric is an action in itself--and a particularly useful one for politicians, for it can be their most potent weapon. "Political discourse is in itself a form of political action," asserts Peter Bull. "Often dismissed as 'just' rhetoric, political discourse plays a vital role in the self-presentation of politicians and political parties, in the presentation of policies, in currying the widest popular support from the electorate." (11) Rhetoric is not a bad thing in and of itself: on the contrary, effective leaders rely on rhetoric to communicate their vision. But because rhetoric does not presuppose factual correctness, it is often given a bad name. Furthermore, as Hart points out, "Rhetoric gives us something to think about as well as something not to think about"; it can obfuscate and create diversions as well as explain and clarify. (12) In any case, rhetoric does not deal with matters of "good" and "bad"--just effectiveness.

Presidents must be able to use rhetoric effectively if they are to put their ideas into action. Jeffrey K. Tulis has even suggested that America now has a "rhetorical presidency," as "popular or mass rhetoric has become a principal tool of presidential governance" over the last century. (13) Roderick P. Hart concurs: "Public speech no longer attends the processes of governance. It is governance. The presidency has been transferred from a formal, print-oriented world into an electronic environment specializing in the spoken word and rewarding casual, interpersonally adept politicians." (14)

In addition, there has been extensive research into crisis rhetoric. Robert L. Ivie maintains that national images (e.g., democracy versus tyranny) lie at the root of crisis situations. (15) Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson note that a central goal of war rhetoric is "the need for the public and the Congress to legitimate presidential use of war powers for an end that has been justified." (16) Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. claims, "The overall objective of presidential crisis rhetoric is to limit and even destroy reasonable public discussion of policy, presenting the public with an either/or choice." (17) Of course, presidents paint rhetorical pictures that ultimately offer only one acceptable, patriotic course of action: their own, which is exactly what Johnson, using the tactics described by Ivie and Windt, tried to do at Johns Hopkins.

Rhetoric in LBJ's World

Lyndon Johnson was an adept politician. He loved backroom politicking, he loved wheeling and dealing--and he loved speaking. Denton and Hahn comment, "For Johnson, all communication was a means to an end." (18) Noting that LBJ tied with Ronald Reagan in the highest number of speeches given during a presidency (despite Reagan's longer period in office), Hart adds, "Johnson's speechmaking was not something he put on, like a coat. It was something he did, something he was." (19)

Johnson used rhetoric that was very familiar to him. As Senator McCarthy points out, he tended to use metaphors when planning and speaking, and most of these came out of his Texas background. For example, McCarthy likens Johnson's approach to Vietnam to driving cattle: "You start them very slowly. The thing to tell them is that they are not going any place, then progressively you increase the pace, and at the end you stampede them, if you have to, to get them where you want them." (20) Furthermore, Johnson used analogies to the Alamo and tapped into the nation's fascination with westerns when discussing Viet Cong "savagery." (21) Harry McPherson, a native Texan and long-time Johnson aide who became special counsel to the president, observed that Johnson's use of such metaphors was not inconsequential: "You can't separate words from policy that easily. The phrase does shape the content; rhetoric tilts the significance." (22) Ball adds, "The dramatic language shared by the Johnson group was a vital part of their communication." (23)

What is more, Johnson's words about Vietnam in 1964-1965 achieved one of the main goals of rhetoric: framing reality in such a way as to preclude rational discussion and debate. Hart's research leads him to assert that Johnson was "seeking reinforcement from his listeners, not dialogue with them ... using rhetoric aggressively, in some senses defiantly. He tried to browbeat his critics into silence by creating a string of successful stump speeches. In Lyndon Johnson's hands, rhetoric often became a blunt instrument." (24) Yet in several important instances over Vietnam--such as the April 7 address and Johnson's cajoling of reporters on July 28--he seemed to be pleading rather than browbeating. Moreover, instead of simply warning that if the Communists took Vietnam they would soon be in Hawaii, Johnson appealed to America's better instincts in the Johns Hopkins address: "Electrification of the countryside ... a rich harvest in a hungry land ... the sight of healthy children in a classroom ... these--not might arms--are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive." (25)

Johnson was neither the first nor the last president to use rhetoric in cunning ways. So why should we examine his speeches, and why the Johns Hopkins speech in particular? First of all, as David Zarefsky notes, "Many of the key events of the 1960s were shaped by or reflected in Johnson's presidential discourse." (26) From a purely historical perspective, one must understand Johnson and his speeches in order to fully understand that turbulent decade. Second, it is during Johnson's term that people began to question the veracity of administration statements. Today, the media and the public approach official statements with skepticism; much of this skepticism began to emerge after Johnson's lofty and optimistic rhetoric proved to clash with the harsh reality on the ground in Vietnam. Third, Johnson aimed to persuade the American public that while Vietnam constituted a crisis, his government was successfully addressing the crisis, so it should not, therefore, detract from his domestic agenda. In other words, though his rhetoric in Baltimore and other speeches included his actual hopes for Vietnam, the main purpose was to mute criticism of his foreign policy in order to implement his domestic policies. Finally, the Johns Hopkins speech in particular is a sterling example of the conflicting goals and ideals among Johnson and his aides--and unlike his speech after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, this was a long-planned speech that underwent several drafts. Thus, by examining this speech, we can draw certain conclusions not only about Johnson and Vietnam, but also about presidential rhetoric in general.

Growing Discontent

Promises and Actions

"This Nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West Berlin," declared Lyndon Johnson in his first presidential address on November 27, 1963. (27) Ascending to the presidency upon the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Johnson was aware that many considered him a pretender to the throne. "I'm a trustee," he told advisor McGeorge Bundy in March 1964. "I've got to win an election. Or Nixon or somebody else has. And then you can make a decision." (28) Assistant Secretary of State George Ball concurred: "It would have been terribly difficult for him to have disengaged immediately, because it would look as though he were repudiating the policy of Kennedy." (29) Consequently, Johnson was determined to uphold his predecessor's pledge to "pay any price [and] bear any burden" in the struggle for freedom against communism. Yet Johnson did have doubts about American involvement in Vietnam; internal records show a president wracked with indecision. (30)

He did not want to enmesh American troops in a second ground war in Asia, but he feared the consequences of withdrawal, especially in an election year. Withdrawing would earn him not only the opprobrium of the Republican right, perhaps leading to a new McCarthyism, but also attacks from staunch Kennedy supporters (not least Robert Kennedy) that he had not preserved JFK's legacy. Moreover, Johnson and his advisors saw Vietnam through a specific lens: "Munich, the wrong way, Korea, the right way." (31) Publicly and privately, they affirmed the principle that aggression had to be met by decisive military force, not least given the overarching Cold War. Finally, Johnson's character led him to see Vietnam, like most other issues, as a personal test of will: two days after Kennedy's assassination, he told advisors, "I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went." (32) Already Johnson was sensitive to his domestic political position (and his place in the history books).

Johnson in 1964 promised to continue Kennedy's policies by keeping America's commitment to maintain an independent South Vietnam. Downplaying the military commitment this promise might entail, he presented himself as the peace candidate relative to his bellicose Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater. During the campaign, American naval ships in the Tonkin Gulf reported attacks from North Vietnamese patrol boats, and Johnson ordered air strikes in retaliation. The Gulf of Tonkin incident allowed Johnson to warn North Vietnam and reassure South Vietnam of his determination to keep Kennedy's pledge. He obtained a congressional blank check for further "retaliatory" action, but the incident also allowed him to show how "measured" and "appropriate" his response was. Garnering public and congressional support, Johnson deemphasized the Vietnam issue during the rest of the campaign, except to note repeatedly that the United States, while pursuing peace, would not withdraw from its commitments in Southeast Asia or anywhere else in the world. Johnson's moderation played a significant role in securing him the largest landslide in modern election history, as well as 2 to 1 advantages for the Democrats in both houses of Congress. (33)

Selling himself as the peace candidate in the November 1964 election raised expectations that Johnson would bring peace to Vietnam. Instead, violence escalated on both sides. On February 7, 1965, National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas killed eight American servicemen and wounded sixty-two in an attack on Pleiku; in retaliation, Johnson ordered repeated "retaliatory" strikes on North Vietnam. (34) Subsequently, U.S. pilots joined their South Vietnamese counterparts in bombing NLF targets within South Vietnam. Sustained bombing of North Vietnam began on March 2. Five days later, 3500 Marines arrived, the first publicly acknowledged American combat troops in Vietnam. Though given a "strictly defensive" role to protect American air bases, Time noted, "Nobody doubted for a minute that sooner or later they would clash with the Viet Cong [NLF]." (35) Then reports came that American forces were using gas (albeit nonlethal) against Communist guerrillas. (36) Almost every week, it seemed, the United States escalated its involvement in the war in Vietnam. Rather than heed advice from allies or opposing advisors, Johnson felt he had no choice but to respond to aggression and maintain America's Cold War consensus on containing communism. (37)

Foreign and Domestic Outcry

   From the time our planes hit the first military target in North
   Vietnam early in February, we were subjected to an increasingly
   heavy propaganda barrage from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.... The
   propaganda message was short and sharp: Stop the Bombing. Soon
   voices in non-Communist countries joined the chorus--Indian, French,
   Swedish, and others. Before long, some American public figures began
   to repeat the theme. (38)

As Johnson noted, American bombing of North Vietnam sparked concern, dismay, and outrage in certain segments of foreign and domestic opinion. The administration dismissed criticism from Communists as mere propaganda, but other critics were harder to ignore. UN Secretary General U Thant infuriated the Johnson administration by announcing, "I am sure the great American people, if only they know the true facts and the background to the developments in South Viet-Nam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary.... As you know, in times of war and of hostilities the first casualty is truth." (39) French President Charles de Gaulle became a thorn in Johnson's side by repeatedly insisting on American withdrawal from Vietnam and a negotiated solution to implement the 1954 Geneva agreements. The British government feared increased domestic criticism for its public backing of U.S. policy; furthermore, most British officials already believed American intervention in South Vietnam to be a hopeless and misguided misadventure. (40)

After American bombing of North Vietnam began, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson wanted to come to Washington for consultations. However, when he suggested such a trip to President Johnson over the telephone, "He let fly an outburst of Texan temper," as Wilson later wrote. (41) Foreign support was clearly scarce if one administration staffer could write, "The firmest public support from any government on our policy in Vietnam has come from the British." (42) A February 16 White House memorandum placed Britain along with Canada and India in the "With us, but wobbly on negotiations" category, with Germany the only country outside the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization listed as "With us pretty strongly." (43) During a visit to the United States at the beginning of April, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson publicly advised the president to stop the bombing, which so incensed Johnson that he cancelled his original engagement at Johns Hopkins. (44)

Domestically, Johnson faced numerous critics. Nationally syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann questioned Vietnam escalation, which worried Johnson because he believed much of the "metropolitan" Eastern establishment followed Lippmann's lead. (45) A wide range of newspapers called on the administration to rule out escalation and seek a negotiated exit from the war in early 1965, including the New York Times, Washington Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Chicago Daily News, San Francisco Examiner, and Hearst and Scripps-Howard newspapers nationwide. (46) Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening (the only senators who voted against the Tonkin Gulf resolution) repeatedly demanded a negotiated withdrawal. Other senators, including LBJ mentor Richard Russell, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright, and Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, regularly met with Johnson and administration officials in 1964 and early 1965 to discuss options in Vietnam and their reservations about escalation. (47) Even supportive senators reported that constituent mail leaned heavily toward negotiation. (48) University students began to protest escalation through all-night teach-ins about the history of Vietnam and American involvement there, often billed as a forum for debate but skewed toward the anti-administration side. Yet precisely because such protests were vocal and one-sided, Johnson tended to ignore the opprobrium from the left. Johnson told Ball, "George, don't pay any attention to what those little shits on the campuses do. The great beast is the reactionary elements in the country. Those are the people that we have to fear." (49)

Johnson consistently feared the right far more than the left. "I believed that the loss of China had played a large role in the rise of Joe McCarthy," he later told his biographer, Doris Kearns, "And I knew that all these problems, taken together, were chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost Vietnam." (50) Former Vice President Richard Nixon delivered a widely publicized address in which he likened Vietnam to Czechoslovakia in 1938 and attacked any solution other than military victory as surrender to the Communists. (51) Conservative columnists Joseph Alsop and William S. White and numerous Republicans in Congress alternated between praising Johnson's military escalation, including the bombing runs, and decrying the administration's apparent willingness to force the American military to fight "with one hand tied behind its back." Taking all of this into account, Johnson was convinced that losing Vietnam would tear the country apart: he once mused to Russell, "Well, they'd impeach a President that would run out, wouldn't they?" (52) He urgently sought a way to deal with Vietnam that would maintain his and America's prestige while protecting his domestic agenda on civil rights and the Great Society.

Internal Debates

President Johnson and his advisors extensively debated Vietnam policy. Moreover, noted the executive secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), "On the crucial problem, Vietnam, he was what we used to call the desk officer." (53) His deep personal involvement in day-to-day decisions, coupled with insecurity and egomania, inclined Johnson to view internal disagreement with his Vietnam policies as disloyalty. (54) For example, after Vice President Hubert Humphrey wrote him a memo urging withdrawal, arguing that the November landslide had marginalized the extreme right, Johnson virtually shut him out of further decision making on Vietnam. (55) Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson advocated a "political track" to accompany the military track in Vietnam but had little influence. (56) George Ball, Chester Cooper, and Clark Clifford opposed military escalation, but Cooper and Clifford kept quiet, and Johnson deemed Ball the in-house devil's advocate. (57)

On the other hand, the president's three key advisors, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Special Assistant National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, all advocated military escalation. (58) Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower advised a "campaign of pressure" and an increasingly hard line. (59) There was broad agreement among decision makers and the general public regarding the Munich analogy, the strategy of containment, and America's need to achieve its goal of "an independent non-Communist South Vietnam," as National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288 succinctly stated. (60) "And Lyndon Johnson was no president to preside over what he considered a Munich," wrote aide Eric F. Goldman. (61) Furthermore, administration officials agreed they had to keep the public as united as possible on Vietnam. Given this consensus, plus fears of partisan attacks and political instability in South Vietnam, some may conclude that American escalation in Vietnam was well-nigh inevitable.

Yet different measures of public opinion provided conflicting pictures for policy makers. Throughout 1964 and 1965, Gallup polls recorded a consistent majority approving the American military presence in Southeast Asia and Johnson's handling of foreign policy, and Johnson earned overall approval ratings of over 60 percent. (62) He considered this support for hard-line Vietnam policies, but these same Gallup polls recorded larger majorities (68 to 74 percent) in favor of a UN-backed compromise peace settlement. (63) John Burke and Fred Greenstein suggest, "The inclination of Johnson and his associates in 1965 was to pay heed to the hawkish findings yielded by Gallup questions that asked the public to affirm its support for the popular president and his policies." (64) Johnson was less interested in the public's preferences for peace.

Interestingly, incoming White House mail overwhelmingly opposed hawkish policies, especially after American planes began bombing North Vietnam. One Cambridge, Massachusetts couple wrote, "You called Goldwater irresponsible and we voted for you. Now we are ashamed." A San Francisco man telegrammed, "We want Johnson reasonableness not Goldwater vengeance. Don't expand Viet war. Rebuild Mekong Valley instead." (65) A February 9 memo from Bundy to the president tallied the score and compared it to previous crises: 1,500 telegrams (breaking 12 to 1 against the government position) concerning the bombing versus 1,650 (2 to 1 against) in the Tonkin Gulf incident, 800 (14 to 1 in support) in the Panama crisis over the canal treaties, and 12,700 in the Cuban missile crisis. (66) A February 16 memo highlights a Gallup poll showing that 67 percent approve of "retaliatory" actions on North Vietnam, which is "at once highly encouraging and somewhat startling--startling, in view of the fact that the telegrams into the White House are still running at about 14 to 1 against our actions. (It goes to show something about telegrams to the White House.)" (67) Perhaps such negative numbers explain why the White House, in contrast to most senators, refused to release details of incoming mail about Vietnam. (68) The comparison between White House mail and Gallup polls suggests that feelings for escalation ran wide but not deep, whereas opinions promoting withdrawal were marginal yet intensely held.

As the bombing and the criticism intensified, administration officials increasingly felt they had to address unraveling of unity on the domestic and foreign fronts. (69) Staffers suggested the administration send representatives, especially the vice president, to answer campus critics. (70) In early March, Bundy wrote to the president that Rusk and McNamara "both feel that to hold some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about 'talks,'" with Rusk wanting "to keep the British just happy enough to hold them aboard." (71) "Each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing [which] will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion," wrote CIA Director John McCone to Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. (72) "Although devoting much effort to public explanations and private persuasion, the President could not quiet his critics," note the Pentagon papers. "From near and far more and more brickbats were being hurled at the Administration's position on Vietnam.... Condemnation of the bombing spread and the President was being pressed from many directions to make a major public statement welcoming negotiations." (73) President Johnson knew it: "I decided it was time to make another major statement on Vietnam to the American people." (74)

The Speech

The "Peace Offensive"

President Johnson's April 7, 1965 address was several months in the making. On January 11, NSC member Chester Cooper wrote that a speech on Vietnam ("which I think is due") should "inform the American people how and why we got into Vietnam," reassure Saigon, signal to the Communists America's determination to achieve its objectives, and set out minimum conditions for negotiations. (75) While Johnson and other administration officials publicly reiterated America's commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia, they avoided publicizing economic or political goals (aside from unconditional surrender by NLF forces). George Ball noted this void in a February 13 memo to the president and argued, "A program of political action ... is an essential accompaniment to the military program." He wrote that such a program--which would ultimately include a joint U.S.-South Vietnam statement of aims, Security Council discussions, and an international conference--was necessary to make clear America's peaceful objectives and "pre-empt a probable peace offensive by the Communists." (76)

The speech was an opportunity to retune America's foreign policy. "Within the Administration there was a growing feeling that somewhere along the line the hand had been misplayed, that somehow the mix of increased military pressure and increased diplomatic efforts for settlement had not been right," according to the Pentagon papers. (77) McGeorge Bundy told the president in March, "We have largely accomplished the immediate purpose of getting our new level of military action into operation without yielding to clamor for 'negotiations.'... [There is now] a strong argument for a more detailed exposition of our conditions for peace, and our view of the future in Southeast Asia." (78) Of course, talking about peace was not only desirable per se, but also necessary in fighting the "other war" against Communist propaganda. "As I have said in every part of the union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time, and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace," Johnson told his cabinet on March 23. (79) Yet this message was clearly not getting through to the country or the world, as teach-ins and demonstrations showed. The next day, he told the NSC,

   It is unlikely that present political actions will meet the
   situation. We should plan for a bigger political effort to reverse
   the current trend. New political actions should be proposed for
   consideration. An overall policy speech on Vietnam should be
   prepared.... One grows tired of reading only what the other side is
   saying. We should crank up our propaganda effort. (80)

America's "peace offensive" would spell out its vision for a postwar Southeast Asia. Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman advocated "one or more statements amplifying Point V of his March 25 statement to capture world opinion as well as to give the enemy a political and economic carrot." (81) Top officials and special assistants, including Bundy (who wrote the original draft), Richard Goodwin (prime author of the 1964 Great Society speech), and Jack Valenti, worked on drafts, following Johnson's instructions to make it "a presidential-style address," and Johnson himself was one of the writers. (82) Bundy wrote to the president, "This may well be the most important foreign policy speech you have yet planned." (83)

Early drafts focused less on diplomatic negotiations than on justification for American military intervention and only a general desire for peace and economic development. (84) Indeed, these drafts explicitly avoided a call for negotiations, under the assumption that such an appeal showed weakness. One striking line from an early draft read, "I know that I am asking for a further sacrifice from the American people," but this was cut. Several staff members convinced the president to add a sentence crafted by Goodwin and Press Secretary Bill Moyers: "And we remain ready ... for unconditional discussions." Johnson reluctantly did so just two hours before the speech, despite the State Department objections; as Valenti noted, "State did not react well to the bold proposals of the Pres." (85) The State Department was particularly concerned that the offer for "unconditional discussions" would upset the South Vietnamese. It did, yet this sentence is what grabbed many of the headlines--and the plaudits.

The Carrot

Another part of the speech to grab headlines and plaudits was an offer to send $1 billion in aid for a plan to develop the Mekong River basin. President Johnson had alluded to such an offer in his March 25 cabinet statement, though this was nothing new within the administration. Cooper's 11 January memo argued that a Vietnam speech "should emphasize the positive as well as negative (i.e., military) aspects of our SEA [Southeast Asia] policy. The speech should develop our views of a Mekong River program," and to underline this point, he attached a detailed description of the UN-led project already underway for Bundy's perusal. (86) A March 16 memo noted, "At the President's direction, State, AID, and USIA, with the White House Staff, are framing a program to match and even out-match the military efforts"--trying to right the imbalance between military escalation and the economic and political efforts. (87) CIA Director McCone reported to Johnson that even the hawkish Eisenhower was "very positive" that gaining popular support for the South Vietnamese government (a perennial problem) required political and civic action. (88) Rusk suggested a positive label akin to the "war on poverty," advocating various economic and social measures to "win the Vietnamese people" including land reform, slum clearance, low-cost housing, improved water supply, rural electrification, and long-term industrial development (89)--effectively extending the Great Society to Vietnam.

Officials noticed several figures outside the administration had suggested exactly such a Great Society or New Deal for Vietnam, particularly a Mekong version of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Wesley Fishel, chairman of the lobby group American Friends of Vietnam, endorsed a "Johnson Plan" to rally regional non-Communists. (90) Several senators added their support, as did Southeast Asia specialists such as former Ambassador to Thailand Kenneth Young. (91) Time and the New York Times editorial board praised Johnson's apparent move toward diplomacy in the March 25 cabinet statement, the latter arguing for a Mekong River development "that would overshadow the Tennessee Valley Authority in size and scope.... Presumably this is the kind of project President Johnson has in mind." (92)

Developing the Mekong was a perfect project for Lyndon Johnson. "I was convinced," he wrote, "that our struggle there would make sense only if it were part of a larger constructive effort in Asia." (93) Lloyd C. Gardner draws a direct line from Johnson's New Deal experiences with economic development and harnessing hydroelectricity to the Mekong proposals: "Johnson's whole career was the politics of economic development." (94) LBJ advisor Walt Rostow agrees, recalling "the depth of his conviction about the outrage and the wastage of poverty and ignorance and disease. If there is a single force and theme in his political life that is it. There are others, but that is it from beginning to end." (95)

On a 1961 vice-presidential visit to South Vietnam, Johnson met with old friend Arthur Goldschmidt, now an economic specialist for the United Nations, and U Nyun, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, who told him about proposed highways and dams. Johnson responded, "You know, Mr. Executive Secretary, I am a river man. All my life I have been interested in rivers and their development." (96) Upon his return, he gave what Rostow called "the best single speech on foreign aid I've ever heard by anyone." Speaking extemporaneously, "he made the link between what he had seen in our own country and seen as a young man in Texas with these poor people out in Asia. And he spoke of how much could be done in the span of one man's lifetime." (97) Lady Bird Johnson called references to his own experience with rural electrification "almost a signature in his speeches." (98) Gardner calls this linkage Johnson's reach for "a field theory of politics, a way of enabling him to make sense of all his experiences from the beginning of the New Deal. (99) Johnson's personal experience with poverty drove him to lift out of poverty as many as he could reach: Americans through the Great Society, and Southeast Asians through a Mekong TVA.

Johnson specifically requested that the "Mekong River project" be made a centerpiece of the Johns Hopkins address. He showed drafts to the liberal lobby Americans for Democratic Action, Lippmann and other journalists, and several senators, who heartily endorsed the speech. (100) On the day of the speech, he persuaded former President of the World Bank Eugene Black to head American participation in the program, adding credibility to the proposal. (101) The State Department objected to the billion-dollar offer because "we didn't have a plan for using it," but the White House said that missed the point. His advisors put the offer back in the speech, and Johnson wrote, "I see you put this back in--that's good." (102) When delivering the speech, he only smiled in the conclusion, as he recalled, "In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area." (103) But while Lyndon Johnson reminisced about the wonder of electricity coming to rural Texas and envisioned the same wonder in Southeast Asia, he also identified and determined to fight the main obstacle to his vision: Communist aggression.

The Stick

Johnson did not want to bomb North Vietnam, or put American lives at risk, or be remembered in history books as a war president. But Johnson firmly believed that only force could meet what he and other American policy makers perceived as a Hanoi- and Peking-directed subversion to topple South Vietnam's government and America's prestige. Negotiation could only come from a position of strength; hence the efforts to strengthen America's bargaining position by increasing military aid, bombing the North, and introducing ground troops. Even once Johnson committed himself to a speech that would answer critics of escalation, he ordered further escalatory steps. At NSC meetings on April 1-2, he increased the number of American combat troops and approved their use in offensive operations against NLF guerrillas. The Pentagon papers calls NSAM 328, which implemented the decision, "a pivotal document." (104) It is worth noting that the final paragraph of NSAM 328 includes the admonishment that the new orders should occur quietly to "minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy." (105) Lest the North Vietnamese misunderstand American resolve, the bombings increased in the two weeks before the address. "The U.S. was now attempting to achieve, through a deliberate combination of intensified military pressures and diplomatic enticements, what it had hoped would result from a mere token demonstration of capability and resolve," notes the Pentagon papers. "The carrot had been added to the stick, but the stick was still the more tangible and visible element of U.S. policy." (106)

Administration officials from Johnson down agreed that they should not replace the stick; on the contrary, they constantly reiterated the need for continued military pressure on North Vietnam and the NLE Memos within the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Saigon embassy dealt with the reasons for and details of military escalation without bothering to question the policy itself. They felt they did not have to: domestic public opinion clearly supported a resolute stance against communism in Vietnam, for the president's approval ratings increased during America's bombing of North Vietnam, despite increasingly vocal dissent. (107)

Thus, while Johnson delivered the Johns Hopkins address in large part to answer escalation critics, he simultaneously reassured its supporters. Reinforcing the March 25 cabinet statement, the president affirmed, "The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next.... We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw." (108) While he declared his willingness for "unconditional discussions," he also declared, "Peace demands an independent South Vietnam." And he added, "We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command. But we will use it." (109) Overall, Johnson emphasized prospects for war and for liberal internationalism; with quintessentially American pragmatism and his canny political instincts, he infused the speech with American munificence and American resolve, diplomacy and economic development but also America's vast military capabilities. (110) The president, writes David Green, united his "generous impulses [and] fear of communist advance ... in the most positive way possible." (111) If Johnson was presenting a contradiction, it was one that reflected his administration, his country, and himself.

Reaction but No Action

Much Applause from Home ...

President Johnson's speech drew near-unanimous acclaim from his domestic audience. White House mail shifted from 5 to 1 against the president to better than 4 to 1 in favor, Cooper reported. (112) Letter writers called the speech "great," "sincere," "wonderful," and said it made them "proud to be an American." Some even offered their services to the Mekong River development plan. (113) Johnson had captured the Wilsonian consciousness that desired a world built on democracy, freedom, and equality, and had in his own mind and in the collective American mind made "propaganda for the truth," as the Wall Street Journal proclaimed. (114) Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James Greenfield noted, "It has mollified some who have persistently called for 'negotiations,' and at the same time satisfied those who believe we should maintain pressure until the Communists are willing to come to the conference table." (115)

Newspapers nationwide reflected the approval. April 8 front-page headlines of the liberal Eastern establishment that Johnson mistrusted now trumpeted his offer: "President Makes Offer to Start Vietnam Talks Unconditionally; Proposes $1 Billion Aid for Asia" (New York Times); "LBJ Offers 'Unconditional' Viet Talks but Stands Firm on U.S. Commitments" (Washington Post); and "LBJ Offers to Start Peace Talks Even While Viet War Goes On" (Boston Globe). "President Johnson last night projected an American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take pride," gushed the New York Times lead editorial. (116) Meanwhile, White and Alsop praised the "Great Speech" that kept America's policy "as Firm as Ever," and Rowland Evans and Bob Novak wrote that Johnson "deftly disarmed his anti-war critics without really changing his hard line." (117) Many newspapers published the full text of the address and added editorials praising Johnson's courage and reason in delivering a "masterful presentation of U.S. policy in southeast Asia" that included both the "Sword and the Olive Branch" and won a diplomatic gain for showing the world "Precisely How It Can Have Asian Peace." (118) The Dallas Morning News ran a huge headline reading "Unconditional Peace Talks Urged" and an editorial a day later entitled "The Johnson Touch": "The Reds have been successful in hog-tying our American diplomats. They may find it rather more difficult to out-deal a Texas politician." Alongside the editorial ran a political cartoon showing LBJ flying over a North Vietnamese guerrilla in a fighter jet with a bomb in one hand and a billion dollars in the other. (119) Columnist Roscoe Drummond epitomized the praise when he wrote that the speech "will decisively unite the American people behind what is being done and whatever still must be done to successfully defend South Viet-Nam; it puts the onus totally on Hanoi for refusing to seek peaceful settlement; it will enlist for the United States mounting support from world opinion." (120) In his speech, the skilful Johnson had managed to appeal to almost everyone.

Congress also showered the president with praise. Senate Majority Leader Mansfield lauded the speech before entering it into the congressional record. Several senators praised Johnson's stated goal of peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia. Most senators and congressmen, however, focused their approval on the president's promise not to withdraw, the "iron hand in the velvet glove" that signaled America's "firm determination ... to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia." Others combined the two, praising the "balance" in the speech, and entered laudatory editorials and articles into the record. Some called the speech a "masterpiece," while one congressman called it "one of the great speeches and one of the great acts of statesmanship of world history." Only Morse, Gruening, and a few Republicans attacked the speech, the former noting, "All I heard in the President's speech was that the United States is going to continue shooting fish in the barrel until they are all dead," and the latter decrying the "proposed $1 billion boondoggle." But most of the Congress strongly supported at least certain elements in Johnson's speech. (121) Nor was this just talk: the next day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to restore $115 million for military spending that they had cut just a week earlier to signal concern with the president's Vietnam policy. (122)

... But Less from Abroad ...

President Johnson also targeted leaders and publics of America's allies, and here his speech also met with widespread governmental approval, though with some media doubts about actual prospects for peace. Europe generally commended a "Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia" and the "frank and generous offer" of unconditional discussions. Britain's Wilson called the president's plan "statesmanlike, imaginative and forwardlooking," while Labor and Conservative MPs praised the "clarification of American aims." Most British newspapers approved of "LBJ's dramatic bid for peace," as the Daily Telegraph called the speech, and the staunchly pro-American Economist proclaimed that Johnson was now "armed with big carrot as well as big stick"; the more skeptical Guardian, though, pointed out that Johnson had still laid down conditions, such as an independent South Vietnam. The French government generally saw the speech as an "effort to make real progress" toward peace, though Le Figaro lamented that America kept bombing North Vietnam without giving Hanoi time to consider the proposals. German and Italian newspapers such as Il Tempo and Frankfurter Rundschau echoed their governments' strong support of the speech.

Similar reactions came from some non-Communist countries elsewhere. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, India, and Indonesia welcomed the proposed unconditional discussions, although the latter "wanted nothing to do with the proposed Asian development plan." On the other hand, Japanese leaders promptly announced their participation in the economic development plan, embracing the speech as "extremely helpful in calming Japanese anxieties, blunting criticism, and winning a greater measure of public acceptance of U.S. policy in Vietnam." Japanese, Burmese, and Indian press switched from criticism of American policy to criticism of the Communist rejection, while Latin American press was strongly supportive. However, praise was not unanimous: Nationalist China in particular lamented the perceived change in American policy made "under the pressure of the international appeasers." African commentary was mixed, while Arab press simply denounced continued American aggression. Nevertheless, the bulk of press opinion, from France's L'Aurore to the Australia's Sydney Herald, now saw the responsibility for peace or war lying in Communist hands. (123)

Unsurprisingly, Communist governments and press attacked the speech. Vice President Humphrey met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin the day after the speech and found the ambassador "very concerned [and] quite honestly, confused.... We saw him [Johnson] as a man of peace. But I honestly cannot understand the bombings." (124) Pravda attacked the offer of unconditional discussions as "a propaganda device designed to fool the world," and Eastern Europe followed suit. Radio Moscow disdainfully noted that Washington refused to talk with the NLE Several Communist news agencies even quoted speeches by Senators Morse and Gruening. Communist China declared it would resist "war blackmail," calling the proposals a "swindle." (125)

More importantly, Vietnamese reactions were broadly negative. Some South Vietnamese officials expressed doubt about the Mekong River development plan, in part because it would include North Vietnam; these doubts confounded Johnson, who lamented, "I'm such a damn fool. I can't understand why they wouldn't want it." (126) To reassure the government that the speech did not constitute appeasement, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor told Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat, "We have no thought of a cease-fire or any cessation of our present activity, which could come only after our receiving concrete evidence that North Viet-Nam was in fact halting its aggression. In sum, [the] President is not announcing any fundamental departure from our policy." (127) Consequently, Quat welcomed Johnson's "reaffirmation of the U.S. determination to have an independent Republic of Vietnam." As for "unconditional discussions," Quat's government indicated that they would be exchanges of views, not "negotiations." (128)

North Vietnam understood the same message and reacted accordingly. Luu Doan Huynh of North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry later recalled, "We thought it was a smoke screen to divert attention from the troop build-up that was under way. That, and the bombing of the North, of course." Hanoi's Nhan Dan boasted, "We will resolutely fight to the end, that is our answer." The day after the speech, North Vietnam announced its "Four Points": American withdrawal and an end to the war; a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements; a settling of South Vietnamese affairs "in accordance with the program" of the NLF; and the ultimate peaceful reunification of Vietnam. (129) Although Huynh insisted that the announcement was not a response to the Johns Hopkins speech, the West saw it that way. (130) Hanoi declared these points as a basis for negotiations--and some advisors saw them and other postspeech statements as a more "reasonable" stance, given that while the conditions were "couched in offensive language," only the third point was unacceptable, so there might be room to negotiate. (131) The New York Times editorialized, "The need to appeal to world opinion has forced both Washington and Hanoi to spell out their objectives in a form that would appear reasonable. And this process alone has inevitably narrowed the gap between the two sides." (132) An intelligence memo agreed that Hanoi now felt "on the defensive [and] compelled to appear more forthcoming toward negotiations." (133) But the Johnson administration publicly characterized such statements as repackaged aggression and only a surface change--ironic, as this mirrored the criticism North Vietnam leveled at the Johns Hopkins address.

... And the Band Played On

Initial euphoria at the Johns Hopkins speech soon slid back into unease both in America and abroad. "There is a great deal of talk in Moscow, in Peking and, in all honesty, in Washington on what the President meant or did not mean by his speech at Johns Hopkins," stated Mansfield two weeks later. (134) World opinion did shift closer to the American position on Vietnam, and the British government in particular was grateful insofar as it could now refer to the speech as evidence of Johnson's good intent and thereby maintain its supportive public stance. Many praised the United States for its determination to prevent Communist expansion, keeping faith with its allies, and firmness in resisting full-scale war. (135) But once dismay at the Communist rejection of "unconditional discussions" receded, many refocused their attention upon the American bombing of North Vietnam. A six-day bombing pause in May failed to change the mood in Hanoi or anywhere else, and bombing resumed, as did the criticism.

Criticism also grew at home. In mid-April, sixteen thousand people converged on Washington to demonstrate against the war. Teach-ins spread to campuses across the country. Hans J. Morgenthau wrote stinging critiques of the administration's policy, charging, "One could write the history of our involvement in Vietnam in terms of self-deception and the deception of others." (136) The New Republic, which had warned that the April 7 address would not get Hanoi to the bargaining table, derided Johnson's "captivity" to the Republican right. (137) In the Senate, Morse continued his attacks, asking, "Does any Senator believe that North Vietnam and Red China would come to a conference table with their diplomatic tails between their legs?" (138)

The Johns Hopkins address succeeded in persuading many journalists and editors that the administration really did seek peace in Vietnam, however, and would not get bogged down in a quagmire. Administration officials continued the "peace offensive" after the speech. Bundy quoted the speech extensively in a televised debate with, among others, Hans J. Morgenthau; Rusk reiterated the president's "three-fold policy [of] determination against aggression, discussion for peace, and development" in a June address; Johnson himself repeated his offers at several press conferences. (139) Front-page headlines featured the phrase "unconditional negotiations" repeatedly over the following weeks; LBJ continually talked with reporters to keep it fresh, as opposed to North Vietnam's Four Points, which became old news rather quickly. The February-March critical interpretation of administration actions became a more supportive, even deferential stance, during April-June. (140)

This permissive atmosphere gave the administration more time and ability to continue escalation without generating enough controversy to derail its domestic legislation. As Larry Berman notes, "This was not the infamous 'Caligula,' but rather the soft-selling Homo politicus--who believed that losing Vietnam in the summer of 1965 would wreck his plans for a truly Great Society." (141) Certainly, it is impossible to fully understand Johnson's motives for near-secrecy in escalating the war without considering the rush of Great Society legislation he was simultaneously pushing through Congress: the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (March 2); an education bill (April 9); a housing bill (June 30); Medicare (July 9); the Voting Rights Act (July 10). "I knew that the day it [Vietnam] exploded into a major debate on the war," he said later, "that day would be the beginning of the end of the Great Society." (142) Johnson and his advisors wanted to keep Vietnam off the domestic radar while signaling to North Vietnam that the United States would not leave. The Johns Hopkins address succeeded on both counts.

Conclusion

The "Peace without Conquest" speech sought to quiet critics, restore America's prestige, and explain and justify America's fight in Vietnam. George Reedy, George Ball, William Bundy, and other administration officials said LBJ spoke to stabilize public opinion, and historians agree. (143) George Herring writes that Johnson wanted "primarily to silence domestic and international critics rather than set in motion determined efforts to find a peace settlement." (144) After all, the administration had not even formulated a plan for its proposed "unconditional discussions." (145) Michael Hunt argues, "Johnson knew the North Vietnamese would reject his offer of negotiation, but he also knew the public wanted overwhelmingly for him to make it." (146) A career politician who had witnessed two wars in his thirty years in Washington, Johnson knew that wartime rhetoric must strive for domestic consensus. (147) Just as he pursued a "middle course" between withdrawal and full-scale war on the ground, he "split the difference between hawks and doves" in the speech, generally satisfying both groups. (148) This was vintage Johnson--as Robert Dallek notes, "When confronted by sharp divisions of opinion throughout his career, he had almost always adopted a moderate position, identifying himself as an accommodationist who reflected the national desire for compromise rather than ideological rigidity." (149) In the speech, Johnson's gut impulses coincided with the timely need for noble rhetoric.

However, Johnson did not make the speech solely to swing public opinion in his favor. He also endeavored to reassure himself and the country of the positive reasons for America's involvement in Vietnam: not just to protect freedom from aggression, but to build infrastructure and achieve his cherished goal of lifting people from poverty. Time correspondent Hugh Sidey recalled, "He may never have been more ecstatic over Vietnam than when he made his Johns Hopkins speech." (150) Johnson's ebullience showed on the helicopter ride back to the White House after the speech, when he famously told Moyers, "Old Ho can't turn me down" (which gives an idea of Johnson's misperceptions about North Vietnam). Indeed, Johnson would cling to his dreams of a Mekong TVA right through 1967. (151) Still, as Gardner notes, "Even if Ho Chi Minh did not respond to the offer, LBJ had addressed the issue of American self-image, crucial to his success with the Great Society legislative program, as well as to support for his foreign policy." (152)

The speech proved only a temporary victory in the propaganda war. Two weeks later, Cooper wrote that while the speech put the Communists on the "propaganda defensive ... we still feel that our liabilities are outweighed by our assets." (153) Johnson, who focused on negative responses to the speech although they were in the minority, bitterly chastised his advisors for flailing to carry congressional opinion and public opinion. (154)

As time passed, it became clear that the Johns Hopkins address had been more rhetoric than substance. It was a "description of reality through language," in Cherwitz and Hikins's phrase, but this one-sided "reality" did not ultimately stand up to examination. (155) It gave voice to Johnson's hopes for Southeast Asian development; but containing communism militarily and maintaining domestic tranquility were higher priorities. The speech reassured many Americans, from citizens to journalists to members of Congress, that intervention in Vietnam was necessary and just; but it also lulled them into complacency as the administration led the country into war. Abroad, the speech strengthened the hand of America's supporters and quieted its critics, especially among NATO and Far Eastern allies; but critics quickly saw the tension between "unconditional discussions" and maintaining an independent South Vietnam. The offer of developing Southeast Asia created a groundswell of support and optimism; but a "Mekong Valley Authority" never arose. "It is highly probable," writes Michael L. Geis, "that a president who says that he is more peace-loving than anyone in the world is getting ready to send troops to fight a war." (156) Indeed, the only part of the speech that proved to be more than rhetoric was Johnson's determination not to withdraw from Vietnam. (157)

The address provided good material for leaflet drops in North Vietnam and appeared to slightly moderate the North Vietnamese stance; but it did not persuade them, the Chinese, or the NLF to change their goal of a united, Communist Vietnam. "While the President's speech evoked a good press and much favorable public reaction throughout the world," noted the Pentagon papers, "its practical consequences were meager." (158) One key reason the speech did not bring peace was the North Vietnamese reaction:

   It was if we were "naughty" little children and you told us that if
   we did not stop crying, there would be no candy, only "punishment."
   That is how we in Hanoi understood it. You will reward us--give us
   money to spend, if we are good "children." ... In the same way,
   U.S.-proposed "unconditional talks" would in our view have amounted
   to negotiations under the threat of continued bombing. In addition,
   Johnson firmly excluded the NLF from negotiations. So, negotiations
   under your terms were not considered possible by us. So you
   continued the bombing. So we got punished. Ah, but you see, we were
   stubborn. You didn't think about that. (159)

Some analysts argue that the Johns Hopkins speech failed because it did not ultimately silence the peace bloc or bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. (160) In fact, it succeeded all too well, for it gave the administration breathing space to accomplish its domestic legislative goals and quietly escalate the war, announcing it on July 28 without causing a massive outcry. Therefore, the speech would exemplify Denton and Hahn's view of rhetoric: "It does rather than is." (161)

Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the phrase "credibility gap" emerged in print just six weeks after the speech. (162) Perhaps it is no surprise either that the press and the public became more wary of Johnson's peace initiatives. And perhaps it is no surprise that even after Johnson left the presidency and right up to the present day, there has been far more skepticism of White House statements about America's aim to "strengthen world order ... slow down aggression ... [and] dream of an end to war." (163) A significant danger to peace lies in complacency--which, as public reaction to the Johns Hopkins address showed, stems far too often from effective rhetoric.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Dr. Steven Casey of the London School of Economics. Sarah Haldeman of the LBJ Library. Leila Nadel-Cadaxa, Dr. David Yuravlivker, the staff of the Library of Congress Manuscript Reading Room, and Joann Davis of PSQ and the reviewers for their helpful comments.

DROR YURAVLIVKER

London School of Economics and Political Science 

(1.) New York Times, April 8, 1965, 16.

(2.) Anticipatory headlines included "LBJ Works on Major Speech," Washington Post, April 7, 1965.

(3.) Public Papers of the Presidents. Lyndon Johnson. 1965, Book I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 394-99; "Destroy or Build," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXI: 13, April 15, 1965, 386-88.

(4.) Kenneth W. Thompson, series ed., Contemporary Politics, Rhetoric and Discourse (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 37.

(5.) David Zarefsky, "Lyndon Johnson," in American Orators of the Twentieth Century, edited by Bernard K. Duffy and Halford R. Ryan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 226.

(6.) Aristotle, On Rhetoric, edited by George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 12, 36. See also pp. 14, 37-40.

(7.) Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, Communication and Knowledge (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), 52.

(8.) Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam-oil-the-Potomac (New York: Praeger, 1992), 22.

(9.) Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication and Knowledge, 1, 67. Cherwitz and Hikins provide a good introduction to rhetoric. See also Amos Kiewe, ed., The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994).

(10.) Robert E. Denton, Jr. and Dan E Hahn, Presidential Communication (New York: Praeger, 1986), xiii.

(11.) Peter Bull, The Microanalysis of Political Communication (London: Routledge, 2003), 6-16.

(12.) Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 69.

(13.) Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 4.

(14.) Hart, The Sound of Leadership, 14-15. Regarding the impact of television in particular, see Nell Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death (New York: Viking, 1985); Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President (New York: Penguin Books, 1988); and Marshall McLuhan, The Medium Is the Message (Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 2001).

(15.) Kiewe, ed., The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric, xx.

(16.) Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 101.

(17.) Kiewe, ed., The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric, xix.

(18.) Denton and Hahn, Presidential Communication, 116.

(19.) Hart, The Sound of Leadership, 26.

(20.) Thompson, series ed., Contemporary Politics. Rhetoric and Discourse, 42-43.

(21.) Ronald H. Carpenter, "America's Tragic Metaphor: Our Twentieth-Century Combatants as Frontiersmen," Quarterly Journal of Speech 76, no. 1 (February 1990): 11-12. Carpenter notes the popularity of westerns such as "Gunsmoke," "Wagon Train," "Have Gun, Will Travel," "The Rifleman," "Maverick," and "Bonanza" in the 1960s.

(22.) Carol Gelderman, All the President's Words (New York: Walker, 1997), 74.

(23.) Ball, Vietnam-on-the-Potomac, 125.

(24.) Hart, The Sound of Leadership, 92. Interestingly, in a broad ranking of the presidents, the only negative rating that LBJ received in the "Administration and Intergovernmental Relations" category came under "Communicating": "The president engaged in one-way communication only; engaged in unnecessary secrecy; failed to keep people informed of matters of national concern." See Charles F. Faber and Richard B. Faber, The American Presidents Ranked by Performance (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2000), 20-23.

(25.) Public Papers 1965, 398.

(26.) Zarefsky, "Lyndon Johnson," 223

(27.) Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Johnson. 1963- 1964. Book I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 8.

(28.) Michael Beschloss, ed., Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 267.

(29.) Transcript, George Ball Oral History Interview I, July 8, 1971, by Paige Mulhollan, Internet copy, LBJ Library, 8. Available from http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ Bali-G/Ball-g1.pdf.

(30.) Evidenced throughout Beschloss, ed., Taking Charge and Michael Beschloss, ed. Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 19674-1965 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).

(31.) Papers of Eric Goldman, Box 69, Folder 8, undated draft speech, 12; Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 252.

(32.) Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 99.

(33.) During the campaign, Americans believed the Democratic party was more than twice as likely as the Republican party to prevent World War III (Gallup Political Index [GPI], no. 6, November 1965 [Princeton, NJ: American Institute of Public Opinion, 1965]).

(34.) The NLF comprised Communist guerrillas fighting against the Saigon government.

(35.) Time, March 19, 1965, 32. Johnson knew this too (Beschloss, ed., Reaching for Glory, 211).

(36.) "As the controversy over gas subsided, President .Johnson sought ways to avoid similar problems in the future while preparing the American people for war" (William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam [Lawrence, KS: Library of America, 1998).

(37.) David Kaiser suggests Johnson chose war in December 1964 (David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War [Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000], 411).

(38.) Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 132. See also Eric Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 1974), 405.

(39.) U Thant, "Press Conference on Southeast Asia and Related Matters," in The Viet-Nam Reader, edited by Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), 266.

(40.) Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 124-25, 222-23. See also Rolf Steininger, "'The Americans Are in a Hopeless Position': Great Britain and the War in Vietnam," Diplomacy and Statecraft 8, no. 3 (November 1997): 238-45.

(41.) Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Joseph, 1971), 80. The phone transcript makes for hilarious good reading (Public Records Office: PREM13/692, 133-138).

(42.) John Dumbrell, "The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez," Journal of American Studies 30, no. 2 (August 1996): 215.

(43.) LBJ National Security Files, Vietnam Special Subjects 1963-1965, 11-0953-4, February 16, 1965.

(44.) Kathleen Turner, Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 123.

(45.) Johnson, Vantage Point, 95-96. He was not entirely wrong (Turner, Dual War, 117).

(46.) Logevall, Choosing War, 283-84; LBJ NSE Vietnam, 10-0369, December 31, 1964.

(47.) Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 400-24.

(48.) New York Times, April 4, 1965, 3.

(49.) Dallek, Flawed Giant, 280.

(50.) Kearns, Johnson, 252-53.

(51.) Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXI: 11. An administration memo called it Nixon's "quarantine" speech (LBJ NSE Vietnam, 11-0447, February 4, 1965).

(52.) Michael Beschloss, ed., Taking, Charge, 369.

(53.) Transcript, Bromley Smith Oral History Interview II, September 25, 1969, by Paige Mulhollan, Internet copy, LBJ Library, 2. Available from http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/ oralhistory.hom/smith-b/smith-b2.pdf.

(54.) Hans Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 18-19; Logevall, Choosing War, 298. John Burke and Fred Greenstein characterize LBJ as "a forceful president who was intolerant of disagreement" (John Burke and Fred Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 [New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989], 144). Still, David Barrett writes, "Johnson was not a victim of groupthink and he received and listened to significant advice warning him against sending troops to Vietnam" (David Barrett, "The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War," Political Science Quarterly 103, no. 4 [Winter 1988-1989]: 638).

(55.) Foreign Relations of the United States. 1964-1968: Volume II. Vietnam, January-June 1965 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 134, February 17, 1965, 311.

(56.) LBJ Cabinet Meetings, 01-0175, February 11, 1965.

(57.) Fredrik Logevall and Geoffrey Warner chastise Ball for not being more strident in his views, calling him the in-house devil's advocate (Logevall, Choosing War, 248-49; Geoffrey Warner, "The United States and Vietnam 1945-65: Part II: 1954-65," International Affairs 48, no. 4 [October 1972]: 610), but Ball maintained that such a characterization was purely Johnson's and that he truly believed escalation was wrong (George Ball Oral History Interview I, 12).

(58.) FRUS, Document 42, January 27, 1963, 96-97. Logevall, however, maintains that the three were not as important in Johnson's decision to escalate as commonly thought (Logevall, Choosing War, 145-46), while presidential secretary George Reedy suggested the advisers and LBJ misperceived each other to be more hawkish than they actually were (George Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir [New York: Andrews and McMeel, 1982], 146).

(59.) Brian Van De Mark, Into the Quagmire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 78; Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1993), 172.

(60.) David Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 161; The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), II, 459. See also Kaiser, American Tragedy, 409; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1976), 43.

(61.) Goldman, Tragedy, 408.

(62.) GPI, nos. 1-7, June-December 1965.

(63.) GPI, no. 4, September 1965.

(64.) Burke and Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality, 193.

(65.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 11-0936, February 9, 1965. The comparison to Goldwater was biting yet commonly aired. The St. Louis Globe Democrat featured an article "Barry--L.B.J.'s Military Mentor," which noted that Goldwater suggested bombing staging areas in North Vietnam, which LBJ did, then Goldwater suggested carrying the war north, which LBJ did, and then to defoliate, which LBJ did. "To find out what the administration plans to do next in Vietnam we suggest rummaging through Senator Goldwater's old speeches" (Congressional Record, 111: 6, 7201-8646, 89th Cong., 1st sess., April 7-27, 1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965], 8180). For a longer and funnier commentary, see Art Buchwald's "If Goldwater Had Won," Time, 19 March 1965. See also Logevall, Choosing War, 242.

(66.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 11-0936, February 9, 1965. Bundy notes, "The propensity of the American people to punch the Communists in the nose over Vietnam seems considerably less than it was six months ago. Americans are more willing to stand firm ... geographically closer to home [and] as long as there is no relatively large-scale shooting involved. The statistics, in general, indicate that we have an education problem that bears close watching and more work."

(67.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 11-0926, February 16, 1965.

(68.) New York Times, April 4, 1965, 3.

(69.) Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 228.

(70.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 12-0852, March 3, 1965.

(71.) FRUS, Document 183, March 6, 1965, 404; see also Document 209, March 22, 1965, 468-69.

(72.) FRUS, Document 234, April 2, 1965, 523.

(73.) Pentagon Papers, III: 275, 354. Among the noted critics are Lippmann, de Gaulle, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

(74.) Johnson, Vantage Point, 132.

(75.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 10-0466-7, January 11, 1965.

(76.) FRUS, Document 113, February 13, 1965, 253-59.

(77.) Pentagon Papers, III: 354.

(78.) William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Part III (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 167. See also LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 11-0949, February 16, 1965 and 12-0474, February 19, 1965.

(79.) LBJ Cabinet Meetings, 01-0232, March 25, 1965.

(80.) FRUS, Document 217, March 26, 1965, 485.

(81.) FRUS, Document 227, April 1, 1965, 506.

(82.) Michael Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 92; Lloyd Gardner, Pay Any Price (Chicago: I. R. Dec, 1995), 191; LBJ Library, Box 143, Folder 2, "Mr. Valenti's Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech"; Patricia Louise Parker Thompson, "Y'all Come to the Speakin': Lyndon Johnson and His Speech Writers" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas at Austin, August 1997), appendix.

(83.) LBJ, Vietnam, 13-0267, March 28, 1963.

(84.) For drafts, see LBJ NSF, 1963-I969, Reel 10; also see LBJ Library, Box 143, Folders 1-3.

(85.) Goldman, Tragedy, 407; David Kraslow and Stuart Loory, The Diplomacy of Chaos (London: Macdonald, 1968), 120-21; "Mr. Valenti's Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech."

(86.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 10-0467, January 11, 1965, and 10-0560-4 attachment.

(87.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 13-0532, March 16, 1965.

(88.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 13-0241, March 30, 1965.

(89.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 13-0339, March 23, 1965.

(90.) New York Times, March 11, 1965, 32.

(91.) Orrin Schwab, Defending the Free World (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 175-76; Gardner, Price, 187; Pentagon Papers, III: 355.

(92.) Time, April 2, 1965, 19; New York Times, March 27, 1965, 26.

(93.) Johnson, Vantage Point, 356.

(94.) Lloyd Gardner, "From the Colorado to the Mekong," in Vietnam: The Early Decisions, edited by Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 39.

(95.) Transcript, Walt W. Rostow Oral History Interview I, March 21, 1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet copy, LBJ Library, 6. Available from http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ROSTOW /rostow1.pdf.

(96.) Gardner, Price, 52-53. Goldschmidt met Johnson at Camp David the weekend before the speech (Gardner, "Colorado," 41).

(97.) Walt Rostow Oral History Interview I, 4-5.

(98.) Lady Bird Johnson, A White House Diary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 256.

(99.) Gardner, Price, 56.

(100.) LBJ Daily Diary, Reel 4, April 6-7, 1965; Turner, Dual War, 124-26; "Mr. Valenti's Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech."

(101.) Pentagon Papers, III: 355; "Mr. Valenti's Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech"; Hunt, Johnson's War, 92; Gardner, "Colorado," 43; Goldman, Tragedy, 408.

(102.) Gardner, Price, 191-92; "Mr. Valenti's Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech."

(103.) Public Papers 1965, 398.

(104.) Pentagon Papers, III: 703.

(105.) FRUS, Document 242, April 6, 1965, 539.

(106.) Pentagon Papers, III: 356.

(107.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 11-0928, February 16, 1965; GPI, nos. 1-7, June-December 1965.

(108.) LBJ Cabinet Meetings, 01-0231, March 25, 1965; Public Papers 1965, 396.

(109.) Public Papers 1965, 396.

(110.) Schwab, Free World, 179-80.

(111.) David Green, Shaping Political Consciousness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

(112.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 14-0521, April 13, 1965.

(113.) LBJ Vietnam, Media, and Public Support, 06-0091, April 9, 1965.

(114.) Schwab, Free World, 181.

(115.) LBJ, Media, 06-0092, April 15, 1965.

(116.) New York Times, April 8, 1965, l, 38; Washington Post, April 8, 1965, A1; Boston Globe, April 8, 1965, 1.

(117.) Congressional Record, 111: 6, 7747; LBJ, Media, 06-0094, April 15, 1965.

(118.) Philadelphia Enquirer, April 9, 1965, 28; Washington Post, April 8, 1965, A24; Baltimore Sun, April 8, 1965, 28; Des Moines Register, April 9, 1965, 8; Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 1965, 20; Atlanta Constitution, April 8, 1965, 4.

(119.) Dallas Morning News, April 8-9, 1965.

(120.) LBJ, Media, 06-0100, April 9, 1965. The State Department's American Opinion Summary noted that Drummond echoed the New York Times and Herald Tribune, Philadelphia Enquirer, Baltimore Sun, Hearst and Scripps-Howard papers, Washington Post and Star, Wall Street Journal, Joseph Alsop, William S. White, and others.

(121.) Congressional Record, 111: 6, 7447-8, 7492-99, 7733-90, 8411. See alsn LBJ, Media, 06-0098-9, April 10, 1965.

(122.) "Senate Bars 'Blank Check' to Johnson on Saigon Aid," New York Times, April 2, 1965; "Aid Cut Restored by Senate Group," New York Times, April 9, 1965.

(123.) LBJ, Media, 06-0080-0114, April 8, 1965 and 06-0041-53, April 14, 1965; Economist, April 10, 1965, 158.

(124.) LBJ NSF Files, 1963-1969, 03-0263-9, April 8, 1965.

(125.) LBJ, Media, 06-0062-78, April 14, 1965.

(126.) Beschloss, ed., Reaching for Glory, 272. For American misperceptions of Vietnamese attitudes toward development aid, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 174-76.

(127.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 14-0146-8, April 6, 1965.

(128.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 14-0031-5, April 9, 1965.

(129.) Pham Van Dong, "Policy Declaration," in The Viet-Nam Reader, 342-43.

(130.) Robert S. McNamara, James G. Blight, Robert K. Brigham, Thomas J. Biersteker, and Herbert Y. Schandler, Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 264, 231.

(131.) McNamara et al., Argument, 230; LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 14-0366-10, April 15, 1965.

(132.) New York Times, April 15, 1965, 32.

(133.) FRUS, Document 255, April 15, 1965, 560.

(134.) Congressional Record, 111: 6, 8124.

(135.) LBJ NSF, Vietnam, 14-0331, April 19, 1965.

(136.) Morgenthau, Vietnam, 15.

(137.) New Republic, May 22, 1965, 5-6.

(138.) Congressional Record, 111: 6, 8200. Among the many articles and letters that Morse inserted into the record was one which asked, "Doesn't the present military, economic, and political program of our rulers give one the impression we are a nation of fools governed by a bunch of imbeciles?" (8137)

(139.) U.S. Senate, "The Anti-Vietnam Agitation and the Teach-In Movement," staff-study for the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, October 22, 1965 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 225; LBJ, Media, 07-0486-91, June 23, 1965; Public Papers 1965, April 27, May 4, May 13.

(140.) Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 93-96.

(141.) Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy (New York: Norton, 1982), 147.

(142.) Dallek, Flawed Giant, 276. See also Kearns, Lyndon Johnson, 251-52; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 379.

(143.) Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon. and the Doves (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 40.

(144.) George Herring, America's Longest War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 149.

(145.) Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 368-69.

(146.) Johnson, Vantage Point, 132; Hunt, Johnson's War, 180; Gibbons, Vietnam War, 221.

(147.) J. Justin Gustainis, American Rhetoric and the Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), xv.

(148.) Burke and Greenstein, Reality, 254.

(149.) Dallek, Flawed Giant, 245.

(150.) Merle Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography (New York: Putnam, 1980), 565.

(151.) Gardner, "Colorado," 53.

(152.) Gardner, Price, xiv.

(153.) LBJ, Vietnam, 15-0043, April 21, 1965.

(154.) FRUS, Documents 266, April 21, 1965, 580, and Document 269, April 22, 1965, 599; Beschloss, ed., Reaching for Glory, 272.

(155.) Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication and Knowledge, 67.

(156.) Michael L. Geis, The Language of Politics (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987).

(157.) The phrase "We will not withdraw" raised some concerns at the State Department because "it implies a permanent military presence in southeast Asia" (LBJ Library, NSF Speech File, President's Address at Johns Hopkins, April 5, 1965 telegram to Secretary of State).

(158.) Pentagon Papers, III: 356.

(159.) McNamara et al., Argument, 265.

(160.) Kraslow and Loory, Chaos, 121; Pentagon Papers, III: 356.

(161.) Denton and Hahn, Presidential Communization, xiii.

(162.) Turner, Dual War, 131, 140-41.

(163.) Public Papers 1965, 394-99.

Dror Yuravlivker is currently teaching government/politics and history at Chigwell School, London.